本文關(guān)鍵詞：證券分析師關(guān)注對(duì)財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告重大錯(cuò)報(bào)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的影響研究　出處：《吉林大學(xué)》2017年博士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

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【摘要】：資本市場(chǎng)秩序的建立和保持需要具備真實(shí)可靠的信息,其中可靠的財(cái)務(wù)信息是投資者及其他利益關(guān)系人進(jìn)行經(jīng)濟(jì)決策的基礎(chǔ),也是維持資本市場(chǎng)秩序和保證資本市場(chǎng)正常運(yùn)行的關(guān)鍵。但由于我國(guó)資本市場(chǎng)存在監(jiān)督機(jī)制不夠完善、法律制度不足等問題,有些上市公司披露的財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告中存在重大錯(cuò)報(bào)的信息,嚴(yán)重地誤導(dǎo)了報(bào)表使用者的相關(guān)決策,使生產(chǎn)力發(fā)展和資源的有效配置受到了阻礙,損害了市場(chǎng)主體的合法權(quán)益。因此,尋找資本市場(chǎng)多方參與者的監(jiān)督力量,提高中介機(jī)構(gòu)的監(jiān)督效力,降低上市公司財(cái)務(wù)信息重大錯(cuò)報(bào)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)成為了優(yōu)化資本市場(chǎng)資源配置的重要基礎(chǔ)。在信息經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)理論下,企業(yè)會(huì)計(jì)信息從內(nèi)向外流動(dòng)的過程形成了“信息生產(chǎn)——信息控制——信息鑒證——信息接收(披露)”的鏈條。在此鏈條中,上市公司、外部審計(jì)師、投資者、監(jiān)管部門等各自起到了不同的作用。資本市場(chǎng)的制約體制包括注冊(cè)分析師、會(huì)計(jì)準(zhǔn)則、資本市場(chǎng)監(jiān)管及反欺詐和內(nèi)部交易的相關(guān)法律,有效的制約體制能夠幫助防止和識(shí)別上市公司財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告中存在的重大錯(cuò)報(bào)問題。但由于我國(guó)的監(jiān)管力度較弱,投資者保護(hù)還不完善,除了健全現(xiàn)有的制約體制外,尋找其他資本市場(chǎng)的監(jiān)督力量是保持資本市場(chǎng)有效運(yùn)行、降低投資者與上市公司之間信息不對(duì)稱程度的關(guān)鍵因素。作為資本市場(chǎng)的信息中介和上市公司的外部監(jiān)督機(jī)制,證券分析師在資本市場(chǎng)信息監(jiān)管體系中扮演了重要的角色。Dyck等(2010)通過對(duì)美國(guó)資本市場(chǎng)的會(huì)計(jì)欺詐案例進(jìn)行搜集,發(fā)現(xiàn)證券分析師識(shí)別舞弊公司的效率要遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)高于市場(chǎng)監(jiān)管層及審計(jì)師。在我國(guó)近年來發(fā)生的財(cái)務(wù)造假事件中,證券分析機(jī)構(gòu)“渾水”沽空公司對(duì)“輝山乳業(yè)”虛報(bào)資產(chǎn)的發(fā)現(xiàn),以及證券分析師蒲某對(duì)“銀廣夏”夸大生產(chǎn)利潤(rùn)的跟蹤和證實(shí),都向市場(chǎng)揭露了財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告中存在的重大錯(cuò)報(bào)信息,引起了監(jiān)管層及投資者的注意。與注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師和政府監(jiān)管相比,證券分析師可以從多渠道獲取公司的信息,包括參加股東大會(huì)、電話會(huì)議和與管理層的私人談話等,因此信息搜集的成本較低;與投資者相比,證券分析師具有更專業(yè)的背景知識(shí),因此信息解析能力更強(qiáng)。盡管以往研究強(qiáng)調(diào)了分析師關(guān)注與會(huì)計(jì)信息質(zhì)量之間的關(guān)系,但是研究結(jié)果并不一致。本文認(rèn)為這是源自兩個(gè)方面的原因:一是我國(guó)證券分析師行業(yè)尚處于發(fā)展階段,政府部門對(duì)于中介機(jī)構(gòu)的監(jiān)管還不完善,因此導(dǎo)致研究結(jié)果受制度環(huán)境的影響;二是已有研究缺乏從會(huì)計(jì)信息傳遞鏈條的整個(gè)過程出發(fā),對(duì)分析師關(guān)注問題進(jìn)行研究,因此不能全面系統(tǒng)地針對(duì)分析師關(guān)注對(duì)上市公司披露會(huì)計(jì)信息的影響進(jìn)行分析。本文借鑒以往研究和現(xiàn)有理論,從研究分析師對(duì)會(huì)計(jì)信息鏈的“制作(生產(chǎn))——控制——鑒證——接收(披露)”流程各層面的影響作用入手,為分析師關(guān)注對(duì)財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告重大錯(cuò)報(bào)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的影響機(jī)理提出了新的解釋框架。本文通過實(shí)證研究發(fā)現(xiàn),分析師關(guān)注較高的上市公司,財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告存在的重大錯(cuò)報(bào)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)較低。具體表現(xiàn)為:(1)在信息制作層面,本文從兩個(gè)方面衡量了上市公司財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告存在重大錯(cuò)報(bào)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。一方面,重大錯(cuò)報(bào)在制作層面的直接表征為財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告舞弊或財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告重述。研究發(fā)現(xiàn),分析師關(guān)注較高的公司,財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告舞弊、及財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告重述發(fā)生的概率越低。另一方面,重大錯(cuò)報(bào)在制作層面的間接表征為盈余管理信息風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。通過識(shí)別上市公司財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告中與業(yè)績(jī)波動(dòng)相關(guān)的可操控應(yīng)計(jì)部分,本文發(fā)現(xiàn),分析師關(guān)注越高的上市公司,財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告中存在的盈余管理信息風(fēng)險(xiǎn)及基本面信息風(fēng)險(xiǎn)越低。(2)在信息控制層面,本文認(rèn)為,當(dāng)上市公司的內(nèi)部監(jiān)督機(jī)制出現(xiàn)問題時(shí),分析師可能會(huì)選擇及時(shí)地發(fā)現(xiàn)并溝通,如果溝通沒有達(dá)到有效提高內(nèi)部控制的目的,分析師在避免發(fā)布負(fù)面預(yù)測(cè)的情況下會(huì)采取停止對(duì)企業(yè)跟蹤的方式向市場(chǎng)傳遞信號(hào)。因此,在信息的“產(chǎn)品控制”階段,分析師的關(guān)注有效提高了公司內(nèi)部的治理環(huán)境,顯著地降低了管理層舞弊的“合理化”因素,從而降低了財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告中可能存在的重大錯(cuò)報(bào)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。