本文關(guān)鍵詞：股權(quán)激勵(lì)、代理成本與公司業(yè)績——基于兩種代理成本的中介效應(yīng)檢驗(yàn)　出處：《湖湘論壇》2017年03期 　論文類型：期刊論文

  更多相關(guān)文章： 顯性代理成本 隱性代理成本 股權(quán)激勵(lì) 中介效應(yīng)

【摘要】：委托代理關(guān)系中,股東與管理層的代理沖突來源于兩部分,一部分是由管理層道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)行為引發(fā)的對公司價(jià)值和股東利益的直接侵害,另一部分是管理層因風(fēng)險(xiǎn)規(guī)避而投資不足造成的產(chǎn)出缺口,文中將之分別定義為"顯性代理成本"和"隱性代理成本"。而以利益共享、風(fēng)險(xiǎn)共擔(dān)為設(shè)計(jì)初衷,旨在統(tǒng)一股東與管理層目標(biāo)函數(shù)的股權(quán)激勵(lì),一方面通過提高管理層為道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)行為承擔(dān)的私人成本,另一方面通過增加管理層投資決策的私人收益,理論上有助于緩解代理沖突。對2006-2015年滬深A(yù)股上市公司的實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)證實(shí),股權(quán)激勵(lì)顯著降低了顯性代理成本和隱性代理成本。進(jìn)一步地,中介效應(yīng)檢驗(yàn)結(jié)果表明:這兩種代理成本在股權(quán)激勵(lì)與公司業(yè)績的關(guān)系中發(fā)揮了部分中介作用,股權(quán)激勵(lì)以顯性代理成本和隱性代理成本為路徑,間接提高了公司業(yè)績。
[Abstract]:In the principal-agent relationship, the agency conflict between shareholders and management comes from two parts, one is the direct infringement on the company value and shareholders' interests caused by the moral hazard behavior of the management. The other part is the output gap caused by the underinvestment of management due to risk aversion, which is defined as "explicit agency cost" and "implicit agency cost" respectively. The aim of equity incentive is to unify the objective function of shareholders and management, on the one hand, by increasing the private cost of moral hazard behavior, on the other hand, by increasing the private income of management's investment decision. The empirical test of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2006 to 2015 proves that equity incentive significantly reduces the explicit agency cost and implicit agency cost. The results of intermediary effect test show that these two kinds of agency costs play a part of intermediary role in the relationship between equity incentive and corporate performance, and the path of equity incentive is explicit agency cost and implicit agency cost. Indirectly improved the company's performance.
【作者單位】： 四川大學(xué);
【基金】：四川省哲學(xué)社會(huì)科學(xué)規(guī)劃重大招標(biāo)項(xiàng)目“四川省創(chuàng)新驅(qū)動(dòng)發(fā)展戰(zhàn)略的產(chǎn)業(yè)實(shí)現(xiàn)與政策研究”(項(xiàng)目編號(hào):SC13ZD05)
【分類號(hào)】：F272.92;F275;F832.51
【正文快照】： 一、引言傳統(tǒng)委托代理視角下,股東與管理層(1)因?yàn)槟繕?biāo)利益函數(shù)的差異而產(chǎn)生代理沖突,表現(xiàn)為管理層往往憑借對企業(yè)較大的控制權(quán)進(jìn)行掏空公司、侵犯股東權(quán)益等一系列行為,造成公司的營業(yè)外支出,是公司價(jià)值及股東利益的顯性損失(李壽喜,2007)。[1]而在股東與管理層的委托代理關(guān)

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