本文選題：相近持股比 + 公司績效�。� 參考：《安徽財經(jīng)大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文

【摘要】：基于現(xiàn)代公司制企業(yè)特征的委托代理理論認(rèn)為,提高公司績效我們首先需要解決兩個問題：一是委托人(股東)與代理人(經(jīng)理人員)兩者間的沖突；二是大股東與中小股東之間的利益沖突。這兩類代理問題是分析股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)和公司績效之間關(guān)系的理論基礎(chǔ)。為了解決上述兩類代理問題,我們需要采取一定的激勵和約束價值,使得上市公司的股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)達(dá)到最優(yōu),從而提高上市公司的績效水平。股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)包括高度集中型、相對集中型、相近持股型和完全分散型,其中相近持股型公司主要解決的便是在股東股權(quán)比例相近的情況下存在的兩類委托代理沖突。但是就相近持股比與公司績效相關(guān)性這方面的研究,已有文獻(xiàn)沒有達(dá)成一致結(jié)論,因此,深入研究兩者者之間的關(guān)系,具有一定的理論現(xiàn)實意義。本文正是從相近持股比對公司績效的影響進(jìn)行理論和實證分析,并在文章的最后得到了一定的結(jié)論及啟示。 因為我國國情的特殊性,大部分上市公司是國有企業(yè)通過改制而來的,這樣就會導(dǎo)致一股獨大等現(xiàn)象的存在,而對上市公司的業(yè)績水平產(chǎn)生負(fù)面影響。本文的研究目的便是通過分析相近持股比式股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)對公司績效的影響,使得達(dá)到一個有利的股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)狀態(tài),能夠有效地解決兩類委托代理問題,實現(xiàn)公司績效最大化。本文通過一定的理論分析,并在文章的后半部分通過因子分析、回歸分析、t檢驗,最終得出以下結(jié)論：(1)相近持股比公司中,外部大股東與控股股東形成控制聯(lián)盟,控制權(quán)私利水平將會高于高度集中型公司,而不利于公司績效水平的提高。同時,伴隨股權(quán)制衡度的增長,控制權(quán)私利水平也得到相應(yīng)的增加；(2)相近持股比公司中,民營控股公司控制權(quán)私利水平高于國有控股公司,民營控股公司的大股東比國有控股公司大股東更有能力形成控制聯(lián)盟,進(jìn)而來侵占中小股東的利益；(3)公司績效和股權(quán)制衡度呈倒U型關(guān)系,即適當(dāng)?shù)墓蓹?quán)制衡程度有利于使得公司績效達(dá)到最大化。 本文共有五個章節(jié),各章節(jié)的劃分是按照以下結(jié)構(gòu)研究的。第一章引言,主要講述本選題的選題背景、選題意義,然后寫的是國內(nèi)外文獻(xiàn)綜述,通過對國內(nèi)外文獻(xiàn)的學(xué)習(xí)闡述造成學(xué)者們研究結(jié)論沒有達(dá)成一致的原因,并在此基礎(chǔ)上提出問題,在本章的最后提出的本文的框架以及研究方法。第二章是相近持股比與公司績效的相關(guān)概念界定及基本理論,主要介紹了相關(guān)概念以及它們的度量指標(biāo)和理論依據(jù)與基本理論研究。第三章寫的是相近持股比與公司績效的政策沿革、作用機(jī)理分析與研究假說。第四章是實證分析,介紹了數(shù)據(jù)的來源、指標(biāo)的選取、實證結(jié)果與分析,文中通過因子分析、描述性統(tǒng)計以及回歸分析的方法對上一章的研究假說進(jìn)行了檢驗,并對實證結(jié)果進(jìn)行了分析。第五章是研究結(jié)論與啟示,系統(tǒng)的概括了本文的研究結(jié)果并在此基礎(chǔ)上得到了一定啟示。
[Abstract]:The principal-agent theory based on the characteristics of modern corporate enterprises holds that to improve corporate performance we need to solve two problems: one is the conflict between the principal (shareholder) and the agent (manager); The second is the conflict of interest between major shareholders and minority shareholders. These two kinds of agency problems are the theoretical basis of analyzing the relationship between ownership structure and corporate performance. In order to solve the above two kinds of agency problems, we need to take some incentive and constraint value to make the ownership structure of listed companies optimal, thus improve the performance level of listed companies. The ownership structure includes high concentration, relative centralization, close shareholding and complete dispersion, in which the two kinds of principal-agent conflicts exist in the case of similar shareholders' equity ratio are mainly solved by similar shareholding companies. However, there is no consensus conclusion on the correlation between similar shareholding ratio and corporate performance. Therefore, it is of theoretical and practical significance to study the relationship between them. This paper makes a theoretical and empirical analysis on the influence of similar shareholding ratio on corporate performance, and at the end of this paper, it draws some conclusions and enlightenments. Because of the particularity of China's national conditions, most of the listed companies come from the state-owned enterprises through restructuring, which will lead to the existence of a dominant phenomenon, which has a negative impact on the performance level of listed companies. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the influence of the similar shareholding ratio on corporate performance, so as to achieve a favorable ownership structure state, which can effectively solve two kinds of principal-agent problems and realize the maximization of corporate performance. In this paper, through a certain theoretical analysis, and in the second half of the article through factor analysis, regression analysis and t test, it is concluded that: 1) in the company with similar shareholding ratio, the outside major shareholder and the controlling shareholder form the control alliance. The level of self-interest of control will be higher than that of high-centralized company, which is not conducive to the improvement of corporate performance. At the same time, with the increase of the degree of equity balance, the level of private interest of control right is also increased accordingly.) among the similar shareholding companies, the private holding company has a higher level of control private interest than the state-owned holding company. The large shareholders of the private holding company have more ability to form the control alliance than the majority shareholders of the state-owned holding company, thus encroaching on the interests of the minority shareholders. (3) the performance of the company and the degree of equity checks and balances are inversely U-shaped. That is, the appropriate degree of equity balance is conducive to maximize corporate performance. This article has five chapters, each chapter divides according to the following structure research. The first chapter introduces the background of the topic, the significance of the topic, and then the literature review at home and abroad, through the study of domestic and foreign literature, scholars do not reach a consensus on the reasons for the conclusion. On the basis of this, the framework and research methods of this paper are put forward at the end of this chapter. The second chapter is the definition and basic theory of the similar shareholding ratio and corporate performance, mainly introduces the related concepts and their metrics, theoretical basis and basic theoretical research. The third chapter is about the policy evolution, mechanism analysis and research hypothesis of similar shareholding ratio and corporate performance. Chapter four is empirical analysis, which introduces the source of data, the selection of indicators, the empirical results and analysis, and tests the hypotheses in the previous chapter by factor analysis, descriptive statistics and regression analysis. The empirical results are analyzed. The fifth chapter is the research conclusion and enlightenment, systematically summarizes the research results of this paper and gets some enlightenment.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：安徽財經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F832.51;F275

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本文編號：1810792