【摘要】：自從公司所有權(quán)與經(jīng)營(yíng)權(quán)相分離之后,股東與經(jīng)理人之間的代理問(wèn)題成為學(xué)術(shù)研究的重點(diǎn)課題,這一問(wèn)題由詹森和麥克林在“代理成本理論”中首次提出。隨著公司治理的深入,在傳統(tǒng)代理問(wèn)題上如經(jīng)理人濫用現(xiàn)金流量、構(gòu)建事實(shí)上的“經(jīng)理人帝國(guó)”等,已有大量文獻(xiàn)進(jìn)行相關(guān)性研究并取得有效成果,能夠有針對(duì)性地對(duì)企業(yè)實(shí)踐活動(dòng)中的治理問(wèn)題進(jìn)行有效借鑒,但在傳統(tǒng)代理問(wèn)題之上,關(guān)于經(jīng)理人職位沖突下的經(jīng)理人私利行為,稱之為“經(jīng)理人管理防御”問(wèn)題,我國(guó)研究尚處于起步階段,并沒(méi)有形成一套系統(tǒng)性的理論能夠?qū)ζ髽I(yè)運(yùn)行產(chǎn)生有效借鑒意義。本文基于經(jīng)理人管理防御假說(shuō)下對(duì)管理防御與企業(yè)資本結(jié)構(gòu)調(diào)整速度之間的關(guān)系具體從以下五個(gè)方面進(jìn)行分析,在文章第一部分對(duì)所研究問(wèn)題的相關(guān)背景進(jìn)行分析,具體闡述本文研究的主要內(nèi)容、研究特色與創(chuàng)新點(diǎn)。第二部分為相關(guān)文獻(xiàn)綜述,對(duì)國(guó)內(nèi)外圍繞這一問(wèn)題所得出的研究結(jié)論進(jìn)行評(píng)述,并以此為基礎(chǔ)探究本文所要研究問(wèn)題的切入點(diǎn)。第三部分為理論分析部分,通過(guò)對(duì)經(jīng)理人管理防御動(dòng)機(jī)與影響因素分析對(duì)經(jīng)理人管理防御對(duì)企業(yè)資本結(jié)構(gòu)調(diào)整速度影響的作用機(jī)理進(jìn)行理論探索。在第四部分,構(gòu)建防御動(dòng)機(jī)驅(qū)動(dòng)下經(jīng)理人資本結(jié)構(gòu)調(diào)整決策的博弈模型,分析不同股權(quán)集中狀況下公司股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)對(duì)其資本結(jié)構(gòu)調(diào)整動(dòng)力的影響,探索出管理防御對(duì)企業(yè)資本結(jié)構(gòu)調(diào)整速度影響的影響路徑,為后文相關(guān)研究奠定理論基礎(chǔ)。第五部分通過(guò)構(gòu)建管理防御對(duì)企業(yè)資本結(jié)構(gòu)調(diào)整速度影響的線性回歸模型,以兩大主板上市公司2012年12月31日至2016年12月31日財(cái)務(wù)數(shù)據(jù)為研究樣本,將其分為高負(fù)債樣本與低負(fù)債樣本分別進(jìn)行多元線性回歸分析,驗(yàn)證本文所提出的相關(guān)假設(shè)。研究發(fā)現(xiàn),經(jīng)理人管理防御對(duì)企業(yè)資本結(jié)構(gòu)調(diào)整速度具有顯著影響,在高負(fù)債公司與低負(fù)債公司中,基于經(jīng)理人管理防御程度的不同,這種影響作用呈現(xiàn)出不同的影響效用,這一研究結(jié)論的發(fā)現(xiàn),為緩解股東與經(jīng)理人之間委托代理問(wèn)題與提升公司治理效率奠定基礎(chǔ),同時(shí),也為完善我國(guó)國(guó)有企業(yè)內(nèi)部監(jiān)督機(jī)制與強(qiáng)化經(jīng)理人市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)機(jī)制提供政策建議。
[Abstract]:Since the separation of corporate ownership and management right, the agency problem between shareholders and managers has become a key issue in academic research. This problem is first proposed by Jansen and Mclean in the "agency cost theory". With the deepening of corporate governance, the fact that managers abuse cash flow on the traditional agency problems is a fact. "Manager Empire" and so on, there have been a large number of literature related research and effective results, can be targeted to the effective reference to the governance problems in the enterprise practice, but on the traditional agency problem, the manager's private profit under the manager position conflict is called "manager management defense" problem. In this paper, the relationship between management defense and capital structure adjustment is analyzed from the following five aspects. In the first part of the article, the research on the relationship between management defense and enterprise capital structure adjustment is analyzed. The relevant background of the question is analyzed, the main content of the study, the research characteristics and the innovation point are elaborated. The second part is related literature review, commenting on the research conclusions surrounding this problem at home and abroad, and taking this as the basis to explore the breakthrough point of this paper. The third part is the theoretical analysis part, through which it is a theoretical analysis part. This paper makes a theoretical exploration of the mechanism of manager management defense motivation and influence factors on the effect mechanism of manager management defense on the adjustment speed of enterprise capital structure. In the fourth part, we construct the game model of manager capital structure adjustment decision driven by defensive motivation, and analyze the ownership structure of the company under the absence of ownership concentration. The influence of capital structure adjustment motivation, explore the influence path of management defense on the speed of enterprise capital structure adjustment, lay a theoretical foundation for the related research. The fifth part, by constructing the linear regression model of the influence of management defense on the adjustment speed of enterprise capital structure, the two major board listed companies from December 31, 2012 to 2016. In December 31st, the financial data were divided into high liability samples and low debt samples, which were divided into multiple linear regression analysis to verify the relevant hypotheses proposed in this paper. The difference in the degree of human management defences shows different effects. The discovery of this research conclusion lays the foundation for alleviating the principal-agent problem between shareholders and managers and improving the efficiency of corporate governance. At the same time, it also provides a policy for improving the internal supervision mechanism of the state-owned enterprises and strengthening the market competition mechanism of the managers in China. Suggestions.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：西安理工大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：F275;F832.51

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