本文關(guān)鍵詞：異質(zhì)機(jī)構(gòu)對(duì)創(chuàng)業(yè)板公司自主創(chuàng)新的影響研究　出處：《大連理工大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文　論文類(lèi)型：學(xué)位論文

  更多相關(guān)文章： 機(jī)構(gòu)投資者 異質(zhì)性識(shí)別 自主創(chuàng)新 創(chuàng)業(yè)板市場(chǎng)

【摘要】：目前中國(guó)的經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)正受到全球性金融危機(jī)以及可持續(xù)發(fā)展所帶來(lái)的雙重挑戰(zhàn),自主創(chuàng)新成為促進(jìn)中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展的重要推動(dòng)力。創(chuàng)業(yè)板市場(chǎng)的成立旨在為自主創(chuàng)新企業(yè)提供發(fā)展平臺(tái),為中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)的增長(zhǎng)提供原動(dòng)力,因此,有必要研究創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司的創(chuàng)新能力。股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)、董事會(huì)結(jié)構(gòu)、管理者激勵(lì)等公司內(nèi)部治理機(jī)制通過(guò)自主創(chuàng)新投資決策的制定,影響公司自主創(chuàng)新能力。近年來(lái),中國(guó)機(jī)構(gòu)投資者持股比重日益增大,市場(chǎng)地位不斷上升,機(jī)構(gòu)投資者作為一項(xiàng)重要的公司外部治理安排,通過(guò)“用手投票”的方式,積極介入公司內(nèi)部治理,關(guān)注公司績(jī)效和長(zhǎng)期價(jià)值,給創(chuàng)業(yè)板公司自主創(chuàng)新帶來(lái)了不可忽視的影響。 在上述背景下,本文首先回顧了與本文研究相關(guān)的文獻(xiàn),然后基于行為金融理論和委托代理理論,從機(jī)構(gòu)投資者異質(zhì)性視角建立了公司管理者自主創(chuàng)新決策的博弈模型,探討不同類(lèi)型機(jī)構(gòu)投資者對(duì)公司自主創(chuàng)新的影響差異。其次,本文選取2009-2012年持有創(chuàng)業(yè)板股票的基金為樣本,以投資組合集中度、風(fēng)險(xiǎn)偏好、投資組合周轉(zhuǎn)率三個(gè)指標(biāo)將基金劃分為風(fēng)險(xiǎn)厭惡的長(zhǎng)期機(jī)構(gòu)投資者和風(fēng)險(xiǎn)偏好的短期機(jī)構(gòu)投資者。最后,本文選取我國(guó)創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司2009-2012年的數(shù)據(jù)為研究樣本,以RD投入和專利申請(qǐng)數(shù)量作為自主創(chuàng)新投入和產(chǎn)出代理變量,以持股基金所屬類(lèi)別的虛擬變量為機(jī)構(gòu)投資者異質(zhì)性的代理變量,采用面板數(shù)據(jù)實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)了機(jī)構(gòu)投資者異質(zhì)對(duì)創(chuàng)業(yè)板公司自主創(chuàng)新的影響。結(jié)果顯示,機(jī)構(gòu)投資者總體持股對(duì)公司自主創(chuàng)新的投入和產(chǎn)出均有顯著的正向影響；風(fēng)險(xiǎn)厭惡的長(zhǎng)期機(jī)構(gòu)投資者與公司自主創(chuàng)新的投入和產(chǎn)出都有正相關(guān)關(guān)系；風(fēng)險(xiǎn)偏好的短期機(jī)構(gòu)投資者與公司自主創(chuàng)新投入負(fù)相關(guān),與產(chǎn)出不相關(guān)。通過(guò)結(jié)論分析,本文提出未來(lái)政策關(guān)注的焦點(diǎn)應(yīng)在于加強(qiáng)對(duì)機(jī)構(gòu)投資者的扶持和監(jiān)管,培養(yǎng)其長(zhǎng)期投資理念,進(jìn)一步發(fā)揮其參與公司自主創(chuàng)新的積極作用。
[Abstract]:At present, China's economic growth is being challenged by the global financial crisis and sustainable development. Independent innovation has become an important driving force to promote the economic development of China. The establishment of the gem market aims to provide a platform for the development of independent innovation enterprises and a driving force for the growth of China's economy. It is necessary to study the innovation ability, ownership structure, board structure, manager incentive and other internal governance mechanisms of gem listed companies through independent innovation investment decision-making. In recent years, the proportion of institutional investors holding shares in China is increasing, the market position is rising, institutional investors as an important external corporate governance arrangements. Through the way of "voting by hand", we can actively intervene in the internal governance of the company, pay attention to the performance and the long-term value of the company, and bring the independent innovation to the gem company to bring the influence which can not be ignored. Under the above background, this paper first reviews the literature related to this study, then based on behavioral finance theory and principal-agent theory. From the perspective of institutional investor heterogeneity, this paper establishes a game model of corporate managers' independent innovation decision-making, and discusses the different types of institutional investors' influence on corporate independent innovation. Secondly. This paper selects the fund which holds the gem stock in 2009-2012 as the sample, takes the investment portfolio concentration degree, the risk preference. Three indicators of portfolio turnover divide the fund into long-term risk-averse institutional investors and short-term risk-averse institutional investors. This paper selects the data of China's gem listed companies from 2009-2012 as the research sample, taking R D input and patent application as proxy variables of independent innovation input and output. Taking the fictitious variable of the ownership fund as the agency variable of institutional investor heterogeneity, the paper empirically tests the influence of institutional investor heterogeneity on the independent innovation of gem companies by panel data. The results show that. Institutional investors' overall shareholding has a significant positive impact on the input and output of independent innovation; Long-term institutional investors with risk aversion have positive correlation with the input and output of independent innovation. Short-term institutional investors of risk preference have negative correlation with independent innovation input, but not with output. Through the conclusion analysis, this paper puts forward that the focus of future policy should be to strengthen the support and supervision of institutional investors. Cultivate its long-term investment concept and further play its active role in independent innovation.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：大連理工大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F276.1;F832.51

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