本文關(guān)鍵詞： 股權(quán)分置 掏空行為 流通股 演化博弈 有限理性 演化穩(wěn)定策略 復(fù)制動態(tài)方程　出處：《西北師范大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：資本市場在我國從創(chuàng)辦至今已走過20多個年頭.在這期間,資本市場的機制、規(guī)模和秩序都取得了長足的進(jìn)步.我們看到這些進(jìn)步的同時,也看到了我國資本市場存在的一些不足.這些問題主要源于上市公司所有權(quán)從分散逐漸走向集中,大股東對上市公司的“掏空”行為變得十分普遍.針對這一熱點問題,國內(nèi)外有關(guān)經(jīng)濟學(xué)家和博弈論專家都作了許多深入的研究和探討,取得了不少建設(shè)性的成果.目前這些研究大多采用經(jīng)典博弈理論作為工具分析大股東“掏空”行為的預(yù)防措施.然而,經(jīng)典博弈理論本身具有一定的局限性,因為經(jīng)典博弈理論要求博弈的所有參與人都是完全理性的.在現(xiàn)實生活中,很難找到一個具有完全理性和完美預(yù)測能力的參與人.而演化博弈理論是把博弈分析和動態(tài)進(jìn)化過程結(jié)合起來的理論,它是以有限理性為基礎(chǔ)、以種群為研究對象的博弈理論.用演化博弈理論來分析和研究證券市場大股東“掏空”策略,分析結(jié)果更具有現(xiàn)實意義.本文運用演化博弈理論對證券市場中上市公司大股東的“掏空”行為建立演化博弈模型,在博弈模型中分別以單種群和多種群兩個角度構(gòu)造不同的博弈框架.由于在現(xiàn)實生活中對大股東“掏空”行為的監(jiān)察工作具有相當(dāng)?shù)膹?fù)雜性,所以我們在多種群博弈模型的內(nèi)部引入監(jiān)管力度因子,并且討論監(jiān)管力度因子對各參與方的期望收益和大股東“掏空”行為的具體影響,然后建立各博弈參與人的復(fù)制動態(tài)方程.分析不同模型中各參與人的演化穩(wěn)定策略（ESS）.然后對模型演化結(jié)果進(jìn)行討論,找出影響大股東“掏空”行為的相關(guān)因素,通過對模型當(dāng)中各個參數(shù)的分析,找到制止大股東“掏空”行為的有效措施,為政府監(jiān)管和調(diào)控證券市場大股東行為提供相應(yīng)的決策參考.
[Abstract]:It has been more than 20 years since the capital market was founded in China. During this period, great progress has been made in the mechanism, scale and order of the capital market. We have also seen some shortcomings in our capital market. These problems are mainly due to the ownership of listed companies gradually changing from decentralization to concentration, and the "tunneling" behavior of major shareholders to listed companies becomes very common. In view of this hot issue, Domestic and foreign economists and game theory experts have done a lot of in-depth research and discussion. Many constructive results have been achieved. At present, most of these studies use classical game theory as a tool to analyze the "tunneling" behavior of large shareholders. However, the classical game theory itself has some limitations. Because the classical game theory requires that all players in the game are completely rational. In real life, It is difficult to find a participant who has the ability of perfect rationality and perfect prediction, and the evolutionary game theory is a theory that combines game analysis with dynamic evolutionary process, and it is based on finite rationality. The game theory, which takes the population as the research object, analyzes and studies the "tunneling" strategy of the major stockholders in the securities market by using the evolutionary game theory. In this paper, the evolutionary game theory is used to establish the evolutionary game model for the "tunneling" behavior of large shareholders of listed companies in the stock market. In the game model, a different game framework is constructed from the two angles of single population and multiple groups. Because of the complexity of monitoring the "tunneling" behavior of large shareholders in real life, Therefore, we introduce the regulatory dynamics factor into the multi-group game model, and discuss the specific impact of the regulatory dynamics factor on the expected income of the participants and the "hollowing" behavior of the major shareholders. Then, the replicating dynamic equations of the participants in the game are established, and the evolutionary stability strategies of each participant in different models are analyzed. Then, the evolution results of the model are discussed, and the relevant factors affecting the tunneling behavior of the major shareholders are found out. Through the analysis of each parameter in the model, we find out the effective measures to stop the "tunneling" behavior of the major shareholders, and provide the corresponding decision-making reference for the government to supervise and control the behavior of the large shareholders in the securities market.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：西北師范大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F832.51;F224.32

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