本文關(guān)鍵詞： 閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈 委托代理理論 信息不對稱 獎(jiǎng)懲機(jī)制　出處：《中國礦業(yè)大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：隨著社會經(jīng)濟(jì)的發(fā)展，人們對電子產(chǎn)品的需求呈現(xiàn)出多樣性，推動(dòng)了科技的創(chuàng)新，同時(shí)也加快了電子產(chǎn)品的淘汰速度。這些廢棄的電子產(chǎn)品如果處理不當(dāng)則會對環(huán)境造成巨大的威脅，反之，合理的利用則可以緩解資源短缺和環(huán)境污染的問題。企業(yè)積極參與廢棄電子產(chǎn)品的回收再利用不僅可以降低自身成本，同時(shí)樹立了良好的環(huán)保形象，增強(qiáng)了市場競爭力。因此，本文以廢舊電子產(chǎn)品回收再利用為載體對閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈進(jìn)行研究具有重要的理論和現(xiàn)實(shí)意義。 本文從信息不對稱的角度對閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈進(jìn)行研究，構(gòu)建了制造商主導(dǎo)，委托零售商或第三方回收商負(fù)責(zé)回收的閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈回收模式：委托零售商回收、委托第三方回收商回收、委托零售商和第三方回收商競爭回收�；厥辗綋碛凶陨砘厥张Τ潭刃畔ⅲ幱谛畔�(yōu)勢，而制造商不知道該信息處于信息劣勢。根據(jù)委托代理理論利用信息甄別的方式，制造商分別對零售商設(shè)計(jì)了由批發(fā)價(jià)、回購價(jià)和特許經(jīng)營費(fèi)構(gòu)成的甄別契約，對第三方回收商則設(shè)計(jì)了由回購價(jià)和特許經(jīng)營費(fèi)構(gòu)成的甄別契約。通過回收方對甄別契約的選擇達(dá)到信息甄別的目的。在每種回收模式下分別考慮了無政府獎(jiǎng)懲機(jī)制及政府對制造商實(shí)施獎(jiǎng)懲機(jī)制的情形。政府設(shè)定獎(jiǎng)懲力度和目標(biāo)回收量，如果回收方的回收量超過目標(biāo)回收量將受到獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)，反之受到懲罰。根據(jù)三種回收模式分別建立模型，設(shè)定相關(guān)參數(shù)進(jìn)行數(shù)值仿真，并對主要參數(shù)進(jìn)行敏感性分析。 對計(jì)算結(jié)果進(jìn)行分析比較后得出如下結(jié)論：(1)在競爭回收時(shí)，隨著競爭的加劇，高回收努力程度的零售商和第三方回收商的回收量及期望利潤減少，并且比無競爭時(shí)的低；(2)在實(shí)施獎(jiǎng)懲機(jī)制時(shí)，，隨著獎(jiǎng)懲力度的加大，高回收努力程度的零售商和第三方回收商的回收量及期望利潤增加，并且比無獎(jiǎng)懲機(jī)制情形下的高；(3)零售商或第三方回收商分別單獨(dú)回收時(shí)，零售價(jià)低的回收模式可以獲得較多的回收量。競爭使得回收方的期望利潤降低，會影響回收方回收廢舊電器電子產(chǎn)品的積極性，而獎(jiǎng)懲機(jī)制的實(shí)施彌補(bǔ)了競爭帶來的損失，并為代理回收方帶來了利潤。因此，對閉環(huán)供應(yīng)鏈中的制造商實(shí)施獎(jiǎng)懲機(jī)制可以有效的引導(dǎo)回收。
[Abstract]:With the development of social economy, people's demand for electronic products presents diversity, which promotes the innovation of science and technology. At the same time, it also speeds up the elimination of electronic products. If these discarded electronic products are not handled properly, they will pose a great threat to the environment, and vice versa. Reasonable utilization can alleviate the problem of resource shortage and environmental pollution. Enterprises actively participate in recycling and reuse of discarded electronic products can not only reduce their own costs, but also set up a good image of environmental protection. Therefore, it is of great theoretical and practical significance to study the closed-loop supply chain with the recycling and reuse of used electronic products as the carrier. This paper studies the closed-loop supply chain from the angle of information asymmetry, and constructs a closed-loop supply chain recovery mode: entrusted retailer recycling, which is dominated by manufacturers and responsible for recycling by entrusted retailers or third-party recyclers. Third party recyclers are entrusted with recycling, and retailers and third-party recyclers compete for recovery. The recyclers have information about their own recycling efforts and are in the advantage of information. The manufacturer does not know that the information is in an information disadvantage. According to the principal-agent theory, the manufacturer designs a screening contract for the retailer which consists of wholesale price, repo price and franchise fee. A screening contract consisting of repo price and franchise fee is designed for the third party recycler. The purpose of information screening is achieved through the selection of the screening contract by the recycler. In each recovery mode, anarchic rewards and penalties are considered separately. The mechanism and the situation that the government implements the reward and punishment mechanism to the manufacturer. The government sets the reward and punishment strength and the target recovery amount. If the payback of the recycler exceeds the target payback amount will be rewarded and otherwise punished. According to the three recovery models respectively set up the relevant parameters for numerical simulation. The sensitivity of the main parameters was analyzed. After analyzing and comparing the calculation results, we draw the following conclusion: 1) in the competitive recovery process, with the intensification of competition, the amount of recovery and expected profits of retailers and third-party recyclers with high recycling effort level are reduced. And lower than those without competition; (2) with the increase of reward and punishment, the amount of recovery and expected profit of retailers and third-party recyclers with high level of recycling effort increases, and it is higher than that without reward and punishment mechanism; (3) when retailers or third-party recyclers separately recycle, the recovery mode with low retail price can get more recovery. Competition reduces the expected profit of the recycler. Will affect the recycling of waste electrical and electronic products enthusiasm, and the implementation of reward and punishment mechanism to make up for the loss of competition, and for the agent recycling party to bring profit. The reward and punishment mechanism for the manufacturers in the closed-loop supply chain can effectively guide the recovery.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：中國礦業(yè)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F274;F252

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