本文選題：管理層盈余預(yù)告 + 擇時(shí)披露��； 參考：《會計(jì)研究》2017年02期

【摘要】：盈余預(yù)告研究一直是學(xué)者們關(guān)注的重點(diǎn)領(lǐng)域,其披露規(guī)律也是學(xué)術(shù)界重要謎團(tuán)之一。本文提出影響盈余預(yù)告披露的新機(jī)制——股市的波動性,并借此為特有的研究場景來觀測管理層擇時(shí)披露行為。本文以2003-2015年管理層盈余預(yù)告披露的上市公司為樣本,實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)上市公司管理層是否會利用股票市場的高頻波動來選擇盈余預(yù)告信息披露的時(shí)機(jī)及該策略的實(shí)施效果。研究發(fā)現(xiàn):公司管理層盈余預(yù)告披露決策會隱性觀察市場的波動態(tài)勢及其幅度,基于披露法定的時(shí)滯裁量空間,利用短期市場行情波動性選擇較優(yōu)的披露時(shí)機(jī)。具體體現(xiàn)在管理層傾向選擇市場行情上升期披露更多壞消息,在市場行情下降期披露更多好消息;與不使用該策略的公司相比,使用該策略的公司能獲得更好市場反應(yīng)。
[Abstract]:The research of earnings forecasting has been a focus area of scholars, and its disclosure law is also one of the important puzzles in academia.This paper proposes a new mechanism to influence earnings disclosure, which is the volatility of stock market, which is a special research scene to observe the behavior of management timing disclosure.Based on the sample of listed companies with earnings disclosure in 2003-2015, this paper empirically tests whether the management of listed companies will make use of the high frequency fluctuation of stock market to choose the timing of earnings announcement and the effect of the strategy.It is found that the decision of earnings disclosure will implicitly observe the volatility of the market and its amplitude. Based on the statutory time-delay discretion space of disclosure, the short-term market volatility can be used to select a better disclosure opportunity.This is reflected in the tendency of management to disclose more bad news in the upward market and more good news in the downturn; companies that use the strategy have a better market response than companies that do not use the strategy.
【作者單位】： 河海大學(xué)商學(xué)院;
【基金】：中央高�；究蒲袠I(yè)務(wù)費(fèi)項(xiàng)目“基于股票市場波動的上市公司盈余預(yù)告披露行為研究”(2015B13214)階段性成果
【分類號】：F275;F832.51

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