本文選題：高管薪酬 + 盈余管理�。� 參考：《中南林業(yè)科技大學》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：隨著資本主義經(jīng)濟的發(fā)展,現(xiàn)代企業(yè)制度逐步確立,所有權(quán)和經(jīng)營權(quán)的分離產(chǎn)生了委托代理關(guān)系�；谛畔⒉粚ΨQ理論,高管有動機為獲得較高的薪酬而進行盈余管理,從而產(chǎn)生代理人的道德風險和逆向選擇,嚴重影響到信息使用者的決策和社會資源的優(yōu)化配置。委托人為了減輕代理人的道德風險和自利行為,便在企業(yè)會計和薪酬制定方面引入了會計穩(wěn)健性。會計穩(wěn)健性作為公司治理的一種有效機制,它能有效地緩解信息不對稱的問題,可以為董事會進行有效的監(jiān)管提供確證的信息,對于降低企業(yè)的代理成本具有重要作用。特別是2006年以后,我國頒發(fā)了全新的企業(yè)會計準則,會計面臨著全新的變化,會計穩(wěn)健性和高管薪酬問題被推上了風口浪尖。在這種制度背景和經(jīng)濟背景下研究我國上市公司高管薪酬與盈余管理幅度對會計穩(wěn)健性影響,有助于全面化、多元化發(fā)展薪酬激勵的方式,幫助促使我國上市公司訂制出一種既能夠持續(xù)維持穩(wěn)健的會計信息,又能夠具有高管薪酬最大化激勵作用的薪酬契約。同時,也能減輕公司職業(yè)經(jīng)理人的委托成本,維持經(jīng)濟市場的運行,對高管人員規(guī)范化的盈余管理行為進行監(jiān)管。本文以實證研究與理論研究相結(jié)合的方法,同時注重創(chuàng)新研究和規(guī)范研究的結(jié)合運用,對上市公司高管薪酬、盈余管理幅度與會計穩(wěn)健性之間關(guān)系的影響進行探討和分析。在理論研究部分,本文重點闡述了奠定理論基礎(chǔ)的相關(guān)理論知識,歸納總結(jié)前人的研究成果,用委托代理理論、契約理論、信息不對稱理論、人力資本理論等相關(guān)知識與方法,對會計穩(wěn)健性、盈余管理幅度和高管薪酬之間的相關(guān)性進行理論上的定性分析。在實證研究部分,本文結(jié)合我國實際,選擇了2010-2016年滬深交易所多家A股上市公司的財務(wù)數(shù)據(jù)作為研究對象,在借鑒前人理論成果與模型的基礎(chǔ)上,加入本文研究所需的相關(guān)變量構(gòu)建模型,通過SPSS統(tǒng)計軟件對數(shù)據(jù)進行描述性統(tǒng)計、多元回歸分析和穩(wěn)健性檢驗,結(jié)合我國的國情與制度背景,對比經(jīng)濟現(xiàn)實對模型結(jié)果進行相關(guān)的解釋、論證,得出實證結(jié)果。通過對數(shù)據(jù)回歸分析,我們發(fā)現(xiàn):上市公司高管薪酬越高,盈余管理的幅度越大;上市公司盈余管理幅度越大,公司會計穩(wěn)健性水平越差;上市公司高管薪酬與上市公司會計穩(wěn)健性水平呈負相關(guān)。
[Abstract]:With the development of capitalist economy, modern enterprise system has been gradually established, and the separation of ownership and management has produced principal-agent relationship. Based on the theory of asymmetric information, executives have motivation to manage earnings in order to obtain higher salary, which results in moral hazard and adverse selection of agents, which seriously affects the decision of information users and the optimal allocation of social resources. In order to reduce the moral hazard and self-interest of the agent, the principal introduces the accounting conservatism in the aspects of enterprise accounting and salary formulation. As an effective mechanism of corporate governance, accounting conservatism can effectively alleviate the problem of asymmetric information, can provide corroborated information for effective supervision of the board of directors, and plays an important role in reducing the agency cost of enterprises. Especially after 2006, our country issued the brand-new enterprise accounting standard, the accounting is faced with the brand-new change, the accounting conservatism and the executive compensation question has been pushed into the storm. Under the background of this system and economic background, this paper studies the influence of executive compensation and earnings management range on accounting conservatism of listed companies in China, which is helpful to the comprehensive and diversified development of compensation incentives. To help the listed companies to order a kind of compensation contract, which can not only maintain steady accounting information, but also can maximize the incentive effect of executive compensation. At the same time, it can also reduce the entrustment cost of professional managers, maintain the operation of economic market, and supervise the standardized earnings management behavior of executives. This paper discusses and analyzes the relationship among executive compensation earnings management range and accounting conservatism in listed companies by combining empirical research with theoretical research and focusing on the combination of innovation research and normative research. In the part of theoretical research, this paper focuses on the related theoretical knowledge, summarizes the previous research results, using principal-agent theory, contract theory, information asymmetry theory, human capital theory and other related knowledge and methods. The correlation between accounting conservatism, earnings management range and executive compensation is analyzed qualitatively in theory. In the part of empirical research, this paper chooses the financial data of several A-share listed companies of Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange from 2010 to 2016 as the research object, and draws lessons from the previous theoretical results and models. Add the relevant variables needed in this paper to build the model, through the SPSS statistical software to describe the data statistics, multiple regression analysis and robustness test, combined with our national conditions and institutional background, Compared with economic reality, the model results are explained and demonstrated, and the empirical results are obtained. Through the regression analysis of the data, we find that the higher the executive compensation, the bigger the earnings management, the worse the accounting conservatism of listed companies. There is a negative correlation between executive compensation and accounting conservatism of listed companies.
【學位授予單位】：中南林業(yè)科技大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F272.92;F275

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