本文關鍵詞： 民間借貸 抵押擔保 社會關系網絡 聲譽 信號傳遞　出處：《寧波大學》2014年碩士論文　論文類型：學位論文

【摘要】：面對農戶缺乏抵押物以及抵押物與金融機構的要求不匹配的現狀，民間借貸是如何防范風險的？在經濟和社會轉型期，民間借貸存在的基礎和條件發(fā)生了變化，傳統(tǒng)的以血緣、地緣為基礎的強關系網絡逐漸向以學緣、業(yè)緣為基礎的不穩(wěn)定的弱關系網絡過渡，民間借貸是如何應對這些變化的？鑒于此，本文從抵押擔保降低借貸交易風險視角出發(fā)，認為只要能發(fā)揮信息形成和違約懲罰作用的，都可以充當借貸交易中的擔保物，即擔保替代，從而不必要求實物資產作抵押，這也與民間借貸一般無實物抵押、高履約率的實情相符合。也就是說，民間借貸本身存在著有效的抵押擔保替代機制或者說隱性擔保機制。 基于村莊治理理論，本文首先構建了完全信息下民間借貸的運行機制模型，在此基礎上，放寬抵押擔保條件和范圍，研究民間借貸在不完全信息下的風險防控機制。基于強、弱社會關系以及主動、被動違約行為的劃分，分別研究了社會關系網絡在強關系民間借貸中和聲譽在弱關系民間借貸中的抵押擔保機制；假設社會關系網絡機制和聲譽機制可以有效抑制主動違約，利用信號傳遞博弈模型研究了借款者項目投資規(guī)模的信號傳遞效應對被動違約的甄別作用。 本文的主要結論是： 1、只要能發(fā)揮信息形成和違約懲罰作用的都可以充當借貸交易中的擔保物，即擔保替代，，民間借貸的高履約率是因為其內在有效的擔保替代機制； 2、民間借貸有三大隱性擔保機制，即社會關系網絡機制、聲譽機制和信號傳遞機制。社會關系網絡機制在強關系民間借貸中發(fā)揮著抵押擔保作用，聲譽機制和借方項目投資規(guī)模的信號傳遞機制在弱關系民間借貸中發(fā)揮了抵押擔保作用； 3、社會關系網絡機制通過當地信息、同伴選擇、同伴監(jiān)督、多邊懲罰和關聯懲罰機制以及規(guī)范、信念和道德治理機制發(fā)揮信息形成和違約懲罰作用。聲譽機制通過借貸雙方不完全信息動態(tài)博弈發(fā)揮聲譽的評價以及聲譽的信息形成和違約懲罰作用。信號傳遞機制通過借款者項目投資規(guī)模的信號傳遞效應發(fā)揮信息形成和違約懲罰作用； 4、本文分別研究了三大擔保替代機制，但這并不意味著它們是分別獨立發(fā)揮作用的，實際上這三者是同時發(fā)揮作用的，只是在不同類型的民間借貸中占據主導地位的擔保機制不同。
[Abstract]:Facing the situation that farmers lack collateral and the requirements of mortgage and financial institutions do not match, how to prevent the risk of private lending? In the period of economic and social transformation, the foundation and conditions of folk lending have changed, and the traditional strong relationship network based on blood and geography has gradually changed to learning. How does private lending cope with these changes in the transition of unstable weak relational networks based on industry fate? In view of this, this paper from the perspective of mortgage guarantee to reduce the risk of lending transactions, think that as long as they can play the role of information formation and default punishment, they can all act as collateral in the loan transaction, that is, the substitution of security. Thus do not need to ask for real assets as collateral, this also with private loans generally no physical collateral, high compliance rate in line with the truth. That is. Private lending itself has an effective mortgage guarantee alternative mechanism or implicit guarantee mechanism. Based on the theory of village governance, this paper first constructs the operational mechanism model of private lending under complete information, and on this basis, relax the mortgage guarantee conditions and scope. This paper studies the risk prevention and control mechanism of folk lending under incomplete information. Based on strong, weak social relations and active and passive behavior of breach of contract. This paper studies the mortgage guarantee mechanism of social relationship network in strong relation private loan and reputation in weak relation private loan respectively. Assuming that social network mechanism and reputation mechanism can restrain active default effectively, this paper studies the discriminating effect of signal transfer effect of borrower project investment scale on passive default by using signal transfer game model. The main conclusions of this paper are as follows: 1. As long as they can play the role of information formation and penalty of breach of contract, they can act as collateral in the loan transaction, that is, the substitution of security. The high performance rate of folk loan is due to its intrinsic and effective guarantee substitution mechanism; 2. There are three implicit guarantee mechanisms in private lending, namely, social network mechanism, reputation mechanism and signal transmission mechanism. Social relationship network mechanism plays a role of mortgage guarantee in strongly related folk lending. The reputation mechanism and the signalling mechanism of the investment scale of the borrower project play the role of mortgage guarantee in the weak relation private loan; 3, social network mechanism through local information, peer selection, peer supervision, multilateral punishment and association punishment mechanisms and norms. The mechanism of belief and moral governance plays the role of information formation and punishment of breach of contract. Reputation mechanism plays the role of reputation evaluation and information formation and punishment of breach of contract through dynamic game of incomplete information between the two parties. The mechanism plays the role of information formation and penalty of default through the signalling effect of borrower project investment scale; 4. This paper studies the three major security substitution mechanisms, but this does not mean that they are acting independently, in fact, these three play a role at the same time. Only in different types of private lending in the dominant position of the guarantee mechanism is different.
【學位授予單位】：寧波大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F832.4;F224

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