本文關(guān)鍵詞：上市公司盈余管理與投資效率的相關(guān)性研究　出處：《山東財經(jīng)大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

  更多相關(guān)文章： 盈余管理 信息不對稱 投資不足 過度投資 投資效率

【摘要】：自20世紀(jì)80年代開始，西方財務(wù)會計理論界致力于盈余管理的研究，盈余管理成為西方國家尤其是美國實證會計研究的重點之一。在我國，盈余管理是隨著股份有限公司股票上市而出現(xiàn)的新問題。迄今為止，國內(nèi)外學(xué)者已經(jīng)圍繞盈余管理的動因、手段和經(jīng)濟(jì)后果等進(jìn)行了廣泛的分析和檢驗。 就盈余管理的經(jīng)濟(jì)后果而言，傳統(tǒng)研究主要集中于盈余管理對企業(yè)契約以及對投資者、債權(quán)人等外部利益相關(guān)者的影響，只有少量文獻(xiàn)涉及盈余管理對企業(yè)內(nèi)部決策的影響。如Bar Gill和Bebchuk（2002）認(rèn)為，由于公司可以通過虛夸業(yè)績獲取低成本的資金，所以盈余管理的公司更容易實施無效的投資項目。Wang（2005）的研究認(rèn)為，財務(wù)舞弊公司為了降低被揭露的風(fēng)險，更傾向投資于高風(fēng)險高收益項目，并存在過度投資的現(xiàn)象。 本文從投資效率的視角研究了上市公司在我國社會背景下盈余管理的經(jīng)濟(jì)后果，采用理論分析和實證檢驗相結(jié)合的方法，對2011-2012年深滬兩市上市公司的所有A股進(jìn)行實證研究。研究結(jié)果表明：盈余管理行為會降低企業(yè)的投資效率。在此基礎(chǔ)上，本文又將盈余管理分為正向盈余管理和負(fù)向盈余管理兩組數(shù)據(jù)，隨后，將這兩組數(shù)據(jù)分別與投資效率進(jìn)行回歸分析，，結(jié)果顯示：負(fù)向盈余管理與投資不足正相關(guān)，而正向盈余管理與投資不足的回歸結(jié)果不顯著，這說明負(fù)向盈余管理的企業(yè)更可能出現(xiàn)投資不足的情況；負(fù)向盈余管理與投資過度、正向盈余管理與投資過度均出現(xiàn)正相關(guān)，這說明負(fù)向盈余管理的企業(yè)也可能會出現(xiàn)投資過度的現(xiàn)象，原因是企業(yè)進(jìn)行負(fù)向盈余管理一般都是采用平滑利潤或使利潤最小化等手段，其目的是使利潤發(fā)生較大變化，但不改變企業(yè)本身的現(xiàn)金流及投資能力；存在正向盈余管理行為的企業(yè)更可能過度投資。本文由此得出結(jié)論：盈余管理不僅影響外部投資者對其進(jìn)行的投資決策，也會影響本單位的投資效率，損害市場資源的有效配置。因此，必須采用有效措施抑制公司的盈余管理行為。
[Abstract]:Since 1980s, the western financial accounting theorists have devoted themselves to the study of earnings management, and earnings management has become one of the focuses of empirical accounting research in western countries, especially in the United States. Earnings management is a new problem in the stock market of limited stock companies. So far, scholars at home and abroad have carried out extensive analysis and testing on the causes, means and economic consequences of earnings management. As far as the economic consequences of earnings management are concerned, the traditional research focuses on the impact of earnings management on corporate contracts and external stakeholders such as investors and creditors. There is only a small amount of literature on the impact of earnings management on internal corporate decisions, such as Bar Gill and Bebchukn 2002, which argue that companies can obtain low-cost funds by boasting about their performance. Therefore, earnings management companies are more likely to implement ineffective investment projects. Wangyn 2005) the study that financial fraud companies in order to reduce the exposure of risk, more inclined to invest in high risk and high return projects. And there is an overinvestment phenomenon. From the perspective of investment efficiency, this paper studies the economic consequences of earnings management of listed companies under the social background of our country, and adopts the method of combining theoretical analysis and empirical test. The empirical study on all A-shares of listed companies in Shenzhen and Shanghai from 2011-2012. The results show that earnings management behavior will reduce the investment efficiency of enterprises. On this basis. In this paper, earnings management is divided into positive earnings management and negative earnings management two groups of data, and then the two groups of data and investment efficiency regression analysis. The results show that the negative earnings management is positively related to the insufficient investment, but the regression result between the positive earnings management and the insufficient investment is not significant, which indicates that the enterprises with the negative earnings management are more likely to underinvest; Negative earnings management and excessive investment, positive earnings management and investment excessive appear positive correlation, which shows that negative earnings management enterprises may also have the phenomenon of excessive investment. The reason is that the negative earnings management is usually carried out by means of smoothing profits or minimizing profits, the purpose of which is to make the profits change greatly, but not to change the cash flow and investment ability of the enterprises themselves. Enterprises with positive earnings management behavior are more likely to overinvest. This paper concludes that earnings management not only affects the investment decisions of external investors, but also affects the investment efficiency of the unit. Therefore, effective measures must be taken to restrain the earnings management behavior of companies.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：山東財經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F275;F832.51

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