本文選題：股權(quán)激勵(lì) + 績效�。� 參考：《南京信息工程大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：股權(quán)激勵(lì)制度創(chuàng)始于20世紀(jì)50年代的美國,主要的激勵(lì)原理是通過授予股權(quán)或股權(quán)替代品給特定的激勵(lì)對(duì)象如管理層和技術(shù)骨干,以達(dá)到提高激勵(lì)對(duì)象工作效率和留住人才之用。股權(quán)激勵(lì)的特點(diǎn)是激勵(lì)對(duì)象獲得的收益受到行權(quán)時(shí)股票市價(jià)的影響,股票市價(jià)越高,與授予日的價(jià)差就越大,收益也就越大。在此過程中,激勵(lì)對(duì)象勢必會(huì)努力工作,提高公司股價(jià)以獲得更多的收益,這在一定程度上就對(duì)公司績效產(chǎn)生了影響。本文就是以“股權(quán)激勵(lì)對(duì)績效的影響”作為研究主題。本文研究的是浙江正泰電器股份有限公司(以下簡稱正泰電器)2011年正式推出的股權(quán)激勵(lì)計(jì)劃在實(shí)施階段對(duì)績效的影響。以案例研究方法為主,結(jié)合股權(quán)激勵(lì)的相關(guān)理論和對(duì)績效評(píng)價(jià)的方法,對(duì)正泰電器此次的股權(quán)激勵(lì)效果做出具體的研究和評(píng)價(jià)。在評(píng)價(jià)績效時(shí),本文使用事件研究法通過計(jì)算在股權(quán)激勵(lì)計(jì)劃草案發(fā)布日前后的異常報(bào)酬率(AR)和累計(jì)異常報(bào)酬率(CAR)反映此事件對(duì)公司的財(cái)富效應(yīng)和短期績效;使用財(cái)務(wù)指標(biāo)分析法通過盈利、償債、運(yùn)營、成長四個(gè)能力11個(gè)財(cái)務(wù)指標(biāo)從縱向?qū)Ρ裙蓹?quán)激勵(lì)實(shí)施前和實(shí)施后的財(cái)務(wù)績效變化情況;使用功效系數(shù)法以正泰電器所處行業(yè)的年平均值為標(biāo)準(zhǔn)值,選擇三家對(duì)照企業(yè)從未實(shí)施股權(quán)激勵(lì)期、等待期和行權(quán)期三個(gè)不同的時(shí)期進(jìn)行打分并排出名次,以橫向的角度來評(píng)價(jià)股權(quán)激勵(lì)給正泰帶來的變化;最后,由于股權(quán)激勵(lì)的目的之一是吸引人才,本文在績效分析的最后對(duì)正泰電器實(shí)施股權(quán)激勵(lì)前后的員工學(xué)歷結(jié)構(gòu)進(jìn)行分析,并以研發(fā)費(fèi)用的變化情況加以輔證,對(duì)其是否吸引了人才、是否提高了研發(fā)能力做出了評(píng)價(jià)。通過分析得出了以下結(jié)論:正泰電器股權(quán)激勵(lì)總體來說是成功的,但是存在持續(xù)性不足的缺點(diǎn),在行權(quán)后期對(duì)績效的提升作用不強(qiáng)。在事件研究法中得出草案發(fā)布當(dāng)日異常報(bào)酬率顯著提高,資本市場對(duì)股權(quán)激勵(lì)持歡迎態(tài)度,形成短期財(cái)富效應(yīng);財(cái)務(wù)指標(biāo)和功效系數(shù)法都顯示出股權(quán)激勵(lì)之后對(duì)長期財(cái)務(wù)績效的提升作用,但是行權(quán)后期績效有下降趨勢,特別是營業(yè)收入有所減少,成長能力受到影響;在本文的最后,結(jié)合股權(quán)激勵(lì)的各要素做出了綜合的評(píng)價(jià),并提出了可行性建議。本文的主要貢獻(xiàn)是從多個(gè)角度客觀評(píng)價(jià)了正泰電器股權(quán)激勵(lì)對(duì)其公司績效的影響,并結(jié)合股權(quán)激勵(lì)的各因素做出了評(píng)價(jià)和建議,為正泰電器未來開展第二次股權(quán)激勵(lì)提供參考和借鑒價(jià)值,也有助于我國民營企業(yè)更加合理的運(yùn)用股權(quán)激勵(lì)提高公司績效。
[Abstract]:Equity incentive system was founded in the 1950s in the United States, the main incentive principle is to grant equity or equity alternatives to specific incentive objects such as management and technical backbone. In order to improve the work efficiency of incentive objects and retain talent. The characteristic of equity incentive is that the income obtained by the incentive object is influenced by the stock market price when the right is exercised. The higher the stock market price is, the bigger the difference between the price and the grant date is, and the bigger the return is. In this process, the incentive object will work hard to raise the company's stock price in order to obtain more income, which to some extent has an impact on the company's performance. This paper focuses on the impact of equity incentive on performance. This paper studies the impact of the equity incentive plan of Zhejiang Zhengtai Electric Co., Ltd (hereinafter referred to as Zhengtai Electric Co., Ltd.) on performance in the implementation stage in 2011. Based on the case study method, combined with the relevant theory of equity incentive and the method of performance evaluation, this paper makes a concrete research and evaluation on the effect of equity incentive of Zhengtai Electric. In evaluating performance, this paper uses the event study method to reflect the wealth effect and short-term performance of the company by calculating the abnormal rate of return (ARR) and cumulative abnormal rate of return (CAR) before and after the issuance of the draft equity incentive plan. The financial performance changes before and after the implementation of equity incentive are compared vertically by using the financial index analysis method through the four financial indicators of profitability, debt service, operation and growth. By using the efficiency coefficient method, using the annual average value of the industry in which Zhengtai Electric Appliance is located as standard value, the three control enterprises are selected to score and rank in three different periods, that is, the equity incentive period, the waiting period and the exercise period. Finally, because one of the purposes of equity incentive is to attract talents, this paper analyzes the educational structure of the employees before and after the equity incentive in the end of the performance analysis. With the change of R & D expenditure, the author evaluates whether it attracts talents and improves R & D ability. Through the analysis of the following conclusions: Zhengtai Electric equity incentive is generally successful, but there are shortcomings of sustainability, in the later stage of the exercise of power on the performance of the promotion role is not strong. In the event study method, it is concluded that the abnormal rate of return on the date of release of the draft has been significantly increased, and the capital market is welcoming the equity incentive, forming a short-term wealth effect. Financial indicators and efficiency coefficient method both show the effect of equity incentive on long-term financial performance, but the performance of the later period of exercise has a downward trend, especially the decrease of operating income, the growth ability is affected; at the end of this paper, Combined with various elements of equity incentive to make a comprehensive evaluation, and put forward feasibility suggestions. The main contribution of this paper is to objectively evaluate the impact of the equity incentive on the performance of the company from a number of angles, and combined with the various factors of equity incentive to make an evaluation and suggestions. It can provide reference and reference value for Zhengtai Electric to carry out the second equity incentive in the future, and also help private enterprises to use equity incentive more reasonably to improve the performance of the company.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：南京信息工程大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：F426.6;F832.51;F406.7

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