本文選題：第三方安全管理 + 監(jiān)管博弈��； 參考：《華中科技大學》2015年碩士論文

【摘要】：安全監(jiān)管是工程建設(shè)安全管理問題中的重要部分,工程建設(shè)過程中各參與主體都追求利益最大化,其利益訴求不同并且相互影響,而安全監(jiān)管問題具備長周期性,這使得安全監(jiān)管問題具備復雜系統(tǒng)和動態(tài)變化的特性,同時也使監(jiān)管效果的預測并不準確。現(xiàn)階段的工程建設(shè)領(lǐng)域管理不夠規(guī)范,監(jiān)理單位由于自身懈怠或在利益驅(qū)使等因素下在施工現(xiàn)場的監(jiān)管不夠嚴格�；诖朔N情況,完全獨立于傳統(tǒng)安全,在保證其公正性與公信力的前提下對施工現(xiàn)場進行突擊檢查(稱為“飛檢”)的第三方安全管理模式的出現(xiàn),有助于形成良好的安全文化與安全氛圍,也對施工單位、監(jiān)理單位起到了一定的約束作用,從而促進了安全管理工作�，F(xiàn)有的大多數(shù)研究討論的是兩個參與方的博弈穩(wěn)定策略的存在性并進行分析,而實際的工程建設(shè)過程中是存在不同類型參建方,對于超過兩方的多方博弈問題研究甚少。鑒于這樣的現(xiàn)狀,本文嘗試分析在第三方安全管理參與下施工現(xiàn)場的三方監(jiān)管博弈。本文首先對工程建設(shè)安全管理的現(xiàn)狀進行分析,引出第三方安全管理的必要性,并分別針對廣義上的第三方安全管理和上海中環(huán)線施工路段的第三方安全檢查小組給出了描述與總結(jié)。其次,從施工現(xiàn)場第三方安全管理與施工單位、監(jiān)理單位的多方博弈關(guān)系入手,建立了混合戰(zhàn)略博弈模型,針對模型求解后的問題,進一步將混合戰(zhàn)略博弈與系統(tǒng)動力學計算機仿真手段相結(jié)合,通過仿真結(jié)果分析各參與主體的策略變化并進行總結(jié)。最后,在考慮到傳統(tǒng)博弈論具備的“完全理性”條件與現(xiàn)實并不匹配,將三個參與主體進行監(jiān)管演化博弈,通過模型求解說明了演化穩(wěn)定均衡難以達到,并從側(cè)面反映出盡管有第三方安全管理的參與,當今社會安全監(jiān)管問題依然在一個較長周期過程處于不穩(wěn)定與波動之中。
[Abstract]:Safety supervision is an important part of the safety management of engineering construction. In the process of engineering construction, all the participants pursue the maximization of interests, and their interest demands are different and affect each other, and the safety supervision problem has a long period of time. This makes the problem of safety regulation have the characteristics of complex system and dynamic change, but also makes the prediction of regulatory effect inaccurate. At present, the management in the field of engineering construction is not standardized enough, and the supervision unit is not strict enough in the construction site because of its slack or interest driven factors. Based on this situation, completely independent from the traditional safety, under the premise of ensuring its impartiality and credibility, the third party safety management mode of the construction site surprise inspection (called "flying inspection") appears. It helps to form a good safety culture and safety atmosphere, and also plays a binding role on the construction units and supervision units, thus promoting the safety management work. Most of the existing studies discuss the existence and analysis of the game stability strategy of two participants, but in the actual construction process, there are different types of participants, but there is little research on the multi-party game problem of more than two parties. In view of this situation, this paper tries to analyze the tripartite supervision game in the construction site with the participation of third party safety management. Firstly, this paper analyzes the present situation of engineering construction safety management, and leads to the necessity of third party safety management. The third party safety management in the broad sense and the third party safety inspection group in the construction section of Shanghai Central Ring Line are described and summarized respectively. Secondly, starting with the multi-game relationship between the third party safety management and the construction unit and the supervision unit, the mixed strategy game model is established, aiming at the problems after the model is solved. Furthermore, the hybrid strategy game is combined with the computer simulation method of system dynamics, and the strategy changes of the participants are analyzed and summarized through the simulation results. Finally, considering that the "perfect rationality" condition of traditional game theory does not match with reality, the three participants are involved in the supervisory evolution game, and the solution of the model shows that the evolutionary stable equilibrium is difficult to achieve. It also reflects that, despite the participation of third-party safety management, the social safety supervision problem is still in a long period of instability and fluctuation.
【學位授予單位】：華中科技大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2015
【分類號】：TU714

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