本文關(guān)鍵詞：市場經(jīng)濟(jì)下行業(yè)壟斷性與政府持股的理論與實(shí)證研究　出處：《清華大學(xué)》2015年博士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

  更多相關(guān)文章： 市場化行為 行業(yè)壟斷性 政府持股 產(chǎn)業(yè)組織理論 國有企業(yè)

【摘要】：由于市場摩擦、進(jìn)入成本、商品特性等因素,經(jīng)濟(jì)中大多數(shù)行業(yè)都很難達(dá)到完全競爭狀態(tài)。在具有壟斷性的行業(yè)中,企業(yè)會(huì)關(guān)注自身利潤的最大化,而不會(huì)考慮行業(yè)壟斷性帶來的負(fù)外部性與消費(fèi)者剩余,從而降低了市場的效率,因此政府的適當(dāng)干預(yù)可以提升社會(huì)福利。市場經(jīng)濟(jì)的運(yùn)行環(huán)境中,政府干預(yù)企業(yè)運(yùn)行的方式是有限的,持股和稅收補(bǔ)貼是主要的方式,但預(yù)算約束會(huì)給政府的干預(yù)行為帶來額外的限制。本文首先以單一產(chǎn)品壟斷性行業(yè)為基準(zhǔn)模型,討論了完全壟斷市場中政府預(yù)算平衡約束條件下的政府的最優(yōu)干預(yù)模式。當(dāng)企業(yè)成本函數(shù)是邊際成本遞增時(shí),政府可以通過將持股分紅所得收入補(bǔ)貼企業(yè)生產(chǎn)的方式實(shí)現(xiàn)社會(huì)最優(yōu)的結(jié)果,此時(shí)政府的最優(yōu)選擇既不是完全控股,也不是企業(yè)完全民營化。對(duì)于允許企業(yè)自由進(jìn)入、但是存在準(zhǔn)入門檻的寡頭壟斷市場,我們發(fā)現(xiàn)單一的補(bǔ)貼政策雖然促進(jìn)了企業(yè)生產(chǎn),但是企業(yè)會(huì)過度進(jìn)入;單一的稅收政策雖然抑制了企業(yè)進(jìn)入,但是同時(shí)抑制了企業(yè)生產(chǎn)。因此,單一的補(bǔ)貼或稅收政策均無法實(shí)現(xiàn)社會(huì)最優(yōu)的結(jié)果,此時(shí)政府實(shí)現(xiàn)社會(huì)最優(yōu)的方法是限制企業(yè)進(jìn)入,同時(shí)對(duì)于企業(yè)的生產(chǎn)給予比例補(bǔ)貼,并通過持股獲取收入的方式平衡預(yù)算約束。本文接下來將單一產(chǎn)品壟斷性行業(yè)模型拓展為差異化產(chǎn)品壟斷競爭模型。引入推測變分概念后的壟斷競爭模型均衡結(jié)果表明,政府不干預(yù)的情況下,企業(yè)過度進(jìn)入還是企業(yè)進(jìn)入不足取決于差異化效應(yīng)與商業(yè)盜竊效應(yīng)的相對(duì)大小關(guān)系;政府可以通過持股并補(bǔ)貼生產(chǎn)來提升社會(huì)福利,隨著行業(yè)競爭性強(qiáng)度的增加,政府會(huì)降低持股比例,并選擇部分持股,產(chǎn)品差異化并不是造成政府對(duì)不同行業(yè)持股比例不同的原因。本文對(duì)上述理論研究的結(jié)論也進(jìn)行了實(shí)證檢驗(yàn),由于美國行業(yè)的集中度可以較好的反映行業(yè)在自然狀態(tài)下的壟斷性,可以作為一個(gè)外生變量來使用,因此為了解決內(nèi)生性問題,本文以該指標(biāo)作為中國行業(yè)壟斷性的工具變量,分別從行業(yè)層面和企業(yè)層面檢驗(yàn)了行業(yè)壟斷性與政府持股比例的關(guān)系。實(shí)證研究的結(jié)果證明了行業(yè)壟斷性與政府持股比例之間的因果關(guān)系:即行業(yè)壟斷性越高,政府持股比例越高,壟斷性是因,政府持股是果。本文的研究成果對(duì)于混合所有制下政府的持股比例選擇具有重要的參考價(jià)值。
[Abstract]:Due to market friction, entry costs, commodity characteristics and other factors, most industries in the economy are very difficult to achieve complete competition. In monopolistic industries, enterprises will pay attention to maximize their own profits. It does not consider the negative externality and consumer surplus brought by the monopoly of the industry, thus reducing the efficiency of the market. Therefore, the appropriate government intervention can promote social welfare in the operating environment of the market economy. Government intervention in the operation of enterprises is limited, holding shares and tax subsidies are the main way. However, budget constraints will bring additional restrictions to the government's intervention behavior. Firstly, this paper takes the single-product monopolistic industry as the benchmark model. This paper discusses the optimal intervention mode of the government under the condition of government budget balance constraint in the complete monopoly market, when the enterprise cost function is marginal cost increment. The government can realize the social optimal result by subsidizing the enterprise's production by the income from the shareholding and dividends. At this time, the optimal choice of the government is neither fully controlled. For the oligopoly market that allows enterprises to enter freely, but there are barriers to entry, we find that a single subsidy policy can promote the production of enterprises, but enterprises will over-enter; Although a single tax policy inhibits the entry of enterprises, it also inhibits the production of enterprises. Therefore, a single subsidy or tax policy can not achieve the best result of the society. At this time the government to achieve the best way to achieve social is to restrict the entry of enterprises, at the same time to give proportional subsidies for the production of enterprises. In this paper, the monopolistic industry model of single product is extended to the monopolistic competition model of differentiated products. The equilibrium model of monopoly competition model after the introduction of the concept of speculated variation is introduced. The fruit shows. In the case of non-intervention by the government, the relationship between the difference effect and the commercial theft effect depends on whether the enterprises enter excessively or not. The government can improve social welfare by holding shares and subsidizing production. With the increase of competitive intensity in the industry, the government will reduce the proportion of shares and choose some of them. Product differentiation is not the reason why the government holds different shares in different industries. The conclusions of the above theoretical research are also tested empirically in this paper. Because the concentration degree of American industry can better reflect the monopoly of the industry under the natural state, it can be used as an exogenous variable, so in order to solve the endogenous problem. This paper takes this index as the tool variable of Chinese industry monopoly. Respectively from the industry level and the enterprise level to test the relationship between the industry monopoly and the proportion of government shareholding. The empirical results prove the causal relationship between the industry monopoly and the proportion of government ownership: that is, the higher the industry monopoly. The higher the proportion of government shareholding is, the more monopolistic is the reason and the result is government shareholding. The research results of this paper have important reference value for the selection of government shareholding proportion under mixed ownership.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：清華大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2015
【分類號(hào)】：D630;F123.9;F203
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本文編號(hào)：1361326