本文選題：高校學(xué)生 + 網(wǎng)絡(luò)借款風(fēng)險(xiǎn)��； 參考：《財(cái)會(huì)通訊》2017年32期

【摘要】：校園借貸問題已引起監(jiān)管部門及媒體的高度關(guān)注。本文針對(duì)高校學(xué)生這一特殊借款群體,在調(diào)查問卷的基礎(chǔ)上揭示出學(xué)生參與網(wǎng)絡(luò)借款的現(xiàn)狀,并依據(jù)"為什么會(huì)借"——"為什么不還"這一邏輯路徑,研究發(fā)現(xiàn):在借款階段,學(xué)生自身能力約束、正規(guī)金融的融資約束、網(wǎng)貸平臺(tái)的逆向選擇和監(jiān)管部門漏洞造成高信用風(fēng)險(xiǎn)、低償債能力的學(xué)生獲得了網(wǎng)絡(luò)借款;在還款階段,收入機(jī)制、成本機(jī)制、聲譽(yù)機(jī)制和法律機(jī)制的作用有限,進(jìn)一步導(dǎo)致了學(xué)生的違約行為。本文據(jù)此針對(duì)網(wǎng)絡(luò)借貸各方提出相應(yīng)的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)控制策略。
[Abstract]:The issue of campus lending has attracted high attention from regulators and the media. Aiming at the special loan group of college students, this paper reveals the current situation of students' participation in network borrowing on the basis of the questionnaire, and according to the logical path of "Why borrow"-"Why not pay it back"? The study found that: in the borrowing stage, students' own ability constraints, formal financial financing constraints, the adverse selection of network lending platform and regulatory loopholes caused high credit risk, low solvency of students to obtain network loans; in the repayment stage, The effect of income mechanism, cost mechanism, reputation mechanism and legal mechanism is limited, which leads to students' breach of contract. According to this, this paper puts forward the corresponding risk control strategy for the network lending parties.
【作者單位】： 中南財(cái)經(jīng)政法大學(xué)會(huì)計(jì)學(xué)院;西南大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)管理學(xué)院;
【基金】：重慶市社會(huì)科學(xué)規(guī)劃項(xiàng)目“高校學(xué)生網(wǎng)絡(luò)借貸風(fēng)險(xiǎn)及其控制研究”(項(xiàng)目編號(hào):2016QNSH17) 西南大學(xué)中央高�；緲I(yè)務(wù)費(fèi)項(xiàng)目(項(xiàng)目編號(hào):SWU1609153、SWU1509506)階段性研究成果
【分類號(hào)】：F832.4;G645.5

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