本文選題：碳排放 + 中央政府　； 參考：《中共中央黨�！�2014年碩士論文

【摘要】：摘要：2013年世界氣象組織在《2012年溫室氣體公報》中指出，從1990年到2012年，由于二氧化碳、甲烷和一氧化二氮等其它吸熱氣體的排放，全球氣候暖化效應(yīng)增加了32%，而主要化石燃料排放的二氧化碳占這一增量的80%。同時，從2011年到2012年，大氣中二氧化碳的增幅超過了過去十年的平均增速。據(jù)統(tǒng)計，中國在2007年就已是全球溫室氣體第一排放大國。2011年，中國人均碳排放量已超出全球平均水平的28%。因此，國際和國內(nèi)都面臨嚴峻的減排壓力。 本文研究碳排放中中央政府、地方政府與企業(yè)三者之間的關(guān)系。中央政府作為節(jié)能減排的政策制定者，，地方政府作為碳排放的監(jiān)督者，企業(yè)則作為碳排放主體。在碳排放過程中，中央政府，地方政府以及企業(yè)為實現(xiàn)自身利益最大化會展開博弈。各自利益出發(fā)點的差異是碳排放中中央政府、地方政府以及企業(yè)博弈的動因。同時，在碳排放中，地方政府與企業(yè)之間有某種利益相關(guān)性，它們會違背中央政府節(jié)能減排的意愿，進行合作博弈，即政企共謀。 通過建立碳排放中“中央政府—地方政府—企業(yè)”之間的三層博弈模型，定量分析地方政府與企業(yè)的最優(yōu)均衡協(xié)議和中央政府防備政企共謀協(xié)議，并論證允許政企共謀和防備政企共謀的條件。最后得出結(jié)論：在中央政府無約束的條件下，地方政府與企業(yè)之間會共謀；如果中央政府想防備政企共謀，需要盡量減少政企共謀收益；為防備政企共謀，中央政府設(shè)計一套激勵相容的約束機制非常必要；加強第四方媒體的監(jiān)督對中央政府防備政企共謀有利。政企共謀可以給企業(yè)以及地方政府帶來短期利益，但更會對其產(chǎn)生不利影響。 為更有效控制碳排放量，中央政府可以建立完善的財政管理體制、有效的權(quán)力監(jiān)督機制以及一套“綠色”政績考核規(guī)制來約束地方政府行為。中央政府也可以從清晰界定產(chǎn)權(quán)、征收碳稅稅種、建立碳排放權(quán)交易機制以及慎重使用經(jīng)濟強制措施等政策工具，同時，也可以鼓勵企業(yè)技術(shù)創(chuàng)新，拓寬企業(yè)融資渠道、營造減排良好環(huán)境和建立減排專項基金等經(jīng)濟杠桿鼓勵企業(yè)碳減排。中央政府也需要發(fā)揮第四方媒體的監(jiān)督作用。最后，我們也要充分發(fā)揮國際環(huán)保非政府組織的重要作用。
[Abstract]:Abstract: the 2013 World Meteorological Organization (WMO) stated in the greenhouse Gas Bulletin 2012 that from 1990 to 2012, due to emissions of other endothermic gases such as carbon dioxide, methane and nitrous oxide, Global warming has increased by 32 percent, while carbon dioxide emissions from major fossil fuels account for 80 percent of the increase. Meanwhile, carbon dioxide in the atmosphere grew faster than the average over the past decade from 2011 to 2012. According to statistics, China was the world's largest emitter of greenhouse gases in 2007. In 2011, China's per capita carbon emissions exceeded the global average of 28 percent. Therefore, both international and domestic are faced with severe pressure to reduce emissions. This paper studies the relationship among central government, local government and enterprises. The central government is the policy maker of energy saving and emission reduction, the local government is the monitor of carbon emission, and the enterprise is the main carbon emitter. In the process of carbon emissions, the central government, local governments and enterprises will play a game to maximize their own interests. The difference in the starting point of their respective interests is the motivation of the game between central government, local government and enterprises. At the same time, in carbon emissions, local governments and enterprises have a certain interest correlation, they will go against the central government's willingness to save energy and reduce emissions, to carry out cooperative game, that is, government and enterprise collusion. Through the establishment of a three-layer game model between "central government, local government and enterprise" in carbon emissions, quantitative analysis of the optimal equilibrium agreement between local government and enterprise and the agreement between central government against complicity of government and enterprise, It also demonstrates the conditions for allowing the government and enterprises to collude and to guard against the complicity of the government and enterprises. Finally, the conclusion is drawn: under the condition that the central government has no constraints, local governments and enterprises will collude; if the central government wants to guard against the complicity of government and enterprises, it needs to minimize the benefits of government and enterprise complicity; to guard against government and enterprise complicity, It is necessary for the central government to design an incentive and compatible restraint mechanism; it is beneficial for the central government to strengthen the supervision of the fourth party media against the collusion of the government and enterprises. Government-enterprise collusion can bring short-term benefits to enterprises and local governments, but will have a negative impact on them. To control carbon emissions more effectively, the central government can establish a sound financial management system, an effective power supervision mechanism and a set of "green" performance assessment regulation to restrain local government behavior. The central government can also clearly define property rights, levy a carbon tax, establish a trading mechanism for carbon emissions rights, and prudently use economic coercive measures. At the same time, it can also encourage enterprises to innovate in technology and broaden their financing channels. Economic levers such as creating a good environment for reducing emissions and establishing special funds to reduce emissions encourage enterprises to reduce carbon emissions. The central government also needs to play a fourth-party media oversight role. Finally, we should also give full play to the important role of international environmental non-governmental organizations.
【學位授予單位】：中共中央黨校
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F205;F123.15

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