本文選題：管理層持股 + 大股東持股��； 參考：《湖南大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文

【摘要】：投資、融資以及股利分配是企業(yè)財(cái)務(wù)管理三大主題。其中,投資效率會(huì)對(duì)企業(yè)發(fā)展及整體價(jià)值產(chǎn)生重大影響。因此,以企業(yè)投資支出與現(xiàn)金流的關(guān)系為切入點(diǎn),對(duì)企業(yè)非效率投資行為進(jìn)行研究一直被理論界與實(shí)務(wù)界所廣泛關(guān)注。已有的大量經(jīng)驗(yàn)研究表明,企業(yè)投資支出對(duì)現(xiàn)金流的變化具有敏感性,且這種敏感性會(huì)受到企業(yè)控制權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)的影響。而企業(yè)控制權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)最終由股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)決定,所以,在我國(guó)資本市場(chǎng)背景下,探討特殊的股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)對(duì)企業(yè)投資現(xiàn)金流敏感性的影響是十分必要的。 本文以2004-2012年間在深滬兩市發(fā)行A股的上市公司作為研究樣本,分別從管理層持股和大股東持股角度出發(fā),并結(jié)合股權(quán)性質(zhì),通過(guò)使用歐拉方程投資模型和動(dòng)態(tài)面板系統(tǒng)廣義矩估計(jì)(GMM)方法,實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)了不同類(lèi)型股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)對(duì)企業(yè)投資現(xiàn)金流敏感性的影響。研究結(jié)果表明,我國(guó)企業(yè)投資現(xiàn)金流敏感性確實(shí)存在,且符合以代理問(wèn)題為前提的投資過(guò)度假說(shuō)。其中,國(guó)有企業(yè)投資支出對(duì)現(xiàn)金流的敏感性程度更高。進(jìn)一步從股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)對(duì)企業(yè)投資現(xiàn)金流敏感性的影響看,與非國(guó)有企業(yè)相比,國(guó)有企業(yè)管理層持股的利益趨同效應(yīng)和大股東持股的監(jiān)督效應(yīng)相對(duì)較弱,而與此對(duì)應(yīng)的壕溝效應(yīng)和侵占效應(yīng)則更為明顯。此外,研究還發(fā)現(xiàn)：國(guó)有企業(yè)中還存在大股東持股的利益趨同效應(yīng),使得企業(yè)投資現(xiàn)金流敏感性在受大股東侵占效應(yīng)影響增加后又呈現(xiàn)下降趨勢(shì)。針對(duì)上述研究結(jié)論,本文為改善股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)治理效應(yīng)的發(fā)揮,提高企業(yè)投資效率和整體價(jià)值,提出了建立健全管理層內(nèi)部激勵(lì)和選拔任用機(jī)制、進(jìn)一步推進(jìn)國(guó)有資產(chǎn)管理體制改革、引入非國(guó)有資本從而發(fā)揮混合所有制優(yōu)勢(shì)的政策建議。
[Abstract]:Investment, financing and dividend distribution are the three major themes of financial management. Among them, investment efficiency will have a significant impact on enterprise development and overall value. Therefore, with the relationship between investment expenditure and cash flow as the breakthrough point, the research on the inefficient investment behavior of enterprises has been widely concerned by the theoretical and practical circles. A large number of empirical studies have shown that corporate investment expenditure is sensitive to the change of cash flow and this sensitivity is affected by the structure of corporate control. The structure of corporate control is ultimately determined by the ownership structure. Therefore, under the background of the capital market in China, it is necessary to explore the influence of the special ownership structure on the sensitivity of corporate investment cash flow. This paper takes the listed companies that issued A shares in Shenzhen and Shanghai Stock Exchange between 2004 and 2012 as the research samples, starting from the perspective of management ownership and large shareholder holding, and combining with the nature of equity. By using the Euler equation investment model and the generalized moment estimation (GMMM) method of dynamic panel system, this paper empirically examines the influence of different types of equity structure on the sensitivity of firms' investment cash flow. The results show that the sensitivity of investment cash flow in Chinese firms does exist and accords with the hypothesis of over-investment on the premise of agency problem. Among them, investment expenditure of state-owned enterprises is more sensitive to cash flow. Further more, from the perspective of the influence of ownership structure on the sensitivity of cash flow, compared with non-state-owned enterprises, the benefit convergence effect of state-owned enterprises' management ownership and the supervision effect of large shareholders' shareholding are relatively weak. The trench effect and the encroachment effect are more obvious. In addition, it is also found that there is an interest convergence effect of large shareholders' shareholding in state-owned enterprises, which makes the sensitivity of corporate investment cash flow decrease after the increase of the influence of large shareholder encroachment effect. In view of the above conclusions, in order to improve the governance effect of equity structure and improve the investment efficiency and overall value of enterprises, this paper puts forward to establish and improve the internal incentive and selection and appointment mechanism of management. To further promote the reform of the management system of state-owned assets and to introduce non-state-owned capital to give play to the advantages of mixed ownership.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：湖南大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F832.51;F275

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