研究發(fā)現(xiàn),分析師關(guān)注較高的公司,披露內(nèi)部控制報(bào)告的可能性越高,內(nèi)部控制的有效性越高,內(nèi)部控制存在缺陷的概率越低。(3)在信息鑒證層面,通過前兩個(gè)階段分析師對(duì)信息制作和控制的關(guān)注,提高了企業(yè)的信息環(huán)境,完善了上市公司的內(nèi)部監(jiān)督機(jī)制,有效降低了財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告舞弊或錯(cuò)報(bào)可能存在的概率,因此,減少了注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師需要投入的審計(jì)成本,同時(shí)增加上市公司被出具“清潔”審計(jì)意見的概率。本文主要的研究貢獻(xiàn)如下:第一,構(gòu)建了分析師關(guān)注對(duì)財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告重大錯(cuò)報(bào)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)影響的新的解釋框架,為分析師關(guān)注對(duì)會(huì)計(jì)信息傳遞的整個(gè)鏈條具有監(jiān)督和改善的作用提供了理論依據(jù)。研究認(rèn)為,會(huì)計(jì)信息是企業(yè)向外界披露的“產(chǎn)品”,從產(chǎn)品的制作到“消費(fèi)者”手中,經(jīng)歷了“制作(會(huì)計(jì)報(bào)告的編制)——控制(企業(yè)內(nèi)部控制)——鑒證(注冊(cè)會(huì)計(jì)師審計(jì))——接收(披露給報(bào)告使用者)”的一系列流程。但是,以往大量文獻(xiàn)把焦點(diǎn)放在分析師關(guān)注對(duì)資本市場(chǎng)反應(yīng)或財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告盈余質(zhì)量的影響,忽略了分析師作為資本市場(chǎng)信息中介和上市公司外部監(jiān)督者對(duì)于會(huì)計(jì)信息流動(dòng)各層面的影響作用。第二,根據(jù)會(huì)計(jì)信息傳遞鏈條的不同層面,構(gòu)建了財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告重大錯(cuò)報(bào)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)新的度量體系。以往文獻(xiàn)主要以受到證監(jiān)會(huì)處罰,或可操控應(yīng)計(jì)利潤(rùn)作為公司財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告存在重大錯(cuò)報(bào)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的衡量變量,但此類替代變量存在局限性:一是沒有受到違規(guī)處罰的公司并不意味著其披露的財(cái)務(wù)信息是“清潔的”(即完全不存在重大錯(cuò)報(bào)風(fēng)險(xiǎn));二是由于盈余管理是中性的,可操控應(yīng)計(jì)利潤(rùn)的高低并不能直接代表上市公司財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告是否存在重大錯(cuò)報(bào)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。因此本研究對(duì)重大錯(cuò)報(bào)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的衡量根據(jù)會(huì)計(jì)信息的傳遞進(jìn)行了多層面的量化,使研究結(jié)論更具有可靠性。第三,本文的研究結(jié)果著重強(qiáng)調(diào)了資本市場(chǎng)中介機(jī)構(gòu)——證券分析師在市場(chǎng)信息傳遞中的重要作用。隨著我國(guó)資本市場(chǎng)規(guī)模的不斷增長(zhǎng),證券分析師從早期不規(guī)范的民間“股評(píng)師”,發(fā)展到截止2017年從事證券投資業(yè)務(wù)的2309人,他們對(duì)于上市公司披露會(huì)計(jì)信息質(zhì)量的影響越來越重要。因此,本研究的主要現(xiàn)實(shí)意義在于引起監(jiān)管層對(duì)如何利用分析師的職業(yè)特點(diǎn)和信息優(yōu)勢(shì),提高上市公司會(huì)計(jì)信息質(zhì)量,完善資本市場(chǎng)會(huì)計(jì)監(jiān)管等問題的重視。研究結(jié)論以期為政府監(jiān)管及資本市場(chǎng)利益相關(guān)者作為未來決策參考。
[Abstract]:The capital market in order to establish and maintain a need to have reliable information, the reliable financial information is the basis for investors and other stakeholders to make economic decisions, but also to maintain the order of the capital market and the key to ensure the normal operation of the capital market. But because of the existence of China's capital market supervision mechanism is not perfect, the legal system deficiencies. The material misstatement disclosure of some listed companies in the financial report information, seriously mislead the decision of the users of financial statements, the effective allocation of resources and the development of productive forces is hindered, damage the legitimate rights and interests of market players. Therefore, looking for the supervisory power of multi participants in the capital market, improve the supervision of intermediary effect, become the important basis for optimizing the capital market allocation of resources to reduce the financial information of listed companies the risk of material misstatement in the information economy theory. The theory, the process of accounting information flow from the inside the formation of the "information control information assurance information receiving information production (Disclosure)" of the chain. This chain, listed companies, external auditors, investors, regulators and other respective plays a different role. The capital market including the registration and control system analysts, accounting standards, capital market supervision laws and anti fraud and insider trading, to help prevent problems of material misstatement and recognition of financial reports of Listed Companies in the system to restrict the effective supervision