發(fā)布時(shí)間：2018-04-14 21:26

  本文選題：股權(quán)激勵(lì) + 盈余管理��； 參考：《江西財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文

【摘要】：股權(quán)激勵(lì)制度在近年來被廣泛地應(yīng)用于各國(guó)的企業(yè)管理當(dāng)中。在西方國(guó)家,股權(quán)激勵(lì)在降低代理成本、改進(jìn)公司治理、增強(qiáng)員工工作積極性等方面所起到的作用已受到了廣泛認(rèn)可。中國(guó)證監(jiān)會(huì)在2005年底發(fā)布了《上市公司股權(quán)激勵(lì)管理辦法》,標(biāo)志著股權(quán)激勵(lì)機(jī)制在國(guó)內(nèi)正式建立,相對(duì)于西方發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家而言有所滯后,但從長(zhǎng)遠(yuǎn)來看也是大勢(shì)所趨。上市公司引入股權(quán)激勵(lì)后,會(huì)給高管行為、經(jīng)營(yíng)績(jī)效帶來怎樣的變化,這些問題逐漸成為理論研究的熱點(diǎn),尤其是股權(quán)激勵(lì)對(duì)于盈余管理行為的影響。盈余管理的產(chǎn)生可能基于多種動(dòng)因,例如報(bào)酬契約、債務(wù)契約、政治成本、資本市場(chǎng)等方面。股權(quán)激勵(lì)究其本質(zhì)來講是一種薪酬合約,只有達(dá)到合約條件方能真正實(shí)現(xiàn)報(bào)酬,且股權(quán)激勵(lì)報(bào)酬的最終結(jié)果通常與公司的經(jīng)營(yíng)業(yè)績(jī)和財(cái)務(wù)狀況密切相關(guān)�；诠蓹�(quán)激勵(lì)的安排,公司管理層調(diào)整企業(yè)對(duì)外披露的業(yè)績(jī),以獲得激勵(lì)收益,這種可能性在理論上是存在的。但換個(gè)思路,實(shí)施股權(quán)激勵(lì)的上市公司也有可能因?yàn)榇沓杀镜慕档?公司治理的改善,信息披露的加強(qiáng),而使得管理層更加關(guān)注公司的長(zhǎng)期發(fā)展,減少(至少是在短期中減少)盈余管理。 本文結(jié)合我國(guó)A股上市公司的數(shù)據(jù),進(jìn)行理論和實(shí)證分析,探討管理層基于獲得股權(quán)激勵(lì)收益動(dòng)機(jī)的盈余管理行為。首先評(píng)述國(guó)內(nèi)外有關(guān)股權(quán)激勵(lì)和盈余管理的研究文獻(xiàn),闡述本文的寫作動(dòng)機(jī)、研究思路、可能的創(chuàng)新點(diǎn)與不足之處。然后以2006-2012年底國(guó)內(nèi)正式提出了股權(quán)激勵(lì)計(jì)劃的上市公司為樣本,從制度規(guī)范、激勵(lì)進(jìn)度和激勵(lì)契約特征等方面,描述了我國(guó)股權(quán)激勵(lì)的實(shí)施情況,概括了我國(guó)上市公司盈余管理的總體特點(diǎn)和實(shí)施手段,并采用修正的截面Jones模型對(duì)我國(guó)近年來上市公司的盈余管理進(jìn)行了量化分析。在理論分析部分,簡(jiǎn)要闡述了股權(quán)激勵(lì)、盈余管理的概念和相關(guān)理論,給出了股權(quán)激勵(lì)影響盈余管理的理論邏輯。在實(shí)證分析部分,本文提出了三條研究假設(shè),先后采用單樣本T檢驗(yàn)法、配對(duì)樣本研究法和多元線性回歸方法進(jìn)行了實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)。本文的研究結(jié)論如下： (1)在股權(quán)激勵(lì)計(jì)劃公告之前,上市公司存在下調(diào)會(huì)計(jì)盈余的行為,而在公告日以后則傾向于上調(diào)會(huì)計(jì)盈余。 (2)推出股權(quán)激勵(lì)計(jì)劃反而加劇盈余管理。從盈余管理的視角來看,上市公司股權(quán)激勵(lì)計(jì)劃在一定程度上成為高管的“福利”。 基于上述研究結(jié)果,本文提出了相應(yīng)的政策建議。
[Abstract]:In recent years, equity incentive system has been widely used in the management of enterprises in various countries.In western countries, the role of equity incentive in reducing agency costs, improving corporate governance and enhancing staff enthusiasm has been widely recognized.China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) issued the "measures for Stock incentive Management of listed companies" at the end of 2005, which marks the formal establishment of equity incentive mechanism in China, which lags behind that of western developed countries, but it is also the trend of the times in the long run.After the introduction of equity incentives, the listed companies will give executives behavior, business performance changes, these issues have gradually become a hot topic of theoretical research, especially the impact of equity incentives on earnings management behavior.Earnings management may be based on a variety of motivations, such as compensation contracts, debt contracts, political costs, capital markets, and so on.Equity incentive is essentially a kind of compensation contract, and the final result of equity incentive reward is usually closely related to the