發(fā)布時間：2018-01-13 21:29

  本文關(guān)鍵詞：基于討價還價博弈的企業(yè)經(jīng)理激勵研究　出處：《華北電力大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

  更多相關(guān)文章： 委托—代理 討價還價 博弈 激勵

【摘要】：隨著生產(chǎn)社會化的不斷發(fā)展和市場競爭的日益激烈，企業(yè)的規(guī)模越來越大，所有權(quán)和經(jīng)營權(quán)相分離，企業(yè)的控制權(quán)實際由企業(yè)的經(jīng)理人掌控，企業(yè)的經(jīng)營管理離不開對經(jīng)理人的激勵與約束。由于委托人與代理人各自追求自身利益的最大化，，且他們之間存在著信息不對稱、契約不完備等不確定性因素，委托人只有對代理人進(jìn)行有效的激勵和引導(dǎo)，才能使其充分發(fā)揮自身的能力，達(dá)到企業(yè)業(yè)績最優(yōu)。因此，企業(yè)的內(nèi)部激勵尤為重要。然而，過去相當(dāng)長的時期內(nèi)，對企業(yè)激勵理論的研究主要著眼于獎懲制度的建立，或者雖然有與企業(yè)激勵機(jī)制有關(guān)的理論研究和實際應(yīng)用，卻很少有考慮經(jīng)理人討價還價能力的激勵研究，這造成我國企業(yè)不能建立完善的激勵機(jī)制，對企業(yè)經(jīng)理人缺乏充分的激勵。本文將創(chuàng)新性的在委托—代理激勵模型中引入經(jīng)理的討價還價能力這一假設(shè)，對我國企業(yè)建立合理的激勵機(jī)制和經(jīng)理的有效激勵問題進(jìn)行深入的研究，為企業(yè)的激勵機(jī)制設(shè)計提供參考。 企業(yè)的激勵機(jī)制實際上就是有效解決企業(yè)委托—代理關(guān)系中企業(yè)經(jīng)理人的道德風(fēng)險和逆向選擇問題，充分調(diào)動經(jīng)理人的積極性，促使經(jīng)理人努力工作的制度性安排。本文建立了一個動態(tài)的經(jīng)理激勵機(jī)制設(shè)計模型，假設(shè)經(jīng)理在完成第一期任務(wù)后，可以與委托人重新談判，即在委托—代理模型中引入委托人和經(jīng)理人的討價還價博弈，研究了經(jīng)理人的討價還價能力和企業(yè)最優(yōu)激勵水平之間的關(guān)系及委托人對經(jīng)理的有效激勵問題。根據(jù)計算和分析發(fā)現(xiàn)，經(jīng)理能否得到滿意的固定薪酬對經(jīng)理人的行為選擇和企業(yè)的長期業(yè)績有重要的影響，委托人為了激勵經(jīng)理努力提高企業(yè)業(yè)績，最好的辦法不是保證經(jīng)理人要求的固定報酬，而是增加其分享企業(yè)業(yè)績的比例。
[Abstract]:With the continuous development of socialized production and the increasingly fierce market competition, increasing the size of the business, the separation of ownership and management rights, control of the actual control by the managers of enterprises, the management of the enterprise cannot do without the incentive and constraint on managers. Because the maximum principal and agent in their pursuit of their own interests between them, and the existence of asymmetric information, incomplete contract and other uncertainties, the client only effective incentive and guidance to the agent, so that it can give full play to its own capabilities, to achieve optimal business performance. Therefore, the internal motivation of enterprises is particularly important. However, for a long period of time, the establishment of research the enterprise incentive theory mainly focuses on the system of rewards and penalties, or although there is incentive mechanism related to theoretical research and practical application and enterprise, but few consider managers. Study on Incentive bargaining ability, which can cause our country to establish the perfect incentive mechanism, the lack of adequate incentives for enterprise managers. In this paper, the hypothesis that the introduction of innovative manager in the principal-agent incentive model of bargaining power, in-depth research on effective incentive problem to establish the reasonable incentive mechanism and the manager told me in the company, to provide the reference for the design of incentive mechanism of the enterprise.
The incentive mechanism of enterprises is actually a valid solution to the enterprise principle of moral hazard and adverse selection problems in enterprise agent manager, fully mobilize the enthusiasm of managers, institutional arrangements encourage managers to work hard. This paper establishes the manager incentive mechanism design of a dynamic model, the assumption that the manager in the completion of the first phase of the task can be. The principal and the re negotiations, namely the introduction of bargaining game client and managers in principal-agent model, the manager's incentive problems of managers' bargaining ability of enterprises and the optimal incentive level between and principal. According to the calculation and analysis, have important influence on the manager can get the long-term performance of the fixed salary satisfaction on the choice of managerial behavior and corporate clients, in order to motivate managers to improve enterprise performance, the best way Instead of ensuring the fixed remuneration required by the manager, it is an increase in the proportion of its share of corporate performance.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：華北電力大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F272.92;F224.32

【相似文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)期刊論文 前10條

1 趙順龍,徐少亞;知識經(jīng)濟(jì)條件下的經(jīng)理人控制探析[J];南京經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)院學(xué)報;2000年06期

2 崔新生;;經(jīng)理人生態(tài)學(xué)[J];經(jīng)理人;2000年09期

3 許經(jīng)勇,曾芬鈺;因勢利導(dǎo)發(fā)育經(jīng)理人市場[J];青海社會科學(xué);2001年01期

4 黃軒;學(xué)院派經(jīng)理人:大河趟水[J];人才w

本文編號：1420629