本文選題：CFO　切入點(diǎn)：內(nèi)部董事　出處：《內(nèi)蒙古大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：CFO制度作為公司治理的重要組成部分,受到學(xué)者們的廣泛關(guān)注。先前研究表明,董事會(huì)監(jiān)督職能較差、公司治理水平較低的情況下,大股東、管理層等利益相關(guān)者傾向于持有較高的現(xiàn)金來(lái)滿足自身利益,侵害股東利益,CFO往往會(huì)被迫執(zhí)行過(guò)高的現(xiàn)金持有政策。委托代理理論認(rèn)為CFO兼任內(nèi)部董事?lián)p害了董事會(huì)的獨(dú)立性,不利于董事會(huì)發(fā)揮有效的監(jiān)督職能。而友好董事會(huì)理論認(rèn)為CFO兼任內(nèi)部董事可以提高其在公司治理中的地位,擺脫CEO等利益相關(guān)者的綁架,能夠更好地發(fā)揮戰(zhàn)略決策與監(jiān)督職能,同時(shí)緩解了董事會(huì)的信息不對(duì)稱問(wèn)題,有利于促進(jìn)董事會(huì)職能的發(fā)揮,提高公司治理效率。本文在此理論基礎(chǔ)上探究了 CFO內(nèi)部董事對(duì)企業(yè)現(xiàn)金持有水平的影響,同時(shí)研究了股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)、所有權(quán)性質(zhì)、機(jī)構(gòu)持股對(duì)二者關(guān)系的影響。本文以2003-2015年中國(guó)A股非金融類上市公司的高管數(shù)據(jù)與財(cái)務(wù)數(shù)據(jù)為樣本,運(yùn)用實(shí)證研究的方法探究了 CFO兼任內(nèi)部董事與企業(yè)現(xiàn)金持有水平的相關(guān)性關(guān)系,研究結(jié)果表明CFO兼任內(nèi)部董事可以顯著降低企業(yè)的現(xiàn)金持有量,穩(wěn)健性檢驗(yàn)中利用了傾向得分匹配法(PSM)緩解了內(nèi)生性影響,同時(shí)利用PSM-DID進(jìn)行了變化效應(yīng)分析,即在PSM配對(duì)樣本的基礎(chǔ)上進(jìn)行雙重差分分析(DID),最終進(jìn)一步證實(shí)了本文的研究結(jié)果,也證明基本回歸的研究結(jié)論具備穩(wěn)健性。同時(shí)用超額現(xiàn)金持有量來(lái)衡量企業(yè)的最佳現(xiàn)金持有水平,發(fā)現(xiàn)CFO兼任內(nèi)部董事有助于優(yōu)化我國(guó)企業(yè)現(xiàn)金持有水平。本文結(jié)果表明,CFO內(nèi)部董事有助于降低代理成本、緩解管理層的自利行為、提高董事會(huì)的監(jiān)督效率。在第一大股東持股比例過(guò)高、機(jī)構(gòu)投資者持股比例較多、所有權(quán)性質(zhì)為國(guó)有的情況下,CFO內(nèi)部董事與現(xiàn)金持有量呈顯著負(fù)相關(guān)關(guān)系,說(shuō)明CFO兼任內(nèi)部董事可以提高公司治理水平,與我們理論分析的結(jié)果一致。本文為企業(yè)現(xiàn)金持有水平的研究提供了一個(gè)全新的視角,證明了 CFO兼任內(nèi)部董事與現(xiàn)金持有水平存在顯著的相關(guān)關(guān)系,不僅豐富了 CFO制度相關(guān)研究,同時(shí)對(duì)CFO制度的改革以及完善公司治理具有實(shí)際的借鑒意義。
[Abstract]:As an important part of corporate governance, CFO system has been widely concerned by scholars. Previous studies have shown that when the supervisory function of the board of directors is poor and the level of corporate governance is low, large shareholders, Stakeholders such as management tend to hold higher cash to satisfy their own interests, and the infringement of shareholders' interests often forces them to implement excessive cash holding policies. The principal-agent theory holds that CFO's co-appointment of internal directors damages the independence of the board of directors. The theory of friendly board of directors holds that CFO can improve its position in corporate governance and get rid of the kidnapping of stakeholders such as CEO. It can play a better role in strategic decision-making and supervision, and at the same time alleviate the problem of information asymmetry of the board of directors, which is conducive to promoting the performance of the functions of the board of directors. On the basis of this theory, this paper probes into the influence of the internal directors of CFO on the cash holding level of enterprises, and studies the ownership structure, the nature of ownership, and so on. The influence of institutional shareholding on the relationship between the two. This paper takes the senior management data and financial data of Chinese A-share non-financial listed companies from 2003 to 2015 as samples. Using the method of empirical research, this paper probes into the correlation between the internal director of CFO and the cash holding level of the enterprise. The results show that the CFO concurrently serving as the internal director can significantly reduce the amount of cash holding in the enterprise. In the robustness test, the propensity score matching method is used to alleviate the endogenous influence, and PSM-DID is used to analyze the variation effect, that is, the double difference analysis is carried out on the basis of the PSM matched samples. Finally, the results of this paper are further confirmed. It also proves that the conclusion of basic regression is robust. At the same time, we use excess cash holdings to measure the best cash holding level of enterprises. The results of this paper show that the internal directors of CFO can reduce the agency cost and ease the self-interest behavior of the management. Improving the supervision efficiency of the board of directors. When the first largest shareholder holds too much shares, the institutional investors hold more shares, and the ownership nature is state-owned, there is a significant negative correlation between the CFO internal directors and cash holdings. It shows that CFO can improve the level of corporate governance, which is consistent with the results of our theoretical analysis. This paper provides a new perspective for the study of corporate cash holding level. It is proved that there is a significant correlation between the internal director of CFO and the level of cash holding, which not only enriches the relevant research of CFO system, but also has practical significance for the reform of CFO system and the improvement of corporate governance.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：內(nèi)蒙古大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：F275;F832.51;F271

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