本文關(guān)鍵詞： 股權(quán)激勵(lì) 公司業(yè)績 上市公司 產(chǎn)權(quán)性質(zhì)　出處：《云南大學(xué)》2016年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：股權(quán)激勵(lì)在西方國家受到廣泛的應(yīng)用,成為了現(xiàn)代公司治理中調(diào)和股東與職業(yè)經(jīng)理人矛盾的一種有效手段。在我國,隨著2005年股權(quán)分置改革的推行以及2006年及之后相繼發(fā)布了股權(quán)激勵(lì)相關(guān)指導(dǎo)性文件,使得國內(nèi)實(shí)施股權(quán)激勵(lì)有了基本的經(jīng)濟(jì)環(huán)境以及法律環(huán)境的保障。其中,國務(wù)院聯(lián)合證監(jiān)會針對國有性質(zhì)以及非國有性質(zhì)的上市公司就激勵(lì)條件分別作了不同規(guī)定。根據(jù)以上背景,本文運(yùn)用規(guī)范研究與實(shí)證研究兩種研究方法,分別對相關(guān)理論以及數(shù)據(jù)進(jìn)行分析；基于2010年及之后Wind數(shù)據(jù)終端提供的上市公司財(cái)務(wù)數(shù)據(jù),考察企業(yè)股權(quán)激勵(lì)程度與其業(yè)績之間的相關(guān)性,并進(jìn)一步對國有控股與非國有控股上市公司的實(shí)證結(jié)果進(jìn)行對比分析。在規(guī)范研究部分,首先闡述了本文的研究動機(jī)、制度背景、研究思路與方法、研究意義以及可能的創(chuàng)新點(diǎn)。其次對相關(guān)理論及文獻(xiàn)綜述進(jìn)行了整理。最后對我國股權(quán)激勵(lì)實(shí)施現(xiàn)狀進(jìn)行描述性統(tǒng)計(jì),分別從產(chǎn)權(quán)性質(zhì)、行業(yè)、標(biāo)的物、有效期以及行權(quán)方式這五個(gè)維度對樣本進(jìn)行考察。在實(shí)證研究部分,本文以2010年至2012年期間公告實(shí)施股權(quán)激勵(lì)政策且至今仍處于實(shí)施進(jìn)程中的210家國有與非國有上市公司為樣本,選取其公告實(shí)施激勵(lì)計(jì)劃當(dāng)年以及隨后兩年的財(cái)務(wù)數(shù)據(jù)來進(jìn)行定量分析。以權(quán)益報(bào)酬率為因變量,股權(quán)激勵(lì)水平為自變量,并引入企業(yè)資產(chǎn)規(guī)模、總資產(chǎn)負(fù)債率、總資產(chǎn)周轉(zhuǎn)率作為控制變量,利用統(tǒng)計(jì)軟件SPSS(22.0)依次對考察樣本的數(shù)據(jù)進(jìn)行描述性統(tǒng)計(jì)分析、相關(guān)性分析、多元線性回歸分析以及調(diào)節(jié)效應(yīng)分析,驗(yàn)證假設(shè)并對實(shí)證結(jié)果進(jìn)行定性分析。最終得到的結(jié)論為：股權(quán)激勵(lì)水平與公司業(yè)績確實(shí)具有正相關(guān)關(guān)系。通過進(jìn)一步對比國有性質(zhì)與非國有性質(zhì)上市公司,發(fā)現(xiàn)非國有上市公司的股權(quán)激勵(lì)水平與其業(yè)績有明顯正相關(guān)關(guān)系,而國有上市公司的股權(quán)激勵(lì)水平與其業(yè)績并沒有明顯正相關(guān)關(guān)系,隨后分析了其中的原因并提出了進(jìn)一步研究的建議。
[Abstract]:Equity incentive has been widely used in western countries and has become an effective means to reconcile the contradiction between shareholders and professional managers in modern corporate governance. With the implementation of the split share structure reform in 2005 and the issuance of the relevant guidance documents on equity incentive in 2006 and after, the implementation of equity incentive in China has the basic economic environment and the protection of the legal environment. The Joint Securities Regulatory Commission of the State Council has made different regulations on incentive conditions for listed companies with state-owned nature and non-state-owned nature. According to the above background, this paper uses two research methods, normative research and empirical research. Based on the financial data of listed companies provided by Wind data terminal in 2010, the correlation between the degree of equity incentive and its performance is investigated. In the normative research part, the author first expounds the research motivation, system background, research ideas and methods of this paper, and makes a comparative analysis of the empirical results of the state-owned holding company and the non-state-owned holding listed company. The significance of the research and possible innovations. Secondly, the related theory and literature review are sorted out. Finally, the current situation of the implementation of equity incentives in China is described, respectively from the property nature, industry, subject matter, In the empirical research part, the validity period and the exercise mode of the samples are investigated. In this paper, 210 state-owned and non-state-owned listed companies that have announced the implementation of the equity incentive policy between 2010 and 2012 and are still in the process of implementation are taken as samples. The financial data of the year and the following two years are selected to carry out quantitative analysis. The equity incentive level is the independent variable and the equity return rate is the dependent variable, and the scale of the enterprise assets and the total asset-liability ratio are introduced. As the control variable, the total assets turnover rate is used to analyze the data of the investigation samples in turn, including descriptive statistical analysis, correlation analysis, multivariate linear regression analysis and adjustment effect analysis by using the statistical software SPSS 22.0. Finally, the conclusion is that there is a positive correlation between the level of equity incentive and the performance of the company. It is found that the equity incentive level of non-state-owned listed companies has a positive correlation with their performance, while the equity incentive level of state-owned listed companies has no obvious positive correlation with their performance. Then the reasons are analyzed and suggestions for further study are put forward.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：云南大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2016
【分類號】：F272.92;F275
，

本文編號：1501340