本文關(guān)鍵詞： 盈余管理 控股股東 限售股解禁 分析師預(yù)測　出處：《廈門大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：在股東掌握公司控制權(quán)的股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)下,公司可能進(jìn)行以控股股東私利為導(dǎo)向的盈余管理,而我國特有的股權(quán)分置改革為控股股東實(shí)施該種盈余管理行為提供了契機(jī)。在限售股解禁的背景下,控股股東利益與二級(jí)市場股價(jià)相聯(lián)系,對公司經(jīng)營具有控制能力的股東有動(dòng)機(jī)通過正向的盈余管理向外部投資者傳達(dá)更加樂觀的盈利信息以實(shí)現(xiàn)解禁收益。如果該盈余管理行為是以控股股東利益為導(dǎo)向的,那么,控股股東股權(quán)性質(zhì)、持股比例、所有權(quán)與控制權(quán)的分離程度等股權(quán)特征差異將對公司盈余管理產(chǎn)生影響。另一方面,當(dāng)控股股東試圖操控公司盈余來欺瞞外部信息使用者時(shí),作為資本市場重要的信息傳遞者的證券分析師在預(yù)測公司盈余時(shí)是否能夠看穿并愿意披露公司以控股股東私利為目的的盈余管理行為? 為研究上述問題,本文以截至2012年底有控股股東限售股解禁數(shù)據(jù)的滬深上市公司為樣本,通過實(shí)證分析得出以下基本結(jié)論：1、公司存在解禁前以控股股東利益為目的的正向盈余管理行為；2、由于國有股東的特殊限制,在限售股解禁過程中,國有控股股東持股比例較高的公司進(jìn)行的盈余管理程度較低；3、控股股東持股比例與兩權(quán)分離度越高,公司的應(yīng)計(jì)盈余管理水平越高,但對真實(shí)盈余管理并無顯著影響；4、分析師在盈余預(yù)測中并沒有反映盈余管理程度,其中應(yīng)計(jì)盈余管理對分析師預(yù)測準(zhǔn)確度的影響是短期的,而真實(shí)盈余管理對分析師預(yù)測準(zhǔn)確度的影響更持久；5、相對于非國有控股公司,分析師對國有控股公司的盈余預(yù)測更加悲觀,而控股股東持股比例和兩權(quán)分離度對分析師預(yù)測準(zhǔn)確度并沒有顯著影響；6、明星分析師在限售股解禁中的盈余管理預(yù)測與非明星分析師無顯著差異,關(guān)聯(lián)分析師對限售股解禁中的盈余管理預(yù)測與非關(guān)聯(lián)分析師無顯著差異。 本文的主要貢獻(xiàn)有：1、從應(yīng)計(jì)盈余管理和真實(shí)盈余管理兩種方式衡量盈余管理,并加入了同時(shí)反映應(yīng)計(jì)和真實(shí)盈余管理水平的綜合指標(biāo)；2、研究控股股東股權(quán)特征對限售股解禁中的盈余管理的影響,從而揭示實(shí)施盈余管理的主體是否為控股股東；3、豐富了分析師對公司盈余管理行為的識(shí)別能力研究。
[Abstract]:In the hands of shareholders control of the company's ownership structure, the company may conduct earnings management in controlling shareholder interests oriented, and our unique non tradable share reform is the controlling shareholder of the implementation of the earnings management provides an opportunity. In restricted shares lifted the background, holding the interests of shareholders and the stock market is two contact on the operation of the company has the ability of controlling shareholders have an incentive to convey to the outside investors more optimistic earnings information in order to achieve the lifting of income through earnings management positive. If the earnings management behavior is in the interests of the controlling shareholder as the guide, then the nature of the controlling shareholder equity stake, the difference degree of separation of ownership and control rights such ownership characteristics will affect the company's earnings management. On the other hand, when the controlling shareholders try to manipulate earnings to cheat external information users, as the capital market Can a security analyst of important information transmitters see whether he is willing to disclose earnings management behavior of controlling shareholders' private interests when Forecast Ltd surplus?
In order to study the above problems, in this paper by the end of 2012, the controlling shareholders of restricted shares lifted the data of Shanghai and Shenzhen listed companies as samples, through empirical analysis draws the following conclusions: 1, the company has lifted the controlling shareholder interests for the purpose of positive earnings management behavior; 2, by special restrictions on the state-owned shareholder, restricted shares of the lifting process, the extent of earnings management of state-owned controlling shareholders a higher proportion of the company is low; 3, the proportion of controlling shareholders and the separation of two rights is higher, the company's earnings management level is higher, but there is no significant impact on real earnings management; 4, analysts in earnings forecast is not reflected the extent of earnings management, accruals earnings management prediction which influence the accuracy of the analyst is short-term, and real earnings management on analysts' forecast accuracy is influenced more durable; 5, relative to the non state The holding company, analysts' earnings forecasts of the state-owned companies more pessimistic, but the proportion of controlling shareholders and the separation of two rights of analyst forecast accuracy and no significant effect; 6, no significant differences in earnings management prediction star analyst in the limited ban the sale of shares of non star analysts, there was no significant difference between the Earnings Management Association analyst forecast to limit the sale of shares lifted in association with non analysts.
The main contributions of this paper are: 1, from the accrual earnings management and real earnings management in two ways to measure earnings management, and joined the comprehensive indicator and should reflect the real earnings management level at the same time; 2, the impact of earnings management on the controlling shareholder equity of restricted shares lifted in the implementation, so as to reveal the subject of earnings management is the controlling shareholder; 3, enrich the research of the recognition ability of analysts on the company's earnings management.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：廈門大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號(hào)】：F275;F832.51

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