company's operating performance and financial situation.Based on the arrangement of equity incentive, it is possible for the management to adjust the performance of the company to obtain the incentive income.But in another way, listed companies that implement equity incentives may also pay more attention to the long-term development of the company because of lower agency costs, improved corporate governance, and enhanced information disclosure.Reduce (at least in the short term) earnings management.Based on the data of A-share listed companies in China, this paper makes theoretical and empirical analysis to discuss the earnings management behavior of management based on the motivation of obtaining equity incentives.First of all, it reviews the domestic and foreign research literature on equity incentive and earnings management, expounds the writing motivation, research ideas, possible innovation points and shortcomings.Then, taking the listed companies that formally put forward the equity incentive plan at the end of 2006-2012 as the sample, this paper describes the implementation of the equity incentive in China from the aspects of system specification, incentive progress and incentive contract characteristics.This paper summarizes the general characteristics and implementation methods of earnings management of listed companies in China, and makes a quantitative analysis of earnings management of listed companies in China in recent years by using the modified cross-section Jones model.In the part of theoretical analysis, the concepts of equity incentive, earnings management and related theories are briefly described, and the theoretical logic of the influence of equity incentive on earnings management is given.In the part of empirical analysis, this paper puts forward three research hypotheses, then uses single sample T test method, paired sample study method and multivariate linear regression method to carry out empirical test.The conclusions of this paper are as follows:1) before the announcement of the equity incentive plan, the listed companies have the behavior of reducing the accounting surplus, but after the announcement day, they tend to raise the accounting surplus.Introduction of equity incentive plan only exacerbates earnings management.From the perspective of earnings management, the equity incentive plan of listed companies has to some extent become the "welfare" of executives.Based on the above research results, this paper puts forward the corresponding policy recommendations.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：江西財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號(hào)】：F832.51;F275;F272.92

【共引文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)博士學(xué)位論文 前4條

1 李雪斌;股權(quán)激勵(lì)機(jī)理研究[D];財(cái)政部財(cái)政科學(xué)研究所;2013年

2 馮星;中國(guó)上市公司股權(quán)激勵(lì)研究[D];廈門大學(xué);2014年

3 王莉;高管薪酬公平對(duì)公司績(jī)效的影響研究[D];山東大學(xué);2014年

4 黃莉;澄清公告異象、治理失靈與信任危機(jī)[D];西南財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué);2014年

相關(guān)碩士學(xué)位論文 前10條

1 方麗芳;上市公司股權(quán)激勵(lì)對(duì)公司業(yè)績(jī)影響研究[D];浙江理工大學(xué);2013年

2 萬t，

本文編號(hào)：1751073