本文選題：創(chuàng)業(yè)板　切入點：高管離職　出處：《安徽工業(yè)大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文

【摘要】：本文研究的是我國創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司高管發(fā)生離職行為的深層次原因，分析企業(yè)業(yè)績與減持套現(xiàn)這兩個因素是否為其主要影響因素；對于持股高管而言，兩者對高管離職行為有何不同影響。數(shù)據(jù)樣本為我國創(chuàng)業(yè)板開板之日到2010年底的所有上市公司。結(jié)合我國現(xiàn)狀，本文將根據(jù)高管是否持股這一變量對樣本進行分組研究，分析在高管是否持股的情況下高管離職行為的影響因素是否會有所不同。通過建立Logistic回歸模型檢驗高管離職與業(yè)績的相關(guān)性，結(jié)論表明對于未持股高管離職的公司而言，，公司業(yè)績與高管離職行為顯著負相關(guān)；而對于持股高管離職的公司而言，結(jié)論相反。為了研究持股高管的減持動機與離職行為二者的關(guān)系，本文創(chuàng)新性的引入高管持股市值與薪酬之比這一中間變量，通過Logistic回歸模型檢驗高管持股市值/薪酬這一變量與高管離職行為的相關(guān)性，檢驗結(jié)果為二者顯著正相關(guān)；再進一步對持股離職高管在鎖定期過后的減持套現(xiàn)行為進行研究，結(jié)論證明持股市值/薪酬與減持套現(xiàn)行為正相關(guān)性，從而驗證了持股高管的離職行為與減持套現(xiàn)因素之間的正相關(guān)性，說明了減持套現(xiàn)因素對持股高管離職的影響。最后，本文論證了對于持股離職高管而言，當(dāng)高管持股市值與薪酬之比較大時，減持套現(xiàn)動機強于經(jīng)營業(yè)績對高管離職的影響。本文的創(chuàng)新點之一在于對創(chuàng)業(yè)板高管的離職行為按照是否持股進行劃分兩種情形研究，創(chuàng)新點之二在于引入高管持股市值與薪酬之比這一變量，通過這一變量間接驗證持股高管離職行為與減持套現(xiàn)行為的相關(guān)性。本文采用對比當(dāng)年年報和上年年報中披露的高管名單的方法來確認高管是否離職，通過研究發(fā)現(xiàn)我國創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司通過換屆離任、任期屆滿離任的高管占比較大，這些高管很有可能通過換屆離任來掩飾其離職的意圖，應(yīng)當(dāng)引起公眾的重視。
[Abstract]:This paper studies the deep-seated causes of the turnover of senior executives in China's gem listed companies, and analyzes whether the two factors, corporate performance and reduction of cash, are the main influencing factors.What is the difference between the two on executive turnover behavior.The data sample is all listed companies from the date of gem opening to the end of 2010.According to the current situation of our country, this paper will group the sample according to the variable of whether the executive shares the stock, and analyze whether the influencing factors of the executive turnover behavior will be different under the condition of whether the senior executive holds the stock right or not.By establishing the Logistic regression model to test the correlation between executive turnover and performance, the conclusion shows that the company performance is significantly negative correlation with executive turnover behavior for the company with no stock ownership, while for the company with stock ownership, the conclusion shows that the performance of the company is negatively correlated with the turnover behavior of the executive.The conclusion is opposite.In order to study the relationship between the motivation of stock holding reduction and turnover behavior, this paper innovatively introduces the middle variable of the ratio of executive shareholding market value and compensation.Through the Logistic regression model to test the relationship between executive stock holding market value / compensation and executive turnover behavior, the test results show that the two variables are significantly positive correlation.The conclusion proves that there is a positive correlation between the stock holding market value / salary and the behavior of reducing the holding of cash, which verifies the positive correlation between the turnover behavior of the stock holding executives and the factors of reducing the holdings of cash, and explains the influence of the factor of reducing the holdings of cash on the turnover of the stock holding executives.Finally, this paper demonstrates that when the executive stock holding market value and salary are relatively large, the incentive to reduce their holdings is stronger than the impact of operating performance on the turnover of senior executives.One of the innovations of this paper is to divide the turnover behavior of gem executives into two situations according to whether they hold shares, and the other is to introduce the variable of the ratio of executive shareholding market value and compensation.This variable indirectly verifies the correlation between stock holding executives' turnover behavior and the behavior of reducing their holdings.This paper uses the method of comparing the list of executives disclosed in the current annual report and the annual report of last year to confirm whether the senior executives quit their jobs.These executives are likely to disguise their intention by leaving their jobs, and should be taken seriously.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：安徽工業(yè)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F272.92;F832.51

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