本文關(guān)鍵詞： 晉升壓力 信貸資源配置 產(chǎn)能過(guò)剩 資本市場(chǎng)效率 政治透明度 晉升錦標(biāo)賽　出處：《北京工商大學(xué)學(xué)報(bào)(社會(huì)科學(xué)版)》2017年01期 　論文類(lèi)型：期刊論文

【摘要】：文章利用2012年世界銀行中國(guó)企業(yè)調(diào)查數(shù)據(jù)考察了地方官員晉升壓力對(duì)產(chǎn)能過(guò)剩的影響,研究結(jié)果表明:產(chǎn)能過(guò)剩是以GDP為核心的晉升錦標(biāo)賽的一系列扭曲性后果之一,地方官員會(huì)迫于晉升壓力支持企業(yè)擴(kuò)大產(chǎn)能,導(dǎo)致產(chǎn)能利用率降低,進(jìn)而產(chǎn)生產(chǎn)能過(guò)剩等問(wèn)題;此外,資本市場(chǎng)信貸資源配置是地方官員晉升壓力影響企業(yè)產(chǎn)能過(guò)剩的中介變量,即地方官員迫于晉升壓力對(duì)信貸資源配置的不當(dāng)干預(yù)降低了信貸資源配置效率,并最終導(dǎo)致企業(yè)產(chǎn)能過(guò)剩。進(jìn)一步研究發(fā)現(xiàn),轉(zhuǎn)變傳統(tǒng)的以經(jīng)濟(jì)績(jī)效為主的官員晉升考核方式,增加環(huán)境保護(hù)等社會(huì)發(fā)展目標(biāo)的比重,能夠降低地方官員晉升壓力對(duì)產(chǎn)能過(guò)剩的影響;而政府透明度的提升,有助于監(jiān)督和制約地方政府的不當(dāng)經(jīng)濟(jì)干預(yù)行為,抑制地方官員晉升壓力對(duì)產(chǎn)能過(guò)剩的影響。
[Abstract]:Based on the data of 2012 World Bank China Enterprise Survey, this paper examines the influence of local official promotion pressure on overcapacity. The results show that overcapacity is one of a series of distorting consequences of the promotion championships with GDP as the core. Local officials will be forced by promotion pressure to support companies to expand capacity, resulting in reduced capacity utilization, resulting in problems such as overcapacity. The allocation of credit resources in capital market is the intermediary variable that the promotion pressure of local officials affects the overcapacity of enterprises, that is, the improper intervention of local officials on the allocation of credit resources under the pressure of promotion reduces the efficiency of the allocation of credit resources. And ultimately lead to overcapacity in enterprises. Further studies have found that changing the traditional way of promoting and assessing officials based on economic performance and increasing the proportion of social development goals such as environmental protection, It can reduce the influence of local officials' promotion pressure on overcapacity, and the increase of government transparency can help to supervise and restrain the improper economic intervention of local government, and restrain the influence of local official's promotion pressure on overcapacity.
【作者單位】： 西南財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)會(huì)計(jì)學(xué)院;
【基金】：國(guó)家自然科學(xué)基金海外及港澳學(xué)者合作研究基金項(xiàng)目“晉升機(jī)會(huì)、高管行為和公司效率——基于隱性契約和顯性契約的解釋”(71428008) 教育部人文社會(huì)科學(xué)研究項(xiàng)目“官員腐敗、企業(yè)尋租與政府補(bǔ)貼”(16XJA630001) 西南財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)重大基礎(chǔ)理論研究項(xiàng)目“現(xiàn)行產(chǎn)業(yè)政策與產(chǎn)能過(guò)剩關(guān)系研究”(JBK161104)
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：D630.3;F832.5

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