本文關(guān)鍵詞：上市公司控制權(quán)溢價影響因素的實證研究　出處：《山東大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

  更多相關(guān)文章： 控制權(quán) 控制權(quán)溢價 影響因素

【摘要】：伴隨著我國股權(quán)轉(zhuǎn)讓市場的逐步完善,股權(quán)交易市場中控制權(quán)的轉(zhuǎn)移交易成為一種普遍現(xiàn)象。上個世紀(jì)末以來,隨著學(xué)者們對公司治理理論的深入研究,逐漸打破了在古典經(jīng)濟學(xué)領(lǐng)域中對“股權(quán)同質(zhì)性”假設(shè),即事實上,全部股東并非按照其所持股份比例享受同等比例的收益。在很多國家尤其是發(fā)展中國家,公司股權(quán)的分散程度不高,控股股東與中小股東所持股份比例差異性非常明顯,而這一現(xiàn)實現(xiàn)狀的存在,使得在相對集中的股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)下,控股股東與中小股東之間的代理沖突也逐漸成為公司治理領(lǐng)域中委托代理理論的一個核心問題。自此,股權(quán)轉(zhuǎn)移交易中的控制權(quán)轉(zhuǎn)移交易溢價現(xiàn)象也開始為各方所關(guān)注�；诖�,合理衡量上市公司控制權(quán)轉(zhuǎn)讓的溢價水平,并探討控制權(quán)溢價現(xiàn)象產(chǎn)生的影響因素及形成機理,不僅能夠提供有效控制不合理溢價的政策措施,以保護中小股東的利益,同時能夠為進一步研究控制權(quán)轉(zhuǎn)讓定價問題提供科學(xué)依據(jù)。 基于對相關(guān)理論基礎(chǔ)和國內(nèi)外文獻的回顧,本文以2006至2013年間公布轉(zhuǎn)讓價格的上市公司股權(quán)轉(zhuǎn)讓交易為樣本,通過采用大小宗股權(quán)配對交易差異法,度量出我國控制權(quán)溢價平均水平為34%,證實了我國上市公司控制權(quán)轉(zhuǎn)讓交易中存在顯著的溢價現(xiàn)象。 在影響因素方面,分別從目標(biāo)公司財務(wù)特征、債權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)特征和治理結(jié)構(gòu)特征三個維度建立多元線性回歸模型對控制權(quán)轉(zhuǎn)讓溢價的影響因素進行回歸分析,并得到以下主要結(jié)論： (1)對財務(wù)特征影響程度的研究發(fā)現(xiàn),目標(biāo)公司的資本密集度、現(xiàn)金比例、總資產(chǎn)收益率與控制權(quán)溢價水平顯著正相關(guān),股權(quán)代理成本與控制權(quán)溢價水平顯著負(fù)相關(guān),而公司規(guī)模與控制權(quán)溢價水平負(fù)相關(guān),但是回歸結(jié)果不顯著,資產(chǎn)增長率以及財務(wù)杠桿與控制權(quán)溢價水平正相關(guān),但是回歸結(jié)果也不顯著。 (2)對債權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)特征影響程度的研究發(fā)現(xiàn),目標(biāo)公司長期債務(wù)比例、商業(yè)信用負(fù)債方式與控制權(quán)溢價水平顯著負(fù)相關(guān),目標(biāo)公司短期債務(wù)比例、銀行借款負(fù)債方式與控制權(quán)溢價水平負(fù)相關(guān),但是回歸結(jié)果不顯著。 (3)對治理結(jié)構(gòu)特征影響程度的研究發(fā)現(xiàn),目標(biāo)公司的股權(quán)集中度與控制權(quán)溢價水平顯著負(fù)相關(guān),股權(quán)制衡度與控制權(quán)溢價水平顯著正相關(guān),內(nèi)部控制質(zhì)量評價指標(biāo)與控制權(quán)溢價顯著負(fù)相關(guān),而目標(biāo)公司董事會規(guī)模、獨立董事比例、內(nèi)部控制評價報告披露與否、事務(wù)所規(guī)模大小、審計意見類型與控制權(quán)溢價水平不相關(guān)。 最后,基于上述分析結(jié)果,本文分別從加強部門監(jiān)管、提高債權(quán)人監(jiān)控力度以及完善公司治理機制方面提出相關(guān)政策建議,并指出論文研究的不足及展望。
[Abstract]:With the gradual improvement of the equity transfer market in China, the transfer of control rights in the equity trading market has become a common phenomenon. Since the end of 0th century, with the in-depth study of corporate governance theory by scholars. Gradually broke with the classical economics of the "equity homogeneity" hypothesis, that is, in fact, all shareholders do not enjoy the same proportion of their share of the income. In many countries, especially in the developing countries. The degree of dispersion of corporate equity is not high, the difference between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders is very obvious, and the existence of this reality makes the relatively concentrated ownership structure. The agency conflict between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders has gradually become a core issue of principal-agent theory in the field of corporate governance. The phenomenon of the premium of the transfer of control rights in the equity transfer transaction has also begun to be concerned by all parties. Based on this, the reasonable measurement of the premium level of the transfer of control rights of listed companies. The paper also discusses the influencing factors and forming mechanism of the phenomenon of control premium, which can not only provide effective policy measures to control unreasonable premium, but also protect the interests of minority shareholders. At the same time, it can provide scientific basis for further research on transfer pricing of control rights. Based on the review of relevant theoretical basis and domestic and foreign literature, this paper takes the stock transfer transactions of listed companies published from 2006 to 2013 as samples. By using the method of the difference of the right of control pairs, the average level of the control right premium in our country is 34. It is proved that there is a significant premium phenomenon in the transfer of the control rights of the listed companies in our country. In terms of influencing factors, the multiple linear regression model is established from the three dimensions of target company financial characteristics, debt structure characteristics and governance structure characteristics to analyze the factors affecting the transfer premium of control rights. The main conclusions are as follows: 1) the study on the influence of financial characteristics shows that the capital intensity, cash ratio, total return on assets and the level of control premium of the target company are significantly positively correlated. The cost of equity agency is negatively correlated with the level of control premium, while the size of company is negatively correlated with the level of control premium, but the regression results are not significant, asset growth rate and financial leverage are positively correlated with the level of control premium. But the regression results are not significant. 2) the study on the influence degree of creditor's rights structure found that the ratio of long-term debt, the way of commercial credit debt and the level of control premium were significantly negative, and the ratio of short-term debt of target company was negative. The way of bank borrowing debt is negatively correlated with the level of control premium, but the regression result is not significant. 3) the research on the influence degree of governance structure found that the ownership concentration of the target company is negatively correlated with the level of control premium, and the equity balance degree is positively correlated with the level of control premium. Internal control quality evaluation index and control premium significantly negative correlation, and target company board size, independent director ratio, internal control evaluation report disclosure or not, the size of the firm. The type of audit opinion is not related to the level of control premium. Finally, based on the above analysis results, this paper respectively from the strengthening of departmental supervision, improve the monitoring of creditors and improve the corporate governance mechanism of the relevant policy recommendations, and pointed out the deficiencies and prospects of the paper.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：山東大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F832.51;F275

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