綠色供應(yīng)鏈的信息獲取及協(xié)調(diào)機制研究
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本文關(guān)鍵詞:綠色供應(yīng)鏈的信息獲取及協(xié)調(diào)機制研究 出處:《曲阜師范大學》2014年碩士論文 論文類型:學位論文
更多相關(guān)文章: 供應(yīng)鏈 消費者綠色偏好 信息獲取 定價策略 收益共享契約
【摘要】:近年來,綠色供應(yīng)鏈管理受到了學術(shù)界的廣泛重視,具有廣闊的研究前景。本文在二級供應(yīng)鏈的基礎(chǔ)上,,研究了綠色度添加模式和關(guān)于消費者綠色偏好的預(yù)測信息會對供應(yīng)鏈成員企業(yè)的決策產(chǎn)生怎樣的影響,并對綠色供應(yīng)鏈契約協(xié)調(diào)機制進行了研究。本文的結(jié)構(gòu)安排如下: 第一章介紹了綠色供應(yīng)鏈的相關(guān)概念、發(fā)展趨勢以及本文的主要研究結(jié)果。 第二章在二級供應(yīng)鏈的基礎(chǔ)上,對綠色度添加模式以及關(guān)于消費者綠色偏好的預(yù)測信息的作用進行了研究。首先建立了不同模式下最優(yōu)策略的數(shù)學模型,然后對所建立的模型進行了求解,最后分類進行了比較。研究發(fā)現(xiàn):⑴信息對稱情形下,綠色度添加模式不會影響供應(yīng)鏈成員的決策;⑵信息不對稱情形下,由制造商來添加綠色度是最優(yōu)策略。⑶當綠色度由供應(yīng)商添加時,供應(yīng)商自己獲取信息時會獲得更高的收益;對于制造商來說,當自身信息預(yù)測精度相對較低時,會傾向于由供應(yīng)商來獲取消費者綠色偏好信息,而自身信息預(yù)測精度較高時,自己獲取信息會獲得更高的預(yù)期收益。 第三章探討了收益共享契約機制是否適用于綠色供應(yīng)鏈。首先,研究了集中模式下企業(yè)的決策行為以及消費者綠色偏好對決策行為的影響。然后,研究了分散模式下企業(yè)的決策行為,并分析了消費者綠色偏好對決策行為的影響。最后,采用收益共享契約機制來協(xié)調(diào)該供應(yīng)鏈,并通過數(shù)值實驗比較了三種模型下供應(yīng)鏈成員企業(yè)的收益以及綠色投入水平。研究發(fā)現(xiàn):收益共享契約機制適用于綠色供應(yīng)鏈。
[Abstract]:In recent years, green supply chain management has been widely paid attention to by the academic community, and has a broad research prospects. This paper is based on the secondary supply chain. This paper studies how the green degree addition model and the prediction information about consumers' green preference will affect the decision of supply chain member enterprises. And the contract coordination mechanism of green supply chain is studied. The structure of this paper is as follows: The first chapter introduces the concept of green supply chain, the development trend and the main results of this paper. In the second chapter, on the basis of the two-level supply chain, the role of green degree addition model and the prediction information about consumer green preference is studied. Firstly, the mathematical model of optimal strategy under different models is established. Then the model is solved and the classification is compared. It is found that the green degree addition model will not affect the decision of supply chain members in the case of information symmetry of 1: 1. (2) in the case of asymmetric information, adding green degree to the manufacturer is the best strategy. 3. When the green degree is added by the supplier, the supplier will get higher profit when he gets the information himself; For manufacturers, when the prediction accuracy of their own information is relatively low, they tend to obtain consumer green preference information from suppliers, while their own information prediction accuracy is higher. Getting information on your own will lead to higher expected returns. The third chapter discusses whether the revenue-sharing contract mechanism is applicable to green supply chain. Firstly, the decision behavior of enterprises and the influence of consumers' green preference on decision-making behavior are studied in the centralized mode. Then. This paper studies the decision-making behavior of enterprises under decentralized mode, and analyzes the influence of consumer green preference on decision-making behavior. Finally, the profit sharing contract mechanism is used to coordinate the supply chain. Through numerical experiments, we compare the profit and green input level of supply chain member enterprises under three models, and find that the revenue-sharing contract mechanism is suitable for green supply chain.
【學位授予單位】:曲阜師范大學
【學位級別】:碩士
【學位授予年份】:2014
【分類號】:F274;F205
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