本文選題：政治關(guān)聯(lián)　切入點：企業(yè)違規(guī)　出處：《財經(jīng)論叢》2017年06期 　論文類型：期刊論文

【摘要】：管理者政治關(guān)聯(lián)在強化企業(yè)競爭優(yōu)勢的同時,也會弱化公司治理機制的有效性。本文基于公司違規(guī)行為發(fā)生及管理者被迫離職兩個方面,利用Bivariate Probit模型和Logit模型研究管理者政治關(guān)聯(lián)對公司治理有效性的影響。研究發(fā)現(xiàn),擁有政治關(guān)聯(lián)的管理者所在企業(yè)更加傾向發(fā)生違規(guī)行為,尤其是民營企業(yè);管理者的政治關(guān)聯(lián)能夠降低其違規(guī)行為被稽查處理的可能性,尤其是國有企業(yè)。政治關(guān)聯(lián)有助于管理者建立職位壕溝,降低管理者被迫離職的概率;而企業(yè)違規(guī)行為被稽查后,管理者被迫離職的可能性將顯著提高。文章的研究結(jié)果證明,管理者政治關(guān)聯(lián)會弱化企業(yè)發(fā)生違規(guī)行為的事前監(jiān)管,同時也會降低企業(yè)違規(guī)行為的稽查在事后監(jiān)管中的公司治理效果。
[Abstract]:While strengthening the competitive advantage of the enterprise, the political association of managers will weaken the effectiveness of the corporate governance mechanism. This paper is based on two aspects: the occurrence of corporate irregularities and the forced departure of managers. Using Bivariate Probit model and Logit model to study the influence of managers' political association on the effectiveness of corporate governance. The political association of managers can reduce the possibility of their irregularities being checked and dealt with, especially state-owned enterprises. Political connections can help managers to build trenches for positions and reduce the probability of managers being forced to leave their jobs. The probability of managers being forced to leave their jobs will be significantly increased. The results of the study prove that the political association of managers weakens the prior supervision of the occurrence of irregularities in enterprises. At the same time, it will reduce the corporate governance effect of the audit of the enterprise's illegal behavior in the post-supervision.
【作者單位】： 浙江大學(xué)經(jīng)濟學(xué)院;
【基金】：國家自然科學(xué)基金資助項目(71673249) 浙江省科技廳軟科學(xué)計劃項目(2014C35033)
【分類號】：F271;F832.51
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本文編號：1638234