本文關鍵詞： 產(chǎn)權性質(zhì) 超額高管薪酬 股價崩盤風險　出處：《浙江財經(jīng)大學》2017年碩士論文　論文類型：學位論文

【摘要】：一直以來,高管薪酬被認為是解決股東與管理層這一傳統(tǒng)委托代理問題的關鍵,也是公司治理的重要機制之一。作為主流激勵理論之一,有效契約理論認為激勵契約的設計和執(zhí)行有利于防范代理人的道德風險,協(xié)調(diào)股東與管理層之間的代理沖突;與之相反,管理層權力理論卻認為,由于資本市場、經(jīng)理人市場及公司治理機制在運作過程中存在固有缺陷,高管薪酬往往淪為管理者權力下的自利產(chǎn)物,其本身便是委托代理成本的一部分。近年來上市公司“天價薪酬”的出現(xiàn)及高管薪酬的“掛倒車”現(xiàn)象也引發(fā)社會公眾的質(zhì)疑與討論。高管高薪究竟是“效率論”下的有效激勵還是“權力論”下的自利產(chǎn)物,一直以來是學術界與實務界爭論的焦點。2008年全球金融危機后,股價暴跌或崩盤對資本市場的強烈沖擊引發(fā)了人們對于股價崩盤風險的思考,股價崩盤影響資本市場的健康發(fā)展,而個股層面的股價崩盤也關系到投資者們的切身利益。本文將超額高管薪酬納入微觀層面股價崩盤風險影響因素的研究范圍,將兩者相結(jié)合,突破從收益框架討論高管薪酬有效性的研究現(xiàn)狀,基于信息不對稱理論下的非對稱風險框架,切入股價崩盤風險視角,對高管超額薪酬是符合“效率論”還是“權力論”進行實證檢驗,從而深入分析超額高管薪酬的激勵有效性和基于薪酬動機的股價崩盤風險成因。在此基礎上,本文考慮產(chǎn)權性質(zhì)的影響,對不同產(chǎn)權性質(zhì)下的超額高管薪酬與股價崩盤風險相關關系進行比較分析。本文研究包括六個部分:第一部分為緒論,闡述了本文的研究背景和研究意義、研究內(nèi)容和研究方法,及本文的研究框架與可能的創(chuàng)新點。第二部分為文獻綜述,分別對超額高管薪酬和股價崩盤風險的相關文獻進行了歸納和梳理,描述了國內(nèi)外現(xiàn)有文獻在超額高管薪酬的有效性和股價崩盤風險的形成、影響因素與經(jīng)濟后果等方面的研究成果,并進行了文獻述評。第三部分為相關概念和理論分析,首先對本文所涉及到的超額高管薪酬和股價崩盤風險的概念進行闡述,然后通過有效契約理論和管理者權力理論分析高管薪酬的激勵有效性,從信息不對稱理論和有效市場理論剖析股價崩盤風險的形成機理,為下文研究奠定理論基礎。第四部分為研究假設和研究設計,根據(jù)第三部分的理論分析進行了假設推演,提出研究假設,介紹本文的被解釋變量、解釋變量與控制變量,以及構(gòu)建本文的研究模型,并以2010—2015年為研究窗口,以深滬A股上市公司為研究樣本進行后續(xù)實證分析。第五部分為實證檢驗,主要運用stata軟件進行實證研究,在描述性統(tǒng)計與相關性分析的基礎上,利用研究模型對全樣本和分組樣本分別進行回歸分析,實證檢驗不同產(chǎn)權性質(zhì)下的超額高管薪酬對股價崩盤風險的影響,為使本文的研究結(jié)論更為穩(wěn)健,本文重新定義超額高管薪酬,替代原先變量進行穩(wěn)健性檢驗。第六部分為研究結(jié)論和政策建議,根據(jù)實證檢驗的結(jié)果得出本文的研究結(jié)論,提出相關政策建議,并指出本文研究存在的局限性和未來研究展望。本文的研究結(jié)論為:(1)全樣本企業(yè)的超額高管薪酬與股價崩盤風險呈正相關關系,但四組結(jié)果僅一組顯著,并不穩(wěn)健,原因是不同產(chǎn)權性質(zhì)的企業(yè)所適用的理論框架存在不同的表現(xiàn)形態(tài),導致區(qū)分了國有企業(yè)和民營企業(yè)后,超額高管薪酬對股價崩盤風險的影響方向相反而影響全樣本的顯著性,因此對于超額高管薪酬與股價崩盤風險的研究必須考慮產(chǎn)權性質(zhì)的影響。(2)國有企業(yè)的超額高管薪酬與股價崩盤風險顯著正相關,在進一步區(qū)分了中央國企與地方國企后發(fā)現(xiàn),超額高管薪酬與股價崩盤風險的顯著正相關關系在地方國企中更為明顯,地方國企的超額高管薪酬支持管理者權力理論。(3)民營企業(yè)的超額高管薪酬與股價崩盤風險呈穩(wěn)定的負相關關系,與在國有企業(yè)中的影響方向相反,但顯著性不強,相較于國有企業(yè),民營企業(yè)的高管高薪更具激勵性,更能反映高管的能力和股東對高管的期望,但激勵效果十分有限。(4)超額高管薪酬的崩盤效應在國有企業(yè)與民營企業(yè)樣本中呈現(xiàn)顯著差異,在中央國企與地方國企樣本中也存在顯著區(qū)別,體現(xiàn)了超額高管薪酬與股價崩盤風險的相關關系受產(chǎn)權性質(zhì)的顯著影響。本文為不同產(chǎn)權性質(zhì)上市公司的高管薪酬機制建設提供了理論依據(jù),并同時反映了基于激勵動機的股價崩盤效應,對完善上市公司高管激勵契約、降低個股層面股價崩盤風險、保護投資者利益等方面具有積極意義。
[Abstract]:Since the executive compensation is regarded as the key to solving the shareholders and the management of the traditional principal-agent problem, is one of the important mechanisms of corporate governance. As one of the mainstream of the incentive theory, the contract theory holds that effective incentive contract design and implementation is conducive to the moral risk prevention agent, agency conflicts between shareholders and management coordination; in contrast, managerial power theory is that, because of the capital market, manager market and corporate governance mechanism has inherent defects in the process of operation, self products often become executive compensation management under the authority, which itself is a part of agency cost. In recent years, the listed company "salary" appeared and the executive compensation "hanging car" phenomenon also led to public questioning and discussion. The well paid executives what is "effective incentive efficiency theory" or "power The product of self-interest ", has always been the focus of the.2008 academic and practical circles in the global financial crisis, the stock price plummeted or collapse of a strong impact on the capital market fears on stock crash risk, price collapse affect the healthy development of capital markets, and the stock price collapse also level to the interests of investors. The excess executive compensation into the scope of the study of micro level factors influence stock price crash risk, combines breakthrough discussed the status of executive compensation effectiveness from the revenue framework, asymmetric risk framework based on the theory of information asymmetry, the starting price collapse risk perspective on executive compensation is over in accordance with the" efficiency theory "or" power "theory of empirical testing, and further analysis of excess executive compensation incentive effectiveness and salary motivation based on shares The price collapse risk causes. On this basis, this paper consider the impact of property rights, to make a comparative analysis of the relationship between excess executive compensation and stock price collapse risk in different nature of property right. This paper includes six parts: the first part is the introduction, introduces the research background and research significance, research contents and research methods, research in this paper, and the framework and