本文關鍵詞： 媒體負面報道 高管薪酬 實證分析　出處：《西南交通大學》2014年碩士論文　論文類型：學位論文

【摘要】：隨著我國社會主義市場經(jīng)濟體制的建立及不斷完善,我國企業(yè)無論是經(jīng)營性質(zhì)還是整體宏觀環(huán)境都發(fā)生了劇烈的變化,而這些都直接影響到我國企業(yè)未來的發(fā)展以及生存狀況。特別是進入新世紀以來,在全球化進程高速發(fā)展的當下,企業(yè)所面臨的競爭不僅僅是單一的國內(nèi)企業(yè)之間的競爭,更要面臨來自于國外優(yōu)秀跨國企業(yè)的共同抗衡。而作為行業(yè)內(nèi)優(yōu)秀企業(yè)的上市公司而言,其本身在市場競爭機制下受到了人們更多地關注,其自身的企業(yè)績效以及盈利能力直接關系到股東的權(quán)益,由此對于上市企業(yè)的發(fā)展特別是財務管理就提出了新的要求和挑戰(zhàn)�；ヂ�(lián)網(wǎng)的出現(xiàn)以及現(xiàn)代新興媒體的介入,使得人們對于高管薪酬的關注熱情不斷上升。社會對不斷爆出的關于國有企業(yè)高層管理人員的天價薪酬等現(xiàn)象更是頗有微詞,認為他們的天價薪酬和其自身的實際管理能力以及對于企業(yè)創(chuàng)造的價值不符合。而從現(xiàn)有的監(jiān)督管理層面來看,卻缺乏對上市公司高層管理人員薪酬約束的有效治理機制。本文采用理論聯(lián)系實證的研究方法,在對國內(nèi)外相關理論分析與闡述的基礎之上,結(jié)合現(xiàn)有高管薪酬的特點,通過理論分析加實證分析的方式,探究了當下,媒體負面報道對高管薪酬的約束與治理作用。本文的媒體負面報道數(shù)據(jù)選取年度為2011到2012年,上市公司數(shù)據(jù)選擇為2011年至2013年我國深滬兩市A股上市的公司。樣本中剔除了金融行業(yè)的上市公司、ST的公司、數(shù)據(jù)缺失的公司以及2009年以后上市的公司,最后共得到2357個研究樣本。實證研究了媒體負面報道對其薪酬的影響,以及媒體關注,對于這種影響的約束作用,得到如下三個結(jié)論：(1)媒體負面報道對高管薪酬呈負面影響；(2)媒體負面報道對國有上市公司高管薪酬影響較非國有上市公司高管薪酬約束能力較大。(3)在控制性股東股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)中,終極控股股東的持股比例越高,媒體負面報道對高管薪酬約束能力越大�？梢娒襟w負面報道對上市公司高管薪酬有一定的治理約束作用。并結(jié)合實證數(shù)據(jù)結(jié)果,提出了應當如何切實有效地,基于已有媒體報道的治理作用,對上市公司高管薪酬進行約束的相關政策性建議。
[Abstract]:With the establishment and continuous improvement of the socialist market economic system in China, the enterprises in our country have undergone drastic changes both in their management nature and in the overall macro environment. All these have a direct impact on the future development and survival of Chinese enterprises, especially in the new century, with the rapid development of globalization, the competition faced by enterprises is not only the competition among the single domestic enterprises. It is even more necessary to face a common challenge from foreign excellent multinational enterprises. As an outstanding enterprise in the industry, the listed companies themselves have been paid more attention to under the market competition mechanism. Its own enterprise performance and profitability are directly related to shareholders' rights and interests, thus putting forward new requirements and challenges to the development of listed enterprises, especially financial management, the emergence of the Internet and the intervention of modern emerging media. This has made people pay more and more attention to executive compensation, and the society has been complaining about the phenomenon of sky-high salary of senior managers in state-owned enterprises. They think that their sky-high salary and their own actual management ability and the value they create for the enterprise are not in line with... And from the existing supervisory management level, However, there is a lack of effective governance mechanism for the executive compensation constraint of listed companies. This paper adopts the research method of combining theory with empirical research, on the basis of theoretical analysis and exposition of relevant theories at home and abroad, combining the characteristics of existing executive compensation. Through theoretical analysis and empirical analysis, this paper explores the current negative media report on executive compensation constraints and governance. The data of listed companies are listed in the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets from 2011 to 2013. The sample excludes listed companies in the financial sector, companies with missing data and those listed after 2009. Finally, a total of 2357 research samples were obtained. The paper empirically studied the impact of negative media reports on their pay, and media attention, and the constraints on this impact. Get the following three conclusions: (1) negative media reports have a negative impact on executive compensation. (2) negative media reports have a greater impact on executive compensation in state-owned listed companies than in non-state-owned listed companies. The higher the shareholding ratio of ultimate controlling shareholder, the greater the ability of media negative report to restrain executive compensation. It can be seen that media negative report has a certain governance constraint on executive compensation of listed companies. This paper puts forward some policy suggestions on how to effectively and effectively restrict the executive compensation of listed companies based on the governance function of existing media reports.
【學位授予單位】：西南交通大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F272.92;F832.51;G206

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