管理者變更、EVA與投資不足
本文關(guān)鍵詞: 管理者變更 經(jīng)濟(jì)增加值 投資不足 短視現(xiàn)象 出處:《廣西大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文 論文類型:學(xué)位論文
【摘要】:投資效率是資本運(yùn)營的核心問題之一,在資本市場中進(jìn)行合理有效的投資是實(shí)現(xiàn)公司價值最大化的途徑。有研究顯示,我國的上市公司存在嚴(yán)重的投資不足現(xiàn)象,制約著企業(yè)價值的增長。中央企業(yè)作為國民經(jīng)濟(jì)的支柱,其非效率投資問題亟待解決,因此,國資委于2010年起在中央企業(yè)負(fù)責(zé)人的業(yè)績評價體系中全面開展經(jīng)濟(jì)增加值(EVA)指標(biāo)考核,引導(dǎo)管理者站在公司的角度進(jìn)行決策,增加理性投資行為。本文以我國滬深兩市非金融類A股主板上市公司在2007年~2014年間的數(shù)據(jù)為樣本,利用Vogt(1994)模型初步判斷了樣本公司的非效率投資傾向,再用Richardson(2006)的模型獲得樣本公司的非效率投資程度,選出央企上市公司在2010年~2014年間的數(shù)據(jù)作為研究子樣本,實(shí)證分析了EVA與投資不足的關(guān)系,并結(jié)合管理者即將退休或任期屆滿時可能存在的短視現(xiàn)象,探討管理者變更、EVA與投資不足三者間的關(guān)系。研究表明,EVA指標(biāo)考核體系能減少我國央企上市公司的投資不足現(xiàn)象;但在管理者正常變更的前一年,EVA指標(biāo)抑制投資不足程度的效果有所減弱,說明即將退休或任期屆滿的管理者存在短視現(xiàn)象,EVA指標(biāo)鼓勵長期投資的效果仍然不足。
[Abstract]:Investment efficiency is one of the core problems of capital operation. Reasonable and effective investment in the capital market is the way to maximize the value of the company. The listed companies in our country have serious underinvestment phenomenon, which restricts the growth of enterprise value. As the pillar of national economy, the central enterprise is the pillar of the national economy, its inefficiency investment problem needs to be solved urgently. Since 2010, SASAC has carried out the EVA index assessment in the performance evaluation system of the central enterprise leaders, leading managers to make decisions from the perspective of the company. Increase rational investment behavior. This paper takes the data of non-financial A-share main board listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets in 2007 and 2014 as samples. Using the Vogts1994) model, we preliminarily judge the inefficiency investment tendency of the sample company, and then use the model of Richardson's 2006) to get the degree of the sample company's inefficiency investment. This paper selects the data of the listed companies in 2010 and 2014 as the research sub-sample, and empirically analyzes the relationship between EVA and underinvestment. Combined with the short-sighted phenomenon that managers are about to retire or when their tenure expires, the relationship between the change of EVA and the underinvestment of managers is discussed. EVA index evaluation system can reduce the phenomenon of insufficient investment of the listed companies of central enterprises in our country; But one year before the normal change of managers, the effect of EVA index on the degree of investment deficiency is weakened, which indicates that managers who are about to retire or whose tenure expires are short-sighted. The effectiveness of the EVA indicator in encouraging long-term investment remains inadequate.
【學(xué)位授予單位】:廣西大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】:碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】:2017
【分類號】:F832.51;F275;F272.91
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