本文關(guān)鍵詞：合同能源管理（EPC）模式下兩制造商的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)與合作研究　出處：《華南理工大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

  更多相關(guān)文章： 合同能源管理 古諾競(jìng)爭(zhēng) 納什議價(jià) 環(huán)境績(jī)效

【摘要】：隨著經(jīng)濟(jì)的快速發(fā)展,人們對(duì)生活環(huán)境的要求越來(lái)越高,環(huán)境污染與資源短缺等問(wèn)題卻目益嚴(yán)重。人們環(huán)保意識(shí)的提高以及環(huán)境壓力的增加迫使節(jié)能減排以及環(huán)境保護(hù)成為企業(yè)的社會(huì)責(zé)任。然而,企業(yè)畢竟是追逐利潤(rùn)的主體,通常不會(huì)自發(fā)地關(guān)注環(huán)境問(wèn)題。因此,一些基于市場(chǎng)機(jī)制的調(diào)控措施(如碳排放權(quán)交易制度、合同能源管理等)受到各國(guó)的青睞。依靠健全的運(yùn)行和監(jiān)督機(jī)制,這些措施在發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家都運(yùn)行良好,也達(dá)到了設(shè)計(jì)這些制度時(shí)的預(yù)期效果。 我國(guó)于2000年發(fā)布了《關(guān)于進(jìn)一步推廣“合同能源管理機(jī)制”的通告》,正式開(kāi)始啟動(dòng)合同能源管理。經(jīng)過(guò)十多年的實(shí)踐,我國(guó)的合同能源管理發(fā)展依然相對(duì)落后。究其原因,是我國(guó)政府對(duì)合同能源管理的扶持力度不足,主要體現(xiàn)為相關(guān)法律法規(guī)的缺失、政府機(jī)關(guān)沒(méi)有帶頭實(shí)施合同能源管理項(xiàng)目、以及激勵(lì)性的財(cái)政措施不足。 近年來(lái),我國(guó)政府逐漸意識(shí)到這一點(diǎn),并陸續(xù)出臺(tái)稅收減免和補(bǔ)貼等措施大力鼓勵(lì)合同能源管理的發(fā)展。受此激勵(lì),在我國(guó)的合同能源管理實(shí)踐中出現(xiàn)了中國(guó)特有的模式 高能耗制造企業(yè)之間實(shí)施合同能源管理項(xiàng)目,例如：寶鋼和攀鋼。與用于建筑節(jié)能的合同能源管理項(xiàng)目不同,這一類項(xiàng)目的節(jié)能服務(wù)提供方同時(shí)也是客戶的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手。正是基于此,本文通過(guò)建立了一個(gè)兩階段的博弈模型來(lái)研究這一中國(guó)特有的合同能源管理實(shí)踐。我們分析了兩個(gè)制造企業(yè)在合同能源管理項(xiàng)目中的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)與合作,并給出了合同能源管理項(xiàng)目的績(jī)效(企業(yè)利潤(rùn)、消費(fèi)者剩余、環(huán)境績(jī)效等)。 我們的結(jié)果表明：合同能源管理項(xiàng)目的實(shí)施將降低節(jié)能服務(wù)提供企業(yè)的產(chǎn)量,提高客戶企業(yè)的產(chǎn)量；兩企業(yè)通過(guò)實(shí)施合同能源管理項(xiàng)目總是能夠?qū)崿F(xiàn)經(jīng)濟(jì)利益上的“雙贏”；合同能源管理項(xiàng)目的實(shí)施提高了總產(chǎn)量以及降低了產(chǎn)品價(jià)格,最終導(dǎo)致消費(fèi)者剩余增加；合同能源管理并不總是能夠降低總能耗；合同能源管理項(xiàng)目的環(huán)境績(jī)效關(guān)于節(jié)能服務(wù)成本并不是單調(diào)的(在某些情況是遞減/遞增),因此政府實(shí)施有關(guān)扶持(甚至是遏制)政策時(shí)應(yīng)當(dāng)是有選擇性的。
[Abstract]:With the rapid development of economy, people have higher and higher demands on the living environment. The problems of environmental pollution and shortage of resources are becoming more and more serious. However, the improvement of environmental awareness and the increase of environmental pressure force energy conservation and environmental protection to become the social responsibility of enterprises. Firms, after all, are profit-hungry, and usually do not pay spontaneous attention to environmental issues. Therefore, some regulatory measures based on market mechanisms (such as carbon emissions trading system). These measures work well in developed countries and achieve the desired results when designing these systems. In 2000, our country issued the notice about further popularizing "contract energy management mechanism", which officially started to start contract energy management. After more than ten years of practice. The development of contract energy management in our country is still relatively backward. The reason is that our government has insufficient support for contract energy management, which is mainly reflected in the lack of relevant laws and regulations. Government agencies have not taken the lead in implementing contracted energy management projects and inadequate incentive fiscal measures. In recent years, our government is gradually aware of this, and gradually introduced tax relief and subsidies and other measures to encourage the development of contract energy management. In the practice of contract energy management in China, there is a unique mode in China. Implementation of contract energy management projects between high-energy manufacturers, such as Baosteel and Panzhihua Iron and Steel Co., unlike contract energy management projects for energy conservation in buildings. It is based on the fact that the provider of energy-saving services for such projects is also a competitor to the customer. In this paper, a two-stage game model is established to study this unique contract energy management practice in China. We analyze the competition and cooperation of two manufacturing enterprises in the contract energy management project. The performance of the contract energy management project (corporate profit, consumer surplus, environmental performance, etc.) is also given. Our results show that the implementation of the contract energy management project will reduce the output of energy-saving service providers and increase the output of customer enterprises; Through the implementation of contract energy management projects, the two enterprises can always achieve "win-win" in economic interests; The implementation of the contract energy management project increases the total output and reduces the product price, which ultimately leads to the increase of consumer surplus. Contract energy management does not always reduce total energy consumption; The environmental performance of a contract energy management project is not monotonous (in some cases decreasing / increasing) with respect to the cost of energy-efficient services, so the government should be selective in implementing support (or even containment) policies.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：華南理工大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號(hào)】：F206

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