本文選題：高管顯性激勵(lì)　切入點(diǎn)：貨幣化薪酬　出處：《南開管理評(píng)論》2017年02期 　論文類型：期刊論文

【摘要】：由于實(shí)際控制人的存在,中國(guó)上市公司的高管激勵(lì)研究需要將實(shí)際控制人的影響納入高管激勵(lì)研究中�；诖�,本文引入"雙向治理"研究視角,期望通過考察實(shí)際控制人在高管顯性激勵(lì)安排有效性中的影響,即高管迎合實(shí)際控制人需要的管理層權(quán)力,探索中國(guó)上市公司高管顯性激勵(lì)安排的治理效應(yīng)。研究發(fā)現(xiàn),貨幣化薪酬呈現(xiàn)積極的治理效應(yīng),但是高管持股卻容易誘發(fā)代理問題,并且弱化貨幣化薪酬的激勵(lì)效果。進(jìn)一步分析得知,高管期權(quán)激勵(lì)的作用主要體現(xiàn)在貨幣化薪酬與代理成本關(guān)系的調(diào)節(jié)效應(yīng)中,并且主要見于民營(yíng)企業(yè)和高科技行業(yè)。本文研究表明,中國(guó)情境下更為有效的高管顯性激勵(lì)組合應(yīng)該是充分考慮實(shí)際控制人的潛在影響,構(gòu)建貨幣化薪酬與期權(quán)激勵(lì)的有機(jī)結(jié)合,同時(shí)還需要兼顧高管持股的負(fù)面治理效應(yīng)和期權(quán)激勵(lì)的適用情境,進(jìn)一步優(yōu)化上市公司高管顯性激勵(lì)的制度安排。
[Abstract]:Because of the existence of actual controller, the research on executive incentive of listed companies in China needs to incorporate the influence of actual controller into the study of executive incentive. Based on this, this paper introduces the perspective of "two-way governance". By examining the influence of actual controller on the effectiveness of executive dominant incentive arrangement, that is, the executive's power to meet the needs of actual controller, this paper explores the governance effect of executive dominant incentive arrangement in Chinese listed companies. Monetized compensation has a positive governance effect, but executive ownership can easily lead to agency problems and weaken the incentive effect of monetized compensation. The role of executive option incentive is mainly reflected in the regulatory effect of the relationship between monetized compensation and agency cost, and mainly in private enterprises and high-tech industries. In China, a more effective executive explicit incentive combination should take full account of the potential impact of actual controllers, and build an organic combination of monetized compensation and option incentive. At the same time, we also need to take into account the negative governance effect of executive ownership and the applicable situation of option incentive, and further optimize the institutional arrangement of executive dominant incentive in listed companies.
【作者單位】： 山東大學(xué)管理科學(xué)與工程博士后流動(dòng)站;山東大學(xué)管理學(xué)院;
【基金】：國(guó)家自然科學(xué)基金面上項(xiàng)目(71272120) 中國(guó)博士后科學(xué)基金面上項(xiàng)目(2016M592205)資助
【分類號(hào)】：F832.51;F272.91

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