本文關(guān)鍵詞： 鋼研高納 股權(quán)激勵(lì) 杜邦分析 事件研究法　出處：《深圳大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：隨著我國(guó)企業(yè)規(guī)模的不斷擴(kuò)大、經(jīng)濟(jì)環(huán)境的不斷變化,以及企業(yè)經(jīng)營(yíng)的跨地域化、全球化,更多的職業(yè)經(jīng)理人走進(jìn)了企業(yè)的管理層,與公司股東之間的信息不對(duì)稱問題更為嚴(yán)重,企業(yè)所有者與管理者之間委托—代理關(guān)系也更為復(fù)雜。為進(jìn)一步提高企業(yè)的管理效率,降低股東和管理者之間的代理成本,股權(quán)激勵(lì)制度便應(yīng)運(yùn)而生。從2005年進(jìn)行股權(quán)分置改革開始,我國(guó)不斷地完善并頒布股權(quán)激勵(lì)的實(shí)施規(guī)范,越來越多的上市公司選擇實(shí)施了股權(quán)激勵(lì)。當(dāng)前我國(guó)上市公司紛紛實(shí)施股權(quán)激勵(lì),但股權(quán)激勵(lì)實(shí)施效果如何,能夠達(dá)到激勵(lì)目的,促進(jìn)企業(yè)快速發(fā)展,是當(dāng)前財(cái)務(wù)理論界研究的重點(diǎn)課題。本文以鋼研高納股權(quán)激勵(lì)案例為研究對(duì)象,深入研究股權(quán)激勵(lì)所帶來的財(cái)務(wù)效應(yīng),以期為上述問題的解決有所裨益。本文通過運(yùn)用事件研究法、EVA模型、杜邦分析等研究方法,以鋼研高鈉股權(quán)激勵(lì)案例為研究對(duì)象,深入分析了鋼研高納公司股權(quán)激勵(lì)財(cái)務(wù)效果、對(duì)經(jīng)營(yíng)績(jī)效影響及股權(quán)激勵(lì)事件的市場(chǎng)反應(yīng)等問題。本文主要分為五個(gè)部分:第一部分為緒論。主要介紹研究背景、意義等內(nèi)容;第二部分是股權(quán)激勵(lì)基礎(chǔ)理論和文獻(xiàn)綜述。主要闡述股權(quán)激勵(lì)的相關(guān)基礎(chǔ)理論及國(guó)內(nèi)外研究現(xiàn)狀;第三部分鋼研高鈉股權(quán)激勵(lì)財(cái)務(wù)效應(yīng)案例分析。主要介紹股權(quán)激勵(lì)案例簡(jiǎn)要情況,并進(jìn)行了股權(quán)激勵(lì)實(shí)施動(dòng)因分析;第四部分為鋼研高納股權(quán)激勵(lì)財(cái)務(wù)效果分析。深入分析了股權(quán)激勵(lì)實(shí)施的財(cái)務(wù)效應(yīng)、對(duì)綜合績(jī)效EVA影響及并購(gòu)事件的市場(chǎng)反應(yīng);第五部分股權(quán)激勵(lì)對(duì)管理層的激勵(lì)力度和效果分析。深入股權(quán)激勵(lì)實(shí)施對(duì)管理層等激勵(lì)對(duì)象的作用與效果;第六部分為結(jié)論與建議�？偨Y(jié)研究結(jié)論并提出建議。通過上述研究,本文得出如下結(jié)論:(一)鋼研高納股權(quán)激勵(lì)實(shí)施對(duì)提升公司經(jīng)營(yíng)績(jī)效具有顯著的積極影響;(二)鋼研高納股權(quán)激勵(lì)取得了市場(chǎng)反應(yīng)良好;(三)鋼研高納股權(quán)激勵(lì)實(shí)施對(duì)管理層激勵(lì)效果良好。
[Abstract]:With the continuous expansion of the scale of enterprises in our country, the constant changes of the economic environment, as well as the cross-regional management, globalization, more professional managers into the management of enterprises. The problem of information asymmetry with shareholders is more serious, and the principal-agent relationship between owners and managers is more complex. In order to further improve the efficiency of enterprise management. Reducing the agency cost between shareholders and managers, the equity incentive system came into being. Since 2005, the reform of split share structure has been carried out, and China has continuously improved and promulgated the implementation of equity incentives. More and more listed companies choose to implement equity incentive. At present, listed companies in China have implemented equity incentive, but how effective the implementation of equity incentive can achieve the purpose of incentive, and promote the rapid development of enterprises. This paper takes the case of equity incentive of steel research institute as the research object, and deeply studies the financial effect of equity incentive. In order to solve the above problems, this paper applies the method of event research to EVA model, DuPont analysis and other research methods, taking the case of high sodium stock incentive as the research object. The financial effect of equity incentive is analyzed in detail. This paper is divided into five parts: the first part is the introduction, mainly introduces the research background, significance and so on; The second part is the basic theory and literature review of equity incentive. The third part is the case analysis of the financial effect of the high sodium equity incentive. The paper mainly introduces the brief situation of the equity incentive case, and analyzes the reasons for the implementation of the equity incentive. The financial effect of equity incentive is analyzed in 4th part. The financial effect of equity incentive is deeply analyzed, and the market reaction to comprehensive performance EVA and M & A event is analyzed. 5th part of equity incentive to the management of the intensity and effect of analysis, in-depth implementation of equity incentive to the management and other incentive objects role and effect; Part 6th is the conclusions and recommendations. The conclusion of the study and recommendations. Through the above study. This paper draws the following conclusions: (1) the implementation of equity incentive in Gangyan has a significant positive impact on the improvement of the company's operating performance; (2) the equity incentive of steel research institute has achieved a good market response; (3) the effect of equity incentive on management is good.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：深圳大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：F724.5

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