本文關(guān)鍵詞：多重代理關(guān)系質(zhì)量對(duì)創(chuàng)業(yè)企業(yè)IPO折價(jià)的影響　出處：《南京大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

  更多相關(guān)文章： 風(fēng)險(xiǎn)資本 承銷商 CEO屬性 折價(jià) 多重代理 創(chuàng)業(yè)企業(yè)

【摘要】：IPO (Initial Public Offerings)折價(jià)是上市過(guò)程中非常常見(jiàn)的現(xiàn)象,在各個(gè)國(guó)家的股票市場(chǎng)上都可以發(fā)現(xiàn)。關(guān)于這方面的研究也相應(yīng)的成為各國(guó)學(xué)者、金融公司忠于探索的焦點(diǎn),其中對(duì)折價(jià)原因的追索甚多,成果也頗豐,比如信息不對(duì)稱理論、代理理論等。然而,在眾多針對(duì)IPO折價(jià)提出的假說(shuō)和模型中,即便有些許具備一定的實(shí)證支持,但是關(guān)于IPO折價(jià)的所有相關(guān)現(xiàn)象仍舊無(wú)法得到令人完全信服的理論解釋,它始終是學(xué)術(shù)界的一個(gè)謎。中國(guó)資本市場(chǎng)走過(guò)這么多年,仍舊處于摸索的階段,IPO市場(chǎng)上的折價(jià)率居高不下,導(dǎo)致資金大量流向一級(jí)市場(chǎng),對(duì)于資金的有效配置是十分不利的。本文從我國(guó)2009年設(shè)立的創(chuàng)業(yè)板市場(chǎng)著手,以這樣一個(gè)新興的、創(chuàng)立時(shí)期較滬深兩市更成熟的階段成長(zhǎng)起來(lái)的市場(chǎng)為樣本,研究IPO折價(jià)的基本規(guī)律,得到基于我國(guó)特殊背景的IPO折價(jià)原因與規(guī)律,以期能夠?yàn)槔碚摻缣峁┬┰S思路,為金融界提供運(yùn)作靈感,為監(jiān)管者提供決策參考,為投資者提供相關(guān)建議。本文以2009年10月30日至2012年9月27日在創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市的351家企業(yè)作為研究對(duì)象,通過(guò)回歸分析法以及雙因子變異數(shù)分析法,研究以風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資、承銷商、CEO (Chief Executive Officer)為代表的多重代理關(guān)系的質(zhì)量對(duì)創(chuàng)業(yè)板IPO折價(jià)的影響。研究發(fā)現(xiàn)：(1)以VC (Venture Capital)與承銷商之前的合作關(guān)系來(lái)表示的VC社會(huì)資本與IPO折價(jià)有非常顯著的正相關(guān)關(guān)系,驗(yàn)證了VC的短期視角與這種合作關(guān)系帶來(lái)的相關(guān)利益偏好。(2)折價(jià)與承銷商聲譽(yù)存在負(fù)相關(guān)現(xiàn)象,后者確實(shí)能夠影響前者。在某種程度上,該情況可能是消解了外部投資者與IPO公司相互之間的信息不對(duì)稱而獲得的,也可能是承銷商聲譽(yù)所代表的“信息披露功能”和“中介認(rèn)證功能”得到了有效的發(fā)揮。(3)在回歸方程中引入承銷商與會(huì)計(jì)師事務(wù)所的先前合作關(guān)系,以此代表承銷商社會(huì)資本,其正相關(guān)于折價(jià),從而得到多重代理關(guān)系與折價(jià)的相互作用機(jī)制。有先前合作的兩者更可能將機(jī)構(gòu)投資者的利益放在首位,通過(guò)折價(jià)增加來(lái)形成利益傾斜。(4)在關(guān)于CEO屬性的相關(guān)變量中,CEO經(jīng)歷與IPO折價(jià)有非常顯著的正相關(guān)關(guān)系。本研究認(rèn)為CEO背景的復(fù)雜性確實(shí)會(huì)產(chǎn)生偏好,即偏好于其他利益相關(guān)者的利益實(shí)現(xiàn)。(5)在調(diào)節(jié)變量的實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)中,發(fā)現(xiàn)在VC有社會(huì)資本、承銷商聲譽(yù)低、承銷商有社會(huì)資本的時(shí)候,IPO折價(jià)會(huì)隨著CEO經(jīng)歷的增加而增加,兩兩相互之間的交互關(guān)系既已形成。在實(shí)踐背景下,需要考慮不同的人物配置、組織關(guān)系,來(lái)最大程度的減少上市公司所不希望發(fā)生的事情。
[Abstract]:IPO initial Public offering is a very common phenomenon in the process of listing. In each country's stock market can be found. About this aspect of the research has become the corresponding countries scholars, financial companies loyal to the focus of exploration, in which there are many reasons for the discount, the results are quite rich. For example, information asymmetry theory, agency theory and so on. However, in many hypotheses and models of IPO discount, even if there is some empirical support. But all the phenomena related to the IPO discount are still not fully convincing theoretical explanation, it has always been a mystery in academia. After so many years, China's capital market is still in the stage of groping. The high discount rate in the IPO market leads to a large amount of capital flowing to the primary market, which is very unfavorable to the effective allocation of funds. This paper starts with the gem market set up in 2009 in our country. Taking such a new market, which is more mature than Shanghai and Shenzhen stock market, as a sample, this paper studies the basic law of IPO discount, and obtains the reason and law of IPO discount based on the special background of our country. With a view to providing some ideas for the theoretical community, for the financial sector to provide operational inspiration, for regulators to provide decision-making reference. This paper takes 351 enterprises listed on the gem from October 30th 2009 to September 27th 2012 as the research object. By means of regression analysis and double factor ANOVA, venture capital and underwriter were studied. The influence of the quality of the Multi-agent relationship represented by CEO Chief Executive Office on the discount of IPO on the gem. The VC social capital expressed by Venture Capital's previous partnership with the underwriter has a very significant positive correlation with the IPO discount. It is verified that VC's short-term perspective has a negative correlation with the underwriter's reputation. To some extent, the discount has a negative correlation with the underwriter's reputation. To some extent, the latter can affect the former. This may have been achieved by eliminating information asymmetries between external investors and IPO. It is also possible that the "information disclosure function" and "intermediary certification function" represented by the reputation of underwriters have been effectively brought into play. 3) the former cooperative relationship between underwriters and accounting firms is introduced in the regression equation. As a representative of underwriter social capital, it is positively related to discount, thus obtaining the interaction mechanism of multi-agency relationship and discount. Both of them with prior cooperation are more likely to put the interests of institutional investors in the first place. Form an interest tilt by increasing the discount. 4) in the relevant variables about the CEO attribute. There is a significant positive correlation between CEO experience and IPO discount. This study suggests that the complexity of CEO background does generate preference. In the empirical test of adjusting variables, we find that when VC has social capital, underwriter has low reputation and underwriter has social capital. IPO discount will increase with the increase of CEO experience, and the interaction between two and two has already formed. In the background of practice, we need to consider different people configuration, organizational relationship. To minimize the number of listed companies do not want to happen.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：南京大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號(hào)】：F832.51

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