【摘要】：2010年在相關(guān)股權(quán)改造指導(dǎo)意見的指導(dǎo)下,股份制的農(nóng)村商業(yè)銀行被確定為農(nóng)村信用社產(chǎn)權(quán)改革的最終組織形式。隨著農(nóng)村信用社向股份制方向發(fā)展,完善農(nóng)村信用社公司治理結(jié)構(gòu),提高農(nóng)村信用社公司治理效率越來(lái)越受到關(guān)注。其中高管層激勵(lì)作為公司治理的重要方面,對(duì)農(nóng)村信用社的可持續(xù)發(fā)展至關(guān)重要。但目前研究農(nóng)村信用社高管激勵(lì)的文獻(xiàn)較少,已有學(xué)者僅對(duì)農(nóng)村信用社高管薪酬水平、持股比例進(jìn)行研究,鮮有關(guān)于農(nóng)村信用社高管在職消費(fèi)的研究。本文在研究高管激勵(lì)對(duì)農(nóng)村信用社績(jī)效的影響時(shí),增加高管在職消費(fèi)對(duì)農(nóng)村信用社績(jī)效的影響,研究其內(nèi)在影響機(jī)理。并考慮到農(nóng)村信用社長(zhǎng)期以來(lái)股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)分散,缺乏真正意義上的大股東以及制衡股東,分散的小股東缺乏監(jiān)督農(nóng)村信用社高管經(jīng)營(yíng)的意愿與動(dòng)機(jī),影響高管激勵(lì)機(jī)制作用的發(fā)揮,本文引入股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)作為調(diào)節(jié)變量,實(shí)證研究股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)對(duì)高管激勵(lì)與農(nóng)村信用社績(jī)效相關(guān)性的影響。首先,本文在相關(guān)文獻(xiàn)綜述以及委托代理、人力資本等理論的基礎(chǔ)上,研究了高管貨幣薪酬、高管持股比例、高管在職消費(fèi)對(duì)農(nóng)村信用社績(jī)效的影響機(jī)理,以及股權(quán)集中度和股權(quán)制衡度對(duì)高管激勵(lì)與農(nóng)村信用社績(jī)效關(guān)系的調(diào)節(jié)效應(yīng),提出本文研究假設(shè)。其次,利用陜西省52家農(nóng)村信用社2010-2015年的數(shù)據(jù),構(gòu)建層次回歸模型進(jìn)行實(shí)證分析。實(shí)證結(jié)果表明:高管貨幣薪酬與農(nóng)村信用社支農(nóng)效率和盈利能力顯著正相關(guān),高管貨幣薪酬起正向激勵(lì)作用;高管持股比例與農(nóng)村信用社支農(nóng)效率顯著負(fù)相關(guān),與經(jīng)營(yíng)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)顯著正相關(guān),高管持股比例對(duì)農(nóng)村信用社績(jī)效產(chǎn)生負(fù)向影響;高管在職消費(fèi)與農(nóng)村信用社盈利能力顯著正相關(guān),與經(jīng)營(yíng)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)顯著負(fù)相關(guān),高管在職消費(fèi)的激勵(lì)效果較好。股權(quán)集中度和股權(quán)制衡度均對(duì)高管持股比例與農(nóng)村信用社績(jī)效的關(guān)系產(chǎn)生顯著的正向調(diào)節(jié)作用,即有利于削弱高管持股比例對(duì)農(nóng)村信用社績(jī)效的負(fù)向影響。最后,根據(jù)實(shí)證結(jié)果,本文從加強(qiáng)股東對(duì)管理層的約束、完善農(nóng)村信用社高管激勵(lì)機(jī)制、加強(qiáng)內(nèi)外部監(jiān)督等三個(gè)方面提出對(duì)策建議。
[Abstract]:In 2010, under the guidance of relevant equity reform, joint-stock rural commercial banks were determined to be the final organizational form of rural credit cooperatives property rights reform. With the development of rural credit cooperatives to joint-stock system, more and more attention has been paid to perfecting the corporate governance structure of rural credit cooperatives and improving the corporate governance efficiency of rural credit cooperatives. As an important aspect of corporate governance, executive level incentive is very important for the sustainable development of rural credit cooperatives. However, there are few researches on the incentive of rural credit cooperatives. Some scholars only study the salary level and shareholding ratio of rural credit cooperatives executives, and there is little research on the in-service consumption of rural credit cooperatives executives. This paper studies the effect of executive incentive on the performance of rural credit cooperatives, increases the effect of in-service consumption of senior executives on the performance of rural credit cooperatives, and studies its internal influence mechanism. And considering that the ownership structure of rural credit cooperatives has been scattered for a long time, the lack of real large shareholders and counterbalance shareholders, the scattered minority shareholders lack the will and motivation to supervise the management of senior managers of rural credit cooperatives. This paper introduces the equity structure as a regulating variable and empirically studies the influence of the equity structure on the relationship between the executive incentive and the performance of rural credit cooperatives. First of all, on the basis of literature review, principal-agent, human capital and other theories, this paper studies the influence mechanism of executive monetary compensation, executive shareholding ratio and executive in-service consumption on the performance of rural credit cooperatives. And the effect of equity concentration and equity balance on the relationship between executive incentive and rural credit cooperative performance, this paper puts forward the hypothesis. Secondly, based on the data of 52 rural credit cooperatives in Shaanxi province from 2010 to 2015, a hierarchical regression model is constructed for empirical analysis. The empirical results show that: the executive monetary compensation and rural credit cooperatives agricultural efficiency and profitability significantly positive correlation, executive monetary compensation plays a positive incentive role, the proportion of senior management ownership and rural credit cooperatives agricultural efficiency significantly negative correlation. The proportion of executive ownership has a negative impact on the performance of rural credit cooperatives, while the in-service consumption of senior executives is significantly positively correlated with the profitability of rural credit cooperatives, and negatively correlated with operational risks. The incentive effect of executives'on-the-job consumption is better. The degree of ownership concentration and equity balance have a significant positive effect on the relationship between the proportion of senior management and the performance of rural credit cooperatives, that is to say, it is helpful to weaken the negative influence of the proportion of ownership of senior executives on the performance of rural credit cooperatives. Finally, according to the empirical results, this paper puts forward some suggestions from three aspects: strengthening the restriction of shareholders on the management, perfecting the incentive mechanism of rural credit cooperatives executives, and strengthening the internal and external supervision.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：西安理工大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：F272.92;F832.35

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