本文選題：風(fēng)險投資　切入點：真實盈余管理　出處：《浙江大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文

【摘要】：2009年10月23日,創(chuàng)業(yè)板登陸我國證券交易市場,開板當(dāng)日即有28家公司掛牌上市,受到資金的狂熱追捧而首日平均暴漲106%。創(chuàng)業(yè)板的的順勢推出,一方面為我國中小企業(yè)提供了更為廣闊的融資平臺,另一方面也拓寬了風(fēng)險投資的退出渠道,豐富了我國資本市場的層次。然而,由于創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市資格的“一票難求”,不少中小企業(yè)會扭曲真實的企業(yè)財務(wù)盈余情況,粉飾上市所需的相關(guān)財務(wù)指標(biāo)來盡快完成創(chuàng)業(yè)板IPO。這其中盈余管理的問題就不容小覷。 先前的盈余管理一直聚焦在應(yīng)計盈余管理部分,但隨著會計準(zhǔn)則和相關(guān)法律制度的日臻完善以及監(jiān)管部門加大審查力度,應(yīng)計盈余操控的空間越來越小,公司高管可能更傾向于通過真實的交易活動來進(jìn)行盈余管理。而真實盈余管理通過構(gòu)建真實的經(jīng)營活動來調(diào)節(jié)企業(yè)財務(wù)數(shù)據(jù),相較于應(yīng)計盈余管理更具有隱蔽性,一般投資者很難通過財務(wù)報告來察覺。但真實盈余管理又潛在著危害上市公司長期價值的風(fēng)險,這時就需要風(fēng)險投資作為“信號機(jī)制”來使得一般投資者獲得更為真實的公司信息。因為風(fēng)險投資對所投資公司進(jìn)行股權(quán)投資后,會參與到公司的經(jīng)營管理過程中,能更清晰更直觀地了解公司的真實運(yùn)作模式和實際市場價值。 為考察風(fēng)險投資對真實盈余管理的影響,本文選取了2009年10月至2012年12月在我國創(chuàng)業(yè)板市場上市的公司作為研究樣本,共355家,經(jīng)過篩選后剩下321家。首先在度量真實盈余管理方面選擇了Roychowdhury模型并進(jìn)行了一定的修正,再在實證分析方面,借助Pearson相關(guān)性檢驗和多元逐步回歸分析,確定了風(fēng)險投資對創(chuàng)業(yè)板IPO真實盈余管理影響的最終回歸模型。最終實證研究結(jié)果表明,真實盈余管理這一問題在創(chuàng)業(yè)板IPO前一年顯著存在,需要相關(guān)部門加強(qiáng)監(jiān)督和管理。并且有風(fēng)投背景的創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市企業(yè)的真實盈余管理水平會顯著低于無風(fēng)投背景的企業(yè),初步證實了風(fēng)險投資的認(rèn)證監(jiān)督效應(yīng)。但研究還發(fā)現(xiàn),當(dāng)多個風(fēng)險投資機(jī)構(gòu)“聯(lián)合投資”參與創(chuàng)業(yè)板的IPO活動時,真實盈余管理問題程度反而加深,說明在“聯(lián)合投資”中風(fēng)險投資的“躁動效應(yīng)”占主導(dǎo)地位。
[Abstract]:On October 23, 2009, the gem landed on the securities market of our country. On the opening day, 28 companies were listed on the market. On the one hand, it provides a broader financing platform for small and medium-sized enterprises in our country, on the other hand, it also broadens the exit channels of venture capital and enriches the level of our capital market. As the qualification of gem is "hard to obtain", many small and medium-sized enterprises will distort the real financial surplus of enterprises, and whitewash the relevant financial indicators needed for listing to complete gem IPO as soon as possible. The problem of earnings management should not be underestimated. Previous earnings management has been focused on accrual earnings management, but with the improvement of accounting standards and related legal systems and increased regulatory scrutiny, there is less and less room for accrual earnings manipulation. Corporate executives may be more inclined to conduct earnings management through real trading activities, while real earnings management can regulate corporate financial data by constructing real business activities, which is more concealable than accrual earnings management. It is difficult for retail investors to detect through financial statements. But real earnings management has the potential to jeopardize the long-term value of listed companies. At this point, venture capital is needed as a "signaling mechanism" to enable retail investors to obtain more true corporate information, because the venture capital will participate in the management process of the company after investing in the equity of the invested company. Can more clearly and intuitively understand the company's real operating mode and actual market value. In order to investigate the impact of venture capital on real earnings management, this paper selects 355 companies listed on the gem from October 2009 to December 2012 as a sample. First of all, the Roychowdhury model is selected and modified in the measurement of real earnings management, and then in the empirical analysis, with the help of Pearson correlation test and multiple stepwise regression analysis, The final regression model of the impact of venture capital on the real earnings management of gem IPO is established. The final empirical results show that the problem of real earnings management existed significantly one year before the gem IPO. It needs the relevant departments to strengthen the supervision and management. Moreover, the real earnings management level of the listed enterprises with venture capital background will be significantly lower than that of the enterprises without venture capital background, which has preliminarily confirmed the certification and supervision effect of venture capital. However, the study also found that, When more than one venture capital institution "joint investment" participates in the IPO activity of gem, the real earnings management problem deepens, which indicates that the "restless effect" of venture capital occupies a dominant position in "joint investment".
【學(xué)位授予單位】：浙江大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F832.51;F275

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