本文選題：電力工程　切入點(diǎn)：物資采購(gòu)　出處：《華北電力大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：招投標(biāo)是一種在平等條件下進(jìn)行公平競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的交易方式,具有公正性、擇優(yōu)性、經(jīng)濟(jì)性等特點(diǎn),它已經(jīng)成為電力工程物資采購(gòu)的主要方式,并在降低運(yùn)營(yíng)成本、推進(jìn)技術(shù)革新以及預(yù)防腐敗等方面發(fā)揮了重要的作用。但也應(yīng)該清醒的看到,招投標(biāo)工作在電力系統(tǒng)內(nèi)開(kāi)展時(shí)間不長(zhǎng),招投標(biāo)行為以及投標(biāo)制度中還存在一些問(wèn)題和漏洞。本文主要研究的內(nèi)容是如何對(duì)電力系統(tǒng)招投標(biāo)開(kāi)展有效的監(jiān)管。 本文首先簡(jiǎn)要介紹了招投標(biāo)制度的發(fā)展情況,分析了國(guó)內(nèi)外監(jiān)管機(jī)制研究現(xiàn)狀,并簡(jiǎn)述了目前我國(guó)工程建設(shè)物資招投標(biāo)存在的困難和問(wèn)題。然后,針對(duì)電力工程物資采購(gòu)招投標(biāo)管理現(xiàn)狀,分別從委托代理理論、招投標(biāo)參與主體規(guī)范性、制度建設(shè)以及經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)博弈論的角度分析了其產(chǎn)生問(wèn)題的根源,并指出腐敗是代理人的逆向選擇和道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的表現(xiàn),防止腐敗其實(shí)就是如何減弱代理人的逆向選擇和道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)；要解決參與主體行為不規(guī)范,就必須對(duì)企業(yè)實(shí)行機(jī)構(gòu)改革,真正實(shí)現(xiàn)法人制；分析了如何完善改進(jìn)我國(guó)現(xiàn)行的招標(biāo)方式和評(píng)標(biāo)定標(biāo)制度,并提出改進(jìn)建議；通過(guò)建立招投標(biāo)博弈三方模型,提出要讓投標(biāo)方、代理機(jī)構(gòu)串謀概率降到最低,必須有明確的監(jiān)管行為,而招投標(biāo)信息平臺(tái)的建設(shè)是無(wú)疑是最優(yōu)選擇。本文最后以某供電公司招投標(biāo)管理現(xiàn)狀為基礎(chǔ),以開(kāi)發(fā)電子招投標(biāo)平臺(tái)以解決信息不對(duì)稱的問(wèn)題為案例,較好地解決了電力工程物資招投標(biāo)中的監(jiān)管問(wèn)題。 本文結(jié)合我國(guó)的電力企業(yè)現(xiàn)狀,積極運(yùn)用國(guó)內(nèi)外先進(jìn)理論和做法,較好的提出了電力企業(yè)招投標(biāo)中監(jiān)管措施和建議,具有較大的實(shí)際意義和參考價(jià)值。
[Abstract]:Bidding is a kind of fair competition under equal conditions. It has the characteristics of fairness, selectivity and economy. It has become the main way of purchasing materials in electric power engineering, and it is reducing the operating cost. The promotion of technological innovation and the prevention of corruption have played an important role. But it should also be soberly recognized that the bidding process does not take long to develop in the power system. There are still some problems and loopholes in bidding behavior and bidding system. The main content of this paper is how to carry out effective supervision of bidding in power system. This paper first briefly introduces the development of bidding system, analyzes the research status of supervision mechanism at home and abroad, and briefly describes the difficulties and problems existing in bidding for construction materials in our country at present. In view of the current situation of bidding management in the procurement of electric power engineering materials, the causes of the problems are analyzed from the perspectives of principal-agent theory, subject normative, institutional construction and economic game theory. It is also pointed out that corruption is the manifestation of adverse selection and moral hazard of agents, the prevention of corruption is actually how to reduce the adverse selection and moral hazard of agents, in order to solve the problem of non-standard behavior of participants, it is necessary to carry out institutional reform on enterprises. It analyzes how to perfect and improve the current bidding method and bid evaluation system in our country, and puts forward some suggestions for improvement. Through establishing the three-party model of bidding and bidding game, it puts forward that the probability of collusion between bidders and agencies should be reduced to the minimum. There must be clear supervision behavior, and the construction of bidding information platform is undoubtedly the best choice. Finally, based on the current situation of bidding management in a power supply company, this paper takes the development of electronic bidding platform to solve the problem of asymmetric information as an example. A better solution to the power engineering materials bidding in the supervision of the problem. Combined with the current situation of electric power enterprises in our country, this paper makes positive use of advanced theories and practices at home and abroad, and puts forward better supervision measures and suggestions in the bidding of electric power enterprises, which is of great practical significance and reference value.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：華北電力大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號(hào)】：F284;F426.61;F251

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本文編號(hào)：1622526