本文選題：企業(yè)集團(tuán) + 管理層權(quán)力��； 參考：《東北財經(jīng)大學(xué)》2015年碩士論文

【摘要】：我國作為一新興的市場經(jīng)濟(jì)體,隨著外資企業(yè)進(jìn)入,面臨的競爭壓力逐漸加大。為了增強(qiáng)我國企業(yè)自身的競爭力,進(jìn)一步推動我國經(jīng)濟(jì)的發(fā)展,中國政府在借鑒日韓經(jīng)濟(jì)快速發(fā)展的基礎(chǔ)上,開始加快企業(yè)集團(tuán)的組建。而且據(jù)筆者整理統(tǒng)計,截止到2013年末,我國資本市場上受企業(yè)集團(tuán)控制的上市公司占所有統(tǒng)計上市公司的比例高達(dá)66.2%,數(shù)量是獨(dú)立公司的二倍。該數(shù)據(jù)足以表明企業(yè)集團(tuán)在我國經(jīng)濟(jì)中的重要地位,企業(yè)集團(tuán)的投資水平也衡量著我國企業(yè)整體的投資水平,更加表明研究企業(yè)集團(tuán)投資效率必須性�，F(xiàn)有文獻(xiàn)研究表明,受集團(tuán)控制的公司可以從集團(tuán)母公司獲得利益和補(bǔ)助。諸如,集團(tuán)母公司利用自身優(yōu)勢組建的內(nèi)部資本市場可以緩解來自外部資本市場的融資制約。但是,集團(tuán)母公司內(nèi)部資本的配置機(jī)制對成員公司使用配置資金效率的保證程度有多少?集團(tuán)母公司構(gòu)建的內(nèi)部資本市場能給成員公司帶來投資效率的提高嗎?在現(xiàn)代公司制下,由于契約關(guān)系的存在,企業(yè)存在著多重委托代理關(guān)系。公司管理層擁有絕對權(quán)力,控制著公司的閑置資本。那么在進(jìn)行投資決策時,企業(yè)管理層為了自身利益,是否對上市公司投資行為產(chǎn)生影響,導(dǎo)致企業(yè)出現(xiàn)過度投資行為或者投資不足行為?在此基礎(chǔ)之上,本文選擇20102013年滬深A(yù)股上市公司的經(jīng)驗(yàn)數(shù)據(jù)作為研究對象,對共計8380個的數(shù)據(jù)樣本進(jìn)行觀測。同時,筆者通過手工搜集并整理滬深A(yù)股上市公司的背景資料,對企業(yè)集團(tuán)進(jìn)行了界定。借鑒相關(guān)文獻(xiàn),構(gòu)建公司非效率投資(投資過度、投資不足)的測量公式,設(shè)定相應(yīng)的假設(shè)模型,利用多元線性回歸的方法檢驗(yàn)企業(yè)集團(tuán)控制對非效率投資(投資過度、投資不足)的影響,并且考察管理層權(quán)力在這種影響關(guān)系中所發(fā)揮的調(diào)節(jié)作用。具體而言：在理論研究部分,本文通過梳理國內(nèi)外相關(guān)領(lǐng)域以往的文獻(xiàn)資料,在此基礎(chǔ)上,從理論出發(fā),分析企業(yè)集團(tuán)控制、管理層權(quán)力以及非效率投資(投資過度、投資不足)之間的關(guān)系和作用機(jī)制,提出了本文的假設(shè)構(gòu)想,組織了文章的研究路徑與研究模型。在該理論模型當(dāng)中,企業(yè)集團(tuán)控制以及非效率投資(投資過度、投資不足)分別為自變量與因變量,并將可能發(fā)揮著調(diào)節(jié)作用的管理層權(quán)力作為調(diào)節(jié)變量,同時參照已有的文獻(xiàn)選取了控制變量。在本文第四章,第一步進(jìn)行描述性統(tǒng)計分析,用做探究變量自身的內(nèi)在規(guī)律；第二步,對主要考察變量之間是否存在的線性關(guān)系,利用Spearman相關(guān)系數(shù)分析進(jìn)行了相關(guān)性分析；第三步,為了檢驗(yàn)本文假設(shè)的成立與否,進(jìn)行了多元線性分析；第四步,出于檢驗(yàn)本文結(jié)論的穩(wěn)健可信性之考慮,本章通過對相關(guān)變量含義再次界定,變化樣本的數(shù)量來再次實(shí)施檢驗(yàn)。本文主要借助Excel以及SPSS19.0進(jìn)行數(shù)據(jù)處理步驟,使用Eviews6.0進(jìn)行實(shí)證分析步驟。研究結(jié)論證明：受企業(yè)集團(tuán)控制的上市公司與獨(dú)立公司在非投資效率(投資過度、投資不足)程度上存在著差異。由于代理問題的存在,上市公司的管理者通過向集團(tuán)母公司進(jìn)行尋租,這促進(jìn)了上市公司的過度投資行為,緩解了其投資不足行為。而且上述現(xiàn)象在管理層權(quán)利越大的情況下越嚴(yán)重,加重了代理成本。具體而言,相比于獨(dú)立上市公司,受企業(yè)集團(tuán)控制對公司的投資過度行為有著促進(jìn)作用,對公司的投資不足行為有著緩解或抑制作用；另外,在管理層權(quán)力越大的情況下,與獨(dú)立上市公司相比較,企業(yè)集團(tuán)控制與投資過度、投資不足之間的關(guān)系程度更強(qiáng),最終的實(shí)證結(jié)果驗(yàn)證了管理層權(quán)力對上述關(guān)系具有的調(diào)節(jié)作用�；诶碚摲治雠c實(shí)證研究,本文認(rèn)為我國的集團(tuán)公司應(yīng)當(dāng)加強(qiáng)內(nèi)部資金管理,重視企業(yè)集團(tuán)控制對成員公司投資效率方面的影響。適度的利用企業(yè)集團(tuán)的內(nèi)部資本市場,可以緩解上市公司在資金方面的不足,提高內(nèi)部資本配置效率、成員公司的投資效率。但是,若不恰當(dāng)?shù)睦闷髽I(yè)集團(tuán)母公司組建的內(nèi)部資本市場,就會導(dǎo)致成員上市公司的非效率投資現(xiàn)象。另外,由于在一定情形下,股東與管理層存在著利益沖突,使得管理者為了自身利益作出非效率投資行為,并且隸屬于企業(yè)集團(tuán)的上市公司上述現(xiàn)象更為嚴(yán)重。本文結(jié)論也為隸屬于企業(yè)集團(tuán)的上市公司加強(qiáng)對管理層的約束或者激勵,以降低代理成本具有一定的啟示意義。
[Abstract]:As a new market economy, with the entry of foreign enterprises, the pressure of competition is gradually increasing. In order to enhance the competitiveness of China's enterprises and further promote the development of our economy, the Chinese government began to speed up the establishment of enterprise groups on the basis of the rapid economic development of Japan and South Korea. By the end of 2013, the proportion of listed companies controlled by enterprise groups in China's capital market accounted for 66.2% of all listed companies and two times the number of independent companies. This data is sufficient to show the important position of the enterprise group in the economy of our country, and the investment level of the enterprise group is also a measure of the overall investment level of the enterprises in our country. The current literature study shows that group controlled companies can obtain benefits and subsidies from the group parent company. For example, the internal capital market formed by the group parent company can ease the financing constraints from the external capital market. However, the internal capital of the group parent company. How much does the configuration mechanism guarantee the efficiency of the allocation of funds for a member company? Can the internal capital market set up by the group parent company bring an increase in investment efficiency to the member companies? Under the modern company system, because of the existence of the contractual relationship, the enterprise has multiple principal-agent relations. The company management