本文選題：股權(quán)眾籌 + 羊群行為��； 參考：《華僑大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：近年來,眾籌作為一種新興的互聯(lián)網(wǎng)金融融資模式,在中國可謂是迅猛發(fā)展。2015年,開展股權(quán)眾籌融資試點工作被寫入政府報告,而國家“十三五規(guī)劃”更是在2016年3月16日將其正式納入。根據(jù)零壹研究院數(shù)據(jù)中心統(tǒng)計,截至2015年上半年,經(jīng)由眾籌平臺成功撮合的股權(quán)融資規(guī)模達(dá)到45億元以上,惠及約900萬家中小微企業(yè)和初創(chuàng)企業(yè)并誕生了一批明星企業(yè),顯示出其廣闊的發(fā)展前景。然則,在股權(quán)眾籌交易的過程中,由于信息不對稱等問題,大眾投資者很容易出現(xiàn)盲目的跟風(fēng)行為。本文從計算實驗金融學(xué)的視角出發(fā),采用基于多擬體的復(fù)雜系統(tǒng)建模方法,構(gòu)建了一個基于信息交互的多擬體仿真模型,同時借助仿真平臺工具NetLogo 5.3.1,對股權(quán)眾籌投資者的羊群行為進(jìn)行仿真實驗分析,實驗結(jié)果表明:(1)由于信息不對稱等問題,縱使不存在領(lǐng)投人機(jī)制,股權(quán)眾籌投資者之間的信息交互也會導(dǎo)致大部分后期投資者選擇跟風(fēng)投資前期有更多投資者參與的項目,這種模仿式的羊群行為可能會致使項目提前快速超額完成融資目標(biāo),而這或許與項目質(zhì)量的基本情況完全無關(guān),故而最終可能使大眾投資者損失慘重。(2)前期投資者參與人數(shù)的減少,或后期投資者自信程度的提高都會降低羊群行為發(fā)生的嚴(yán)重性;但是,隨著投資者之間信息交互鄰域的逐步擴(kuò)大則會對從眾投資趨勢產(chǎn)生倒U型影響。(3)當(dāng)前為多數(shù)股權(quán)眾籌平臺采用的“領(lǐng)投+跟投”機(jī)制并非良方和長久之計。領(lǐng)投人的積極投資態(tài)度或其決策信息的較高可信度都可能會引發(fā)大眾投資者的盲從心理,導(dǎo)致更為嚴(yán)重的羊群行為的發(fā)生。為了緩解羊群行為的次優(yōu)結(jié)果,保護(hù)投資者權(quán)益,促進(jìn)股權(quán)眾籌的良性有序發(fā)展,監(jiān)管當(dāng)局和整個眾籌行業(yè)應(yīng)當(dāng)致力于完善投資者教育,適度分級披露信息,弱化領(lǐng)投人機(jī)制,加強眾籌平臺監(jiān)管。
[Abstract]:In recent years, crowdfunding, as a new Internet financial financing model, has been developing rapidly in China. In 2015, the pilot project of crowdfunding was written into the government report. The country's 13 th-5-year Plan was formally incorporated on March 16, 2016. By the first half of 2015, more than 4.5 billion yuan worth of equity financing had been successfully brokered through crowdfunding platforms, benefiting about 9 million small and micro businesses and start-ups and a number of stardom, according to the one Research Institute data Center. Show its broad development prospects. However, in the process of crowdfunding trading, mass investors are prone to blindly follow suit due to information asymmetry and other problems. In this paper, from the perspective of computational experimental finance, a multi-quasi volume simulation model based on information interaction is constructed by using the modeling method of complex system based on multi-quasi volume. At the same time, with the help of the simulation platform tool NetLogo 5.3.1, this paper analyzes the herd behavior of crowdfunding investors. The experimental results show that because of the information asymmetry and other problems, even if there is no lead mechanism, The exchange of information among investors will also lead most of the late investors to follow the trend and invest in projects in which more investors participate. This kind of mimic herd behavior may lead the projects to exceed their financing targets quickly and ahead of schedule. And this may have nothing to do with the basic situation of project quality, so it may eventually make the mass investors lose a lot of money) the number of investors participating in the early stage will decrease, or the increase of investor confidence in the later period will reduce the severity of herd behavior; However, with the gradual expansion of the neighborhood of information interaction among investors, it will have a negative U shape impact on the trend of herd investment.) the current "leading and investing" mechanism used for the majority equity crowdfunding platform is not a good and long-term solution. The positive investment attitude of the lead investors or the high reliability of their decision information may lead to the blindness of the masses of investors and lead to more serious herding behavior. In order to alleviate the sub-optimal results of herd behavior, protect the rights and interests of investors, and promote the healthy and orderly development of crowdfunding, the regulatory authorities and the whole crowdfunding industry should devote themselves to improving investor education, appropriately grading disclosure of information, and weakening the mechanism of leading investors. Strengthen the supervision of crowdfunding platform.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：華僑大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F832.51

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