possible innovations. The second part is literature review, summarized and analyzed respectively the literatures related to excess executive compensation and stock crash risk, describes the formation of the existing literature at home and abroad in excess of executive compensation and the effectiveness of the stock crash risk, research the influential factors and economic consequences etc., and a literature review. The third part is the related concepts and theoretical analysis, the first of this paper refers to excessive executive compensation and stock crash risk probability Read the paper, and then through the analysis of the effectiveness of executive compensation incentive contract theory and the theory of effective power management, analyzes the formation mechanism of stock price crash risk from information asymmetry theory and efficient market theory, the theoretical basis for the following research. The fourth part is the research hypothesis and research design, according to the third part of the theoretical analysis of hypothesis deduction and put forward the research hypothesis, the explanatory variables, explanatory variables and control variables, and build the model of this research, and from 2010 to 2015 as the research window, with the Shanghai and Shenzhen A shares listed companies as research samples for subsequent empirical analysis. The fifth part is the empirical test, the main use of Stata software in the empirical research. Based on the descriptive statistics and correlation analysis, the whole sample and grouping samples respectively by regression analysis model, an empirical test of different products Effect of the nature of the right to excess executive compensation for stock crash risk, in order to make the conclusion of this paper is more robust, this paper redefines the excess executive compensation, to replace the original variables for the robustness test. The sixth part is the conclusions and policy recommendations, according to the results of empirical conclusions, and puts forward relevant policy suggestions. This paper points out the limitations and future research prospects. The conclusions of the paper are: (1) the relationship between excess executive compensation and stock price collapse risk positively full sample of enterprises, but the results of the four groups only one group, is not robust, because there are different forms of the theoretical framework of the companies of different property rights applicable the resulting distinction between state-owned enterprises and private enterprises, the excess executive compensation effect on stock crash risk in the opposite direction and significant influence on the whole sample. Study on excess executive compensation and stock crash risk must be considered property rights. (2) is significantly related to excessive executive compensation and stock crash risk of state-owned enterprises, found in the further distinguish between the central SOEs and local state-owned enterprises, excessive executive compensation and stock price collapse risk of the significant positive correlation in the local state-owned enterprises more obviously, the local state-owned enterprises excessive executive compensation support managerial power theory. (3) private enterprises over executive pay and stock crash risk is negatively related to the stable, contrary effect in state-owned enterprises in the direction, but the significance is not strong, compared to the state-owned enterprises, private enterprises paid executives more incentive, better reflect the executive ability and shareholder expectations of executives, but the incentive effect is very limited. (4) the collapse effect of excess executive compensation in state owned enterprises and private enterprises in the sample Significant differences in the central state-owned enterprises and local state-owned enterprises in the sample have significant difference, significant effect reflects the correlation between executive compensation and excess stock crash risk by property rights. This paper provides a theoretical basis for the construction of executive compensation mechanism of listed company's property rights, and also reflects the effect of incentive based on stock crash. To improve the listed company executives incentive contract, reduce the level of stocks price collapse risk, is of positive significance to protect the interests of investors and so on.

【學位授予單位】：浙江財經(jīng)大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F272.92;F832.51

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