has absolute power and control. In order to make the investment decision, does the enterprise management have an impact on the investment behavior of the listed company for its own benefit, which leads to the excessive investment behavior or the underinvestment behavior? On this basis, this paper chooses the empirical data of the 20102013 years A stock listed companies of Shanghai and Shenzhen as the research object. The total of 8380 data samples are observed. At the same time, the author collects and collates the background information of the Shanghai and Shenzhen A shares listed companies by hand, and defines the enterprise groups. Methods to examine the influence of enterprise group control on inefficiency investment (overinvestment and underinvestment) and to examine the regulatory role of management power in this relationship. The relationship and mechanism of enterprise group control, management power and inefficiency investment (overinvestment, underinvestment), put forward the hypothesis of this article, and organized the research path and research model of the article. In the theoretical model, the enterprise group control and the inefficiency investment (overinvestment and underinvestment) are independent variables, respectively. In the fourth chapter, descriptive statistical analysis is carried out in the first step, and the second step is the linear relationship between the main variables, and the second step. The correlation analysis was carried out with the Spearman correlation coefficient analysis. The third step, in order to test the hypothesis of this article or not, carried out multiple linear analysis. The fourth step, in order to test the robust credibility of the conclusion of this article, this chapter redefines the meaning of the related variables and changes the number of samples to test again. The data processing steps are carried out with the help of Excel and SPSS19.0, and the empirical analysis is carried out using Eviews6.0. The conclusion is that there are differences in the degree of non investment efficiency (overinvestment and insufficient investment) between listed companies and independent companies controlled by enterprise groups. The parent company rent-seeking, which promotes the overinvestment behavior of the listed companies and alleviates the underinvestment behavior. Moreover, the above phenomenon is more serious in the case of the higher management rights, and aggravates the agency cost. In particular, the enterprise group control system has a promoting effect on the overinvestment behavior of the company compared to the independent listed company. In addition, compared with the independent listed companies, the relationship between the control of enterprise group and the overinvestment and the underinvestment is stronger than that of the independent listed companies. The final empirical results verify the regulatory effect of management power on the above relationship. On the basis of analysis and empirical research, this paper holds that the group company in China should strengthen the internal capital management and attach importance to the influence of the enterprise group control on the investment efficiency of the member companies. The appropriate use of the internal capital market of the enterprise group can alleviate the lack of funds in the listed companies and improve the efficiency of the internal capital allocation. However, if the internal capital market formed by the parent company of the enterprise group is not properly used, it will lead to the inefficiency investment phenomenon of the listed companies. In addition, there is a conflict of interests between the shareholders and the management in a certain situation, which makes the managers make inefficiency investment behavior for their own interests and is subordinate to the enterprises. The above phenomenon is more serious in the listed companies of the industry group. The conclusion of this paper is also for the listed companies affiliated to the enterprise group to strengthen the management constraint or incentive, so as to reduce the agency cost.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：東北財經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2015
【分類號】：F275;F276.4

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