本文關(guān)鍵詞： 保薦制 承銷商聲譽(yù) IPO機(jī)會可獲得性 IPO機(jī)會及時性　出處：《安徽工業(yè)大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：自2004年保薦制實施后，承銷商在新股市場上的地位得到了不斷的凸顯，作為發(fā)行人聘請的最重要的中介，承銷商聲譽(yù)在發(fā)行人的新股申請過程中發(fā)揮著重要的作用。傳統(tǒng)的聲譽(yù)理論認(rèn)為，承銷商聲譽(yù)的有效發(fā)揮可以緩解股票市場的信息不對稱問題。那么，在保薦核準(zhǔn)制的背景下，良好聲譽(yù)的承銷商能否有效緩解發(fā)行人與發(fā)審委之間的信息不對稱，以提高發(fā)行人獲得IPO(Initial Public Offerings，首次公開發(fā)行)機(jī)會的可能性，促進(jìn)發(fā)行人及時獲得IPO機(jī)會。針對這些問題，本文試圖從IPO機(jī)會可獲得性與IPO機(jī)會及時性兩個維度研究承銷商聲譽(yù)與IPO機(jī)會之間的關(guān)系。文章分別對此做了深入的理論分析，并且結(jié)合研究的制度背景，選取2004年1月至2012年12月于主板和創(chuàng)業(yè)板市場進(jìn)行的發(fā)行申請為研究樣本，建立模型逐一對其進(jìn)行實證檢驗。 發(fā)行人與IPO機(jī)會可獲得性的實證結(jié)果顯示，承銷商聲譽(yù)與發(fā)行申請是否通過發(fā)審委審核顯著正相關(guān)，說明承銷商聲譽(yù)越高，發(fā)行申請通過發(fā)審委審核的可能性越大，即發(fā)行人IPO機(jī)會的可獲得性越大。其中，在再次上會的發(fā)行申請中存在著變更承銷商的現(xiàn)象，文章進(jìn)一步從變更承銷商的角度，檢驗承銷商聲譽(yù)與IPO機(jī)會可獲得性之間的關(guān)系。實證結(jié)果表明，再次上會變更為高聲譽(yù)承銷商的發(fā)行申請獲得IPO機(jī)會的可能性更大，進(jìn)一步驗證了承銷商聲譽(yù)越高，發(fā)行人IPO機(jī)會的可獲得性越大。另外，承銷商聲譽(yù)與IPO機(jī)會及時性的實證檢驗表明，承銷商聲譽(yù)與發(fā)行人上市進(jìn)度在1%的水平下顯著負(fù)相關(guān)，說明承銷商聲譽(yù)越高，，發(fā)行人獲取IPO機(jī)會越及時。 本文的研究內(nèi)容和結(jié)論具有一定的獨(dú)創(chuàng)性和時效性，豐富了承銷商聲譽(yù)機(jī)制在新股發(fā)行領(lǐng)域的研究。
[Abstract]:Since the implementation of the sponsorship system in 2004, the position of underwriters in the new stock market has been constantly highlighted, as the most important intermediary hired by issuers. The reputation of underwriters plays an important role in the process of issuing new shares. The traditional reputation theory holds that the effective performance of the reputation of underwriters can alleviate the problem of asymmetric information in the stock market. Whether reputable underwriters can effectively ease the information asymmetry between issuers and issuers in order to increase the possibility of issuers' access to IPO(Initial Public offerings (IPOs) and facilitate issuers' access to IPO opportunities in a timely manner. This paper attempts to study the relationship between underwriter reputation and IPO opportunity from the two dimensions of IPO opportunity availability and IPO opportunity timeliness. From January 2004 to December 2012 in the main board and gem market applications as a research sample, establish a model one by one to conduct an empirical test. The empirical results of the availability of opportunities between issuers and IPO show that there is a significant positive correlation between the reputation of underwriters and the approval of issuance applications by issuers, indicating that the higher the reputation of underwriters, the more likely the issuance applications will pass the approval of issuers. That is, the greater the availability of IPO opportunities for issuers. Among them, there is a phenomenon of changing underwriters in the issuance application of the meeting again, the article further from the point of view of changing the underwriters, The empirical results show that the higher the reputation of the underwriters is, the more likely they are to obtain the IPO opportunities for the issuance applications that will be changed to the high-reputation underwriters again, which further verifies that the higher the reputation of the underwriters, the higher the reputation of the underwriters. The higher the availability of IPO opportunities for issuers is, the more significant negative correlation between underwriter reputation and IPO opportunity timeliness shows that underwriter reputation is negatively correlated with issuer listing schedule at the level of 1%, which indicates that the higher the underwriter reputation is, the higher the underwriter reputation is. The more timely the issuer gets the IPO opportunity. The research contents and conclusions of this paper have some originality and timeliness, which enrich the research of underwriter reputation mechanism in the field of new issue.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：安徽工業(yè)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F832.51

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