本文選題：前景理論　切入點：博弈論　出處：《西南交通大學》2014年碩士論文

【摘要】：對于代建制尋租問題的研究,大多是從完全理性角度出發(fā),并沒有考慮到“人的完全理性假設”的局限性和現實性。目前國內對前景理論的研究和應用主要集中在數據分析、風險決策等問題,與博弈理論相結合的研究比較少,將其運用在代建制尋租研究領域的研究尚屬空白。因此,本文在代建制尋租問題研究中,引入前景理論,并運用博弈理論,建立博弈模型分析代建制模式下的尋租行為,充分考慮到人的有限理性和風險不確定狀態(tài)下人的非理性行為,為代建制模式下的尋租防范提供借鑒與依據。1.將前景理論和靜態(tài)博弈理論相結合,對博弈收益函數中不確定的收益元素考慮前景理論的影響,構建基于前景理論的代建制尋租靜態(tài)博弈模型。根據前景理論的價值函數和權重函數建立靜態(tài)博弈的收益感知矩陣,構建政府、主管部門、代建單位為決策者的三方博弈模型,并對該模型進行求解分析,討論了針對該模型的代建制尋租防范對策。2.對靜態(tài)博弈模型進行修正拓展,對各博弈方的整體收益考慮前景理論的影響,構建基于前景理論的代建制尋租靜態(tài)博弈拓展模型。根據前景理論的價值函數和權重函數建立靜態(tài)博弈的收益感知矩陣,構建政府、主管部門、代建單位為決策者的三方博弈模型,對該模型進行求解,并和前文的靜態(tài)博弈模型結果進行了對比分析。3.將前景理論和演化博弈理論相結合,不僅對博弈收益中不確定收益元素考慮了前景理論的影響,引入心理效用的價值函數和權重函數,建立了感知價值收益矩陣。同時,在博弈決策過程中考慮人的有限理論局限,利用演化博弈進行了博弈模型討論分析,使整個博弈中從博弈收益和決策過程貫穿有限理性思想,構建基于前景理論的代建制尋租演化博弈模型。根據前景理論的價值函數和權重函數建立演化博弈的收益感知矩陣,構建主管部門人員、代建單位人員為決策者的兩方博弈模型,并對該模型進行求解,最后對博弈模型結果進行了分析討論。4.根據前文的研究結果,結合目前我國代建制的發(fā)展和監(jiān)管的現狀,討論代建制模型下對尋租行為的防范對策。
[Abstract]:Most of the researches on rent-seeking by agent system are from the perspective of complete rationality, without considering the limitation and reality of "the assumption of complete rationality of human beings".At present, the research and application of foreground theory mainly focus on data analysis, risk decision and so on, but the research on the combination of game theory and game theory is relatively few, and the research of applying it to the field of rent-seeking by agent system is still blank.Therefore, in the study of rent-seeking in the agent system, the prospect theory is introduced, and the game model is established to analyze the rent-seeking behavior under the agent system model.Taking into account the limited rationality of people and the irrational behavior of people under the uncertain state of risk, this paper provides a reference and basis for rent-seeking prevention in the mode of agent system.The prospect theory is combined with the static game theory to consider the influence of the foreground theory on the uncertain income elements in the income function of the game, and the model of rent-seeking static game based on the prospect theory is constructed.According to the value function and weight function of foreground theory, the income perception matrix of static game is established, and the three-way game model of government, competent department and agent is constructed, and the model is solved and analyzed.This paper discusses the countermeasures of rent-seeking based on agent system. 2. 2.The static game model is modified and extended to consider the influence of the foreground theory on the whole income of the game parties, and a static game expansion model based on the prospect theory is constructed.According to the value function and weight function of the foreground theory, the income perception matrix of the static game is established, and the three-way game model of the government, the competent department and the agent is constructed, and the model is solved.And compared with the static game model. 3. 3.By combining the foreground theory with the evolutionary game theory, this paper not only considers the influence of the prospect theory on the uncertain income elements in the game returns, but also introduces the psychological utility value function and the weight function, and establishes the perceived value return matrix.At the same time, considering the limitation of human's finite theory in the decision-making process of the game, the game model is discussed and analyzed by using the evolutionary game, which makes the whole game run through the idea of bounded rationality from the game profit and the decision-making process.The evolutionary game model of rent-seeking based on foreground theory is constructed.Finally, the game model results are analyzed and discussed.According to the previous research results, combined with the development of agent system and the current situation of supervision in our country, this paper discusses the preventive measures of rent-seeking behavior under the agent system model.
【學位授予單位】：西南交通大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F283;F224.32

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