本文選題：風險投資 + 內(nèi)幕交易　； 參考：《廈門大學》2014年碩士論文

【摘要】：本文研究風險投資機構(gòu)在解禁日后的減持模式及內(nèi)幕交易行為。我們首先對風險投資機構(gòu)的減持模式進行具體的分析,而后從以下三個方面來研究風險投資機構(gòu)的內(nèi)幕交易行為：首先,在盈余公告發(fā)布之前風險投資機構(gòu)會采用怎樣的減持策略?公司的信息透明度會對其行為產(chǎn)生怎樣的影響?其次,風險投資機構(gòu)減持之后的市場反應(yīng)如何?公司的信息透明度會對其產(chǎn)生怎樣的影響?從長期上看,風險投資機構(gòu)的減持是否包含與公司長期業(yè)績相關(guān)的信息?最后,風險投資機構(gòu)的減持行為會對其收益產(chǎn)生怎樣的影響? 我們采用2007年到2012年的177家風險投資機構(gòu)的投資數(shù)據(jù)與減持交易數(shù)據(jù)進行研究后發(fā)現(xiàn)：(1)風險投資機構(gòu)的減持遵循一定的模式：他們會在解禁后的頭三個月進行快速減持,而后減持速度放緩。(2)隨著監(jiān)管的不斷加強,在盈余公告之前,風險投資機構(gòu)會采用消極的減持策略,即未來公布的業(yè)績信息越好,風險投資機構(gòu)減持的股份就越多,以避免不必要的法律監(jiān)管與訴訟風險。但風險投資機構(gòu)的這一行為可以通過良好的信息披露制度加以緩解。(3)風險投資機構(gòu)的減持行為是有信息含量的。較慢的減持,即較長的持有期,預(yù)示著較高的長期業(yè)績。同時,我們也發(fā)現(xiàn)風險投資機構(gòu)進行減持時的公司的信息透明度越低,市場反應(yīng)越差。(4)減持持有期越長的風險投資機構(gòu)的退出收益也越好。 論文貢獻及主要創(chuàng)新體現(xiàn)在：我們的研究補充了現(xiàn)階段風險投資研究在二級市場退出交易方面研究的空白,本文采用具體的風險投資機構(gòu)的交易與投資數(shù)據(jù)進行研究可以更為準確的分析風險投資機構(gòu)的減持行為和收益。同時,我們的研究將公司治理與風險投資及內(nèi)幕交易聯(lián)系起來可以為后續(xù)的內(nèi)幕交易及公司治理問題的研究提供理論參考。
[Abstract]:This paper studies the reduction model and insider trading behavior of venture capital institutions in the future. First of all, we analyze the reduction model of venture capital institutions, and then study the insider trading behavior of venture capital institutions from the following three aspects: first, What kind of reduction strategy will venture capital institutions adopt before the earnings announcement is issued? How does the transparency of the company's information affect its behavior? Second, how does the market react after the VCs reduce their holdings? How will the transparency of the company's information affect it? In the long run, does the reduction of VCs contain information related to the long-term performance of the company? Finally, what effect will the reduction of venture capital institutions have on their earnings? We looked at 177 VCs from 2007 to 2012, and we found that in the first three months after lifting the ban, we found that there was a certain pattern for VCs to reduce their holdings: in the first three months after the lifting of the ban, they would reduce their holdings quickly. Then the rate of reduction slowed. (2) with the continuous strengthening of supervision, before the earnings announcement, venture capital firms would adopt a negative strategy of reducing their holdings, that is, the better the performance information published in the future, the more shares the venture capital institutions would reduce. To avoid unnecessary legal supervision and litigation risks. However, this behavior of venture capital institutions can be alleviated by a good information disclosure system. 3) the reduction behavior of venture capital institutions has information content. A slower reduction, that is, a longer holding period, foreshadowes higher long-term performance. At the same time, we also find that the lower the transparency of information, the worse the market response. The contributions and main innovations of the thesis are as follows: our research complements the gaps in the research of venture capital research in the secondary market exit trading at the present stage. In this paper, the transaction and investment data of venture capital institutions can be used to analyze the reduction behavior and income of venture capital institutions more accurately. At the same time, our research will link corporate governance with venture capital and insider trading to provide a theoretical reference for further research on insider trading and corporate governance.
【學位授予單位】：廈門大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F275;F832.51

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