本文選題：商業(yè)銀行 + 公司治理��； 參考：《吉林財經大學》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：商業(yè)銀行是現(xiàn)代金融體系的主體,是我國經濟發(fā)展的中樞,因而相對一般的上市公司來說,商業(yè)銀行的公司治理問題要更為的復雜和困難,同時上市商業(yè)銀行公司治理的有效性不僅關系著銀行本身的經營業(yè)績,對于整個國民經濟的平穩(wěn)化發(fā)展和適度化運行也都有著至關重要的作用。而隨著市場化金融進一步的發(fā)展和不斷成熟,商業(yè)銀行也開始向著現(xiàn)代企業(yè)轉型與發(fā)展,以應對日益激烈的金融行業(yè)競爭。而這就要求商業(yè)銀行,尤其是上市商業(yè)銀行能夠積極轉變傳統(tǒng)經營模式,優(yōu)化公司治理結構,完善高管薪酬體系,從而更好的提升商業(yè)銀行的整體業(yè)績,使其能夠在競爭中獲得綜合優(yōu)勢。因此我國上市商業(yè)銀行面對日益復雜的金融市場環(huán)境和殘酷激烈的金融競爭,都提出了包括完善董事會治理結構、健全公司治理機制、優(yōu)化高管薪酬體制等一系列深化改革措施,希望能夠通過實際的優(yōu)化措施實現(xiàn)銀行業(yè)績的全面提升。因此本文主要基于上述研究現(xiàn)狀,進一步展開對于上市商業(yè)銀行公司治理、高管薪酬與銀行業(yè)績相關性的研究。本文首先以國內外商業(yè)銀行公司治理與高管薪酬的相關研究依據(jù)作為理論基礎,設計出研究假設,進而以我國上市商業(yè)銀行的相關數(shù)據(jù)指標作為研究變量,通過描述性統(tǒng)計分析、相關性分析以及線性回歸分析等一系列研究方法對公司治理、高管薪酬與銀行業(yè)績之間的經濟相關性進行全面而系統(tǒng)的分析。通過實證研究,結果顯示:獨立董事比例與銀行業(yè)績之間存在顯著相關性;董事會成員持股比例與銀行業(yè)績之間不存在顯著相關性;第一大股東性質與銀行業(yè)績之間存在顯著相關性;股權集中度與銀行業(yè)績之間存在顯著負向相關性;高管薪酬與銀行業(yè)績之間存在顯著相關性;高管持股比例與銀行業(yè)績之間存在顯著相關性。本文更加深入的了解了公司治理與高管薪酬對于商業(yè)銀行經營發(fā)展和業(yè)績提升的重要作用,同時也認識到了我國上市商業(yè)銀行現(xiàn)有的治理結構以及高管薪酬體系所存在的問題,從而對不合理之處提出優(yōu)化改進的完善措施。
[Abstract]:Commercial banks are the main body of the modern financial system and the center of our country's economic development. Therefore, compared with the general listed companies, the corporate governance of commercial banks is more complicated and difficult.At the same time, the effectiveness of corporate governance of listed commercial banks is not only related to the performance of the banks themselves, but also plays a vital role in the smooth development and moderate operation of the whole national economy.With the further development and maturity of market-oriented finance, commercial banks have begun to transform and develop towards modern enterprises in order to cope with the increasingly fierce competition in the financial industry.This requires that commercial banks, especially listed commercial banks, can actively change the traditional business model, optimize the corporate governance structure, improve the executive compensation system, and thus better enhance the overall performance of commercial banks.To enable it to gain a comprehensive advantage in the competition.Therefore, in the face of increasingly complex financial market environment and cruel and fierce financial competition, the listed commercial banks of our country have proposed to improve the governance structure of the board of directors and the corporate governance mechanism.To optimize the executive compensation system and a series of deepening reform measures, hoping to achieve a comprehensive improvement in bank performance through practical optimization measures.Therefore, this paper mainly based on the above research status, further to the listed commercial banks corporate governance, executive compensation and bank performance correlation.Based on the theoretical basis of the research on corporate governance and executive compensation of commercial banks at home and abroad, this paper designs the research hypotheses, and then takes the relevant data indicators of listed commercial banks in China as the research variables.Through descriptive statistical analysis, correlation analysis and linear regression analysis, this paper makes a comprehensive and systematic analysis of the economic correlation among corporate governance, executive compensation and bank performance.The empirical results show that there is a significant correlation between the proportion of independent directors and bank performance, while there is no significant correlation between the proportion of board members holding shares and bank performance.There is a significant correlation between the nature of the first major shareholder and bank performance, a significant negative correlation between equity concentration and bank performance, and a significant correlation between executive compensation and bank performance.There is a significant correlation between the proportion of senior management ownership and bank performance.This paper has a deeper understanding of the important role of corporate governance and executive compensation for the development and performance improvement of commercial banks, and also recognizes the existing governance structure and executive compensation system of listed commercial banks in China.Therefore, the improvement measures of optimization and improvement are put forward to the unreasonable points.
【學位授予單位】：吉林財經大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F271;F272.92;F830.42

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本文編號：1753028