本文選題：盈余管理 + 高管貨幣薪酬　； 參考：《天津財經(jīng)大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文

【摘要】：現(xiàn)代的高管薪酬激勵機(jī)制既包括短期激勵也包括長期激勵,兩種激勵方式的結(jié)合被認(rèn)為是緩解委托代理沖突的有效舉措。一方面,由于高管薪酬通常與企業(yè)盈余有著非常緊密的聯(lián)系,高管有動機(jī)通過盈余管理調(diào)整盈余,以實現(xiàn)自身利益的最大化,因此盈余管理和高管薪酬之間的關(guān)系是論文研究的問題之一；另一方面,高管薪酬機(jī)制能否有效地提升企業(yè)價值和高管進(jìn)行盈余管理能否提升企業(yè)價值也是論文研究的兩個問題。為了探討這些問題,論文首先在對盈余管理、高管薪酬與企業(yè)價值關(guān)系進(jìn)行充分理論分析的基礎(chǔ)上提出了假設(shè)。之后篩選了2010-2012年間滬深兩市A股385家制造業(yè)企業(yè)作為論文的研究樣本。論文采用前三名高管貨幣薪酬總額均值的自然對數(shù)作為高管貨幣薪酬的代理變量；采用高管平均持股比例作為高管股權(quán)激勵的代理變量；采用以修正的橫截面Jones模型計算出的可操縱性應(yīng)計利潤的絕對值作為盈余管理程度的代理變量；采取托賓Q作為企業(yè)價值的代理變量。通過構(gòu)建5個線性回歸模型,采用0LS回歸分析的方法對盈余管理、高管薪酬與企業(yè)價值關(guān)系進(jìn)行實證研究,并且提出了相關(guān)的政策與建議。研究結(jié)果發(fā)現(xiàn)：高管貨幣薪酬與盈余管理程度顯著正相關(guān)；高管股權(quán)激勵與盈余管理程度的正相關(guān)關(guān)系并不顯著；高管貨幣薪酬與企業(yè)價值之間呈現(xiàn)倒U型關(guān)系,即隨著高管貨幣薪酬的增加,企業(yè)價值先升高再降低；高管股權(quán)激勵與企業(yè)價值之間呈現(xiàn)倒U型關(guān)系,即隨著高管持股比例的增大,企業(yè)價值先升高再降低；盈余管理的程度(EM)與企業(yè)價值(TQ)之間呈現(xiàn)倒U型關(guān)系,即隨著盈余管理程度的增加,企業(yè)價值先升高再降低。最后將盈余管理、高管薪酬與企業(yè)價值納入到統(tǒng)一的框架里,尋找最優(yōu)的盈余管理程度和最優(yōu)的高管薪酬水平使企業(yè)價值達(dá)到最大。
[Abstract]:The modern executive compensation incentive mechanism includes both short-term incentives including long-term incentive, combining two kinds of incentive methods are considered to be effective measures to alleviate agency conflicts. On the one hand, because the executive compensation usually has a very close relationship with earnings, executives have motivation through earnings management to adjust earnings to maximize their own interests. Therefore, the relationship between earnings management and executive compensation is one of the main research questions; on the other hand, executive compensation mechanism can effectively promote the enterprise value and executives two earnings management can enhance the enterprise value is the research in this paper. In order to investigate these questions, firstly, on earnings management, based on the full theory analysis of the relationship between executive compensation and corporate value is put forward. After 2010-2012 years of screening that Shanghai and Shenzhen two A shares 385 manufacturing enterprises Industry as the research sample of this thesis. Using the natural logarithm of the top three executives total compensation money mean as a proxy for executive monetary compensation; proxy with executives of the average stake as executive equity incentive; using modified cross-section Jones model to calculate the discretionary accruals as a proxy for the absolute value the extent of earnings management; take Tobin Q as a proxy for the value of the enterprise. Through the construction of 5 linear regression model, management method by 0LS regression analysis on earnings, makes an empirical study on the relationship between executive compensation and corporate value, and put forward policies and proposals. The results showed that: significant positive correlation of executive monetary compensation and earnings management level; positive correlation between executive equity incentive and earnings management is not significant; between executive monetary compensation and corporate value Inverted U type relation, namely with the increase of executive monetary compensation, the enterprise value increased first and then decreased; inverted U relationship between executive equity incentive and corporate value, namely with the increase of the proportion of managerial ownership, corporate value first increased and then decreased; the degree of earnings management (EM) and enterprise value (TQ) between inverted U type relation, namely with the increase of the degree of earnings management, the enterprise value increased first and then decreased. Finally, earnings management, executive compensation and corporate value into a unified framework, to find the optimal degree of earnings management and the optimal high tube salary level to enable enterprises to maximize the value.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：天津財經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F275;F832.51

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