本文選題：市場(chǎng)操縱 + 噪聲交易　； 參考：《系統(tǒng)工程理論與實(shí)踐》2017年03期

【摘要】：基于DSSW模型的非有效市場(chǎng)構(gòu)架,在信息市場(chǎng)操縱和社交網(wǎng)絡(luò)的環(huán)境下,內(nèi)生化情緒噪聲交易者的投資決策,給出并分析跟隨者與噪聲交易者之間的均衡.結(jié)論顯示:知情交易者操縱市場(chǎng)會(huì)增加價(jià)格的信息含量;非知情交易者操縱市場(chǎng)給價(jià)格帶來噪聲,價(jià)格的信息含量先增后減.適度悲觀情緒是導(dǎo)致噪聲交易者跟隨交易的充分條件.此外,市場(chǎng)可能收斂到無噪聲交易者、無跟隨交易者、或噪聲交易者和跟隨交易者共存三種均衡狀態(tài).
[Abstract]:Based on the non-efficient market framework of DSSW model, under the environment of information market manipulation and social network, the investment decision of endogenous emotional noise traders is given and analyzed, and the equilibrium between follower and noise trader is given and analyzed. The results show that informed traders manipulate the market will increase the information content of the price, the uninformed traders manipulate the market to bring noise to the price, and the information content of the price increases first and then decreases. Moderate pessimism is a sufficient condition for noise traders to follow the trading. In addition, the market may converge to three equilibrium states: noise-free trader, non-follower trader, or noise-trader and follower.
【作者單位】： 北京航空航天大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)管理學(xué)院;北京化工大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)管理學(xué)院;魯東大學(xué)商學(xué)院;
【基金】：國家自然科學(xué)基金(71371023,71371024)~~
【分類號(hào)】：B84-05;F831.51
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本文編號(hào)：1968674