上市公司股權(quán)再融資與過度投資行為
發(fā)布時(shí)間:2018-03-12 13:39
本文選題:制度環(huán)境 切入點(diǎn):股權(quán)再融資 出處:《石河子大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文 論文類型:學(xué)位論文
【摘要】:目前我國(guó)正處于市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)體系建設(shè)的關(guān)鍵時(shí)期,理性思考上市公司股權(quán)再融資效率狀況,對(duì)促進(jìn)證券市場(chǎng)的健康、穩(wěn)健發(fā)展,更好地服務(wù)于國(guó)民經(jīng)濟(jì)大局具有深遠(yuǎn)的意義。如何定義資本市場(chǎng)微觀效率,,是最近三四十年來世界金融經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)界討論的重點(diǎn)課題。上市公司股權(quán)再融資效率的重要性體現(xiàn)在:一是其直接關(guān)系到企業(yè)資金的使用效率,二是其反映了一國(guó)資本市場(chǎng)配置資源的宏觀效率。本文以上市公司是否進(jìn)行配股和增發(fā)為出發(fā)點(diǎn),深入分析上市公司股權(quán)再融資效率問題,探討股權(quán)再融資與過度投資行為之間關(guān)系問題以及在不同制度背景下,二者關(guān)系是否發(fā)生變化,這對(duì)科學(xué)理解、認(rèn)識(shí)和發(fā)揮我國(guó)證券市場(chǎng)的功能,了解證券市場(chǎng)的運(yùn)行機(jī)制,分析市場(chǎng)投資者行為等有重要的理論和現(xiàn)實(shí)意義。特別是在我國(guó)證券市場(chǎng)推行股權(quán)分置改革的同時(shí),考察上市公司股權(quán)再融資效率,對(duì)分析證券市場(chǎng)總體效率、尋求相應(yīng)的改革措施,對(duì)證券市場(chǎng)的長(zhǎng)遠(yuǎn)健康發(fā)展有極為重要的參考價(jià)值。不僅如此,也為解決我國(guó)上市公司股權(quán)再融資效率低下、融資制度失靈提供了有利的理論和實(shí)證證據(jù)。對(duì)我國(guó)監(jiān)管部門如何進(jìn)一步完善上市公司再融資渠道提供了積極的實(shí)踐意義。 本文使用中國(guó)滬深股票市場(chǎng)A股公司2001-2010年數(shù)據(jù)作為研究樣本,在國(guó)內(nèi)外相關(guān)研究成果的基礎(chǔ)上,針對(duì)不同制度背景下上市公司股權(quán)再融資與過度投資的關(guān)系進(jìn)行了研究。研究結(jié)果發(fā)現(xiàn):上市公司股權(quán)再融資與過度投資之間顯著正相關(guān),且股權(quán)再融資程度越大,過度投資越嚴(yán)重。將有助于我們從一個(gè)全新的視角揭示上市公司“SEO后業(yè)績(jī)下降之謎”。進(jìn)一步的研究發(fā)現(xiàn),相對(duì)于民營(yíng)企業(yè),股權(quán)再融資導(dǎo)致的過度投資問題在國(guó)有企業(yè)中更為嚴(yán)重。對(duì)股權(quán)分置改革的影響研究發(fā)現(xiàn),股權(quán)分置改革后非流通股的流通上市,控股股東與中小股東利益的趨同,上市公司代理成本得到有效抑制,控股股東有更大的積極性去提高公司籌集資金的利用效率,此時(shí),股權(quán)再融資導(dǎo)致過度投資行為現(xiàn)象會(huì)得到有效緩解。最后結(jié)合外部治理環(huán)境研究發(fā)現(xiàn),法制環(huán)境、市場(chǎng)化進(jìn)程和政府治理環(huán)境的改善能夠抑制股權(quán)再融資導(dǎo)致的過度投資行為。這在一定程度上表明企業(yè)產(chǎn)權(quán)性質(zhì)顯著影響股權(quán)再融資與過度投資之間的關(guān)系,而外部治理環(huán)境的改善能有效緩解股權(quán)再融資導(dǎo)致的過度投資行為。本文的研究發(fā)現(xiàn),只有改善公司的微觀治理機(jī)制(產(chǎn)權(quán)性質(zhì)與內(nèi)部股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu))和外部治理環(huán)境,才能提高上市公司再融資后資金的使用效率和減少過度投資行為。
[Abstract]:At present, our country is in the key period of the construction of market economy system. To think rationally about the efficiency of equity refinancing of listed companies will promote the healthy and steady development of the securities market. It is of profound significance to serve the overall situation of the national economy better. How to define the micro efficiency of capital market, The importance of equity refinancing efficiency of listed companies is reflected in the following: first, it has a direct bearing on the efficiency of the use of corporate funds. Second, it reflects the macro-efficiency of a country's capital market allocation of resources. This paper discusses the relationship between equity refinancing and overinvestment and whether the relationship between the two changes under different institutional background, which is scientific understanding, understanding and giving full play to the functions of the securities market in China, and understand the operating mechanism of the securities market. It is of great theoretical and practical significance to analyze the behavior of investors in the market. Especially, while carrying out the split share structure reform in China's securities market, the efficiency of equity refinancing of listed companies is investigated, which is of great importance to the analysis of the overall efficiency of the securities market. Seeking corresponding reform measures is of great reference value for the long-term and healthy development of the securities market. Not only that, but also to solve the low efficiency of equity refinancing of listed companies in China. The failure of the financing system provides favorable theoretical and empirical evidence and provides a positive practical significance for how to further improve the refinancing channels of listed companies. This paper uses the data of A share companies in China's Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets for the period 2001-2010 as a research sample, on the basis of the relevant research results at home and abroad. This paper studies the relationship between equity refinancing and overinvestment of listed companies under different institutional backgrounds. The results show that there is a significant positive correlation between equity refinancing and overinvestment of listed companies, and the greater the degree of equity refinancing, the greater the degree of equity refinancing. The more serious overinvestment is, the more it will help us to reveal the "mystery of decline in performance after SEO" of listed companies from a new perspective. The problem of overinvestment caused by equity refinancing is more serious in state-owned enterprises. The agency cost of the listed company is effectively suppressed, and the controlling shareholders have greater enthusiasm to improve the efficiency of the company in raising funds. At this time, The phenomenon of excessive investment behavior caused by equity refinancing will be effectively alleviated. Finally, combined with the study of external governance environment, it is found that the legal environment, The process of marketization and the improvement of government governance environment can restrain the over-investment behavior caused by equity refinancing, which to some extent indicates that the nature of enterprise property rights significantly affects the relationship between equity refinancing and overinvestment. The improvement of external governance environment can effectively alleviate the overinvestment behavior caused by equity refinancing. This paper finds that the only way to improve the micro-governance mechanism (property rights and internal equity structure) and external governance environment is to improve the corporate governance mechanism. Only in order to improve the efficiency of refinancing funds and reduce excessive investment behavior.
【學(xué)位授予單位】:石河子大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】:碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】:2014
【分類號(hào)】:F832.51;F275
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