of our country. But due to the weak investor protection is not perfect, in addition to the existing restriction system, supervision power look for other capital market is to maintain the effective operation of capital market, a key factor in reducing the information asymmetry between investors and listed companies in the capital market. The information intermediary and the external supervision mechanism of listed companies, securities analysts play an important role in.Dyck information supervision system in the capital market (2010) collected by the American capital market accounting fraud case, found that the efficiency of securities analyst identification fraud companies is much higher than the market regulators and auditors. In the event of China in recent years in the event of financial fraud, securities analysis agency muddy water short of Huishan company false assets and securities analysts "found a Po of" Yinguangxia "exaggerated production profit tracking and confirmed all revealed the material misstatement in the financial report information to the market, has attracted regulatory attention and investors. Compared with the CPA and the government supervision, the securities analyst can obtain company information from multiple channels, including telephone conferences and participate in the general meeting of shareholders, and The management of private conversation, so the information gathering and low cost; compared with investors, securities analysts have more professional background knowledge, so the information analysis ability. Although previous studies emphasize the relationship between analysts concerned with the quality of accounting information, but the results are not consistent. This paper argues that this is derived from two reasons a: China securities industry analyst is still in the stage of development, government departments for intermediary supervision is not perfect, resulting in the results affected by the institutional environment; the two is the lack of existing research from the whole process of accounting information transmission chain, conducts the research to the analyst concerns, therefore cannot systematically according to analysts concerned about the impact of accounting information disclosure of listed companies is analyzed. Based on the existing theory and previous research, from the research analyst for Production information chain "(production) - control - Verification - receiving (Disclosure)" with the influence process of each level, the influence mechanism of the financial report of the analyst for the risk of material misstatement concerning the proposed new framework. The empirical research shows that analysts pay attention to the higher of the listed companies, the existing financial report the risk of material misstatement is low. The specific performance: (1) in the information production level, this paper measures the risk of material misstatement of the financial report of listed companies from two aspects. On the one hand, the material misstatement in the characterization of the production level for financial reporting fraud or financial restatements. The study found that analysts focused on high the company, financial reporting fraud, and financial reporting restatements probability is lower. On the other hand, material misstatement in the indirect characterization of production levels for information risk of earnings management. Through the identification of listed companies Our financial report and performance fluctuation can be part of manipulation, this paper found that analysts look more listed companies, earnings management and risk information of basic information on risks of financial report is lower. (2) in the information control aspect, this paper argues that, when the internal supervision mechanism of listed company problems, the analyst may choose to promptly discover and communicate, if communication is not effectively improve the objective of internal control, to avoid the release of negative analyst in the case of