本文選題：審計(jì)師受罰　切入點(diǎn)：聲譽(yù)受損　出處：《當(dāng)代財(cái)經(jīng)》2017年07期

【摘要】：以2000—2014年簽字審計(jì)師受罰為切入點(diǎn),系統(tǒng)檢驗(yàn)了審計(jì)師個(gè)人聲譽(yù)受損在客戶公司債務(wù)融資活動(dòng)中的信號(hào)價(jià)值。研究發(fā)現(xiàn):審計(jì)師個(gè)人聲譽(yù)受損會(huì)導(dǎo)致客戶公司債務(wù)融資成本提高,而且這一聲譽(yù)效應(yīng)在民營(yíng)企業(yè)融資中更加顯著,這驗(yàn)證了審計(jì)師聲譽(yù)機(jī)制在中國(guó)證券市場(chǎng)具有治理價(jià)值;進(jìn)一步研究發(fā)現(xiàn),審計(jì)師聲譽(yù)效應(yīng)伴隨著審計(jì)師受罰嚴(yán)厲程度的增加而增強(qiáng),但大型事務(wù)所的質(zhì)量控制機(jī)制能夠在一定程度上緩解審計(jì)師個(gè)人聲譽(yù)受損的負(fù)面影響。
[Abstract]:Based on the punishment of signed auditor from 2000 to 2014, this paper systematically examines the signalling value of auditor's personal reputation damage in client company's debt financing activities.It is found that the damage of auditors' personal reputation will lead to higher cost of debt financing of client companies, and this reputation effect is more significant in the financing of private enterprises, which verifies that auditor reputation mechanism has governance value in China's securities market.Further research shows that the auditor reputation effect increases with the severity of auditors' punishment, but the quality control mechanism of large firms can alleviate the negative impact of auditors' personal reputation damage to some extent.
【作者單位】： 江西財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)會(huì)計(jì)發(fā)展研究中心;
【基金】：國(guó)家自然科學(xué)基金項(xiàng)目“會(huì)計(jì)師事務(wù)所合并、智力資本與審計(jì)質(zhì)量”(71362008) 江西省高校人文社會(huì)科學(xué)規(guī)劃項(xiàng)目“進(jìn)入權(quán)機(jī)制、事務(wù)所規(guī)模與審計(jì)質(zhì)量”(GL1518)
【分類號(hào)】：F239.4;F275;F832.51
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本文編號(hào)：1704607