prediction will be taken to stop the enterprise tracking method of transmitting a signal to the market. Therefore, in the information of the product control stage, analysts' attention to effectively improve the environmental governance within the company, significantly reduced the management fraud "rationalization" factors, thereby reducing the risk of material misstatement may exist in the financial report. The study found that analysts Pay attention to the higher, the possibility of disclosure of internal control report is high, the effectiveness of internal control is higher, the probability of internal control deficiencies is low. (3) in the information assurance level, through the first two stages of information analyst making and control attention, improve the enterprise information environment, perfecting the listed company the internal supervision mechanism, to effectively reduce the probability of financial reporting fraud or misstatement may exist therefore, reducing the need to invest in the CPA audit cost, and increase the probability of listed companies was issued by the "clean" audit opinions. The main research contributions are as follows: first, construct the analyst attention to financial report significant wrong at risk of a new framework, provides a theoretical basis for the analyst attention has supervision and improvement of accounting information transfer of the entire chain. Research shows that accounting information is Companies to disclose the "product", from the manufacture of products to consumers hands, experienced production (accounting report) - control (internal control) - Verification (CPA) - receiving (Disclosure of users to report) "a series of processes. However, the previous literatures focus in the analysts are concerned about the impact on the capital market reaction or financial reporting of earnings quality, ignoring the analyst as the capital market information intermediaries and listed companies external supervisors for the accounting information flow impact on all levels for second, according to the different level of accounting information transmission chain, constructs the financial report of the risks of material misstatement of the new measurement system. The previous literature mainly to the punishment by the CSRC, or manipulation of accruals as variables to measure the financial report of the company there is the risk of material misstatement, but such alternative The amount of limitations: one is not punishment, does not mean that the disclosure of financial information is "clean" (i.e. there is no risk of material misstatement); two is due to the earnings management is neutral and can be manipulated directly on behalf of isn't profit in the financial report of the company whether there the risk of material misstatement. Therefore the research on the risk of material misstatement measure according to the transfer of accounting information to quantify the level, so the conclusion is more reliable. Third, the results of this study emphasize the capital market intermediaries -- an important role in the transmission of information in the market. With the growing scale of securities analysts China's capital market, securities analysts from nonstandard folk "stock analysts" early, to 2309 by the end of 2017 to invest in securities business, they put to the listed company Effect of exposure of the quality of accounting information is more and more important. Therefore, the main significance of this research is caused by regulators on how to use the analyst's occupation characteristics and information advantage, improve the quality of accounting information of listed companies, improve the capital market accounting supervision and attention. The research conclusion in order to government regulation and capital market stakeholders as a future reference.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：吉林大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：F275;F832.51
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本文編號(hào)：1371060