本文選題：保薦信用監(jiān)管處罰　切入點：聲譽機制　出處：《安徽工業(yè)大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：保薦人制度的推行是新股發(fā)行制度的重大變革(陳冬華,2009)。保薦人的行為舉動關(guān)系到IPO企業(yè)、投資者及各個利益相關(guān)者的利益,甚至是關(guān)系到金融市場的長期穩(wěn)定發(fā)展,可以說具有“牽一發(fā)而動全身”的關(guān)鍵作用。然而,保薦人制度實施至今十余年來,在一片溢美聲中,憂思之語也不絕于耳�，F(xiàn)實中接連發(fā)生的“光大證券風(fēng)波”、“萬福生科”財務(wù)造假事件等保薦人丑聞事件頻頻曝光,也將保薦人制度推向風(fēng)口浪尖,保薦人“合謀造假”“只薦不�！钡臉�(biāo)簽也將公眾關(guān)注的焦點拉回至審視承銷商聲譽及證監(jiān)會證券監(jiān)管處罰的效率效果上來(章鐵生,2016)。在證監(jiān)會保薦信用監(jiān)管處罰的約束機制下,承銷商聲譽機制如何運行,以及會給保薦人的經(jīng)濟行為帶來怎樣的影響呢?本文的研究思路是:首先,探究證監(jiān)會的保薦信用監(jiān)管處罰對保薦人市場份額的影響。受到證監(jiān)會保薦信用監(jiān)管處罰的保薦人之后年份市場份額相比于未受到證監(jiān)會保薦信用監(jiān)管處罰的保薦人市場份額會顯著下降。在此基礎(chǔ)之上,考察受到證監(jiān)會保薦信用監(jiān)管處罰的保薦人在之后年份保薦業(yè)務(wù)中所作出的努力,發(fā)現(xiàn)相比于未受到保薦信用監(jiān)管處罰的保薦人,受到保薦信用監(jiān)管處罰的保薦人IPO抑價會顯著降低。最后,考察受到證監(jiān)會信用監(jiān)管處罰的保薦人謹(jǐn)慎執(zhí)業(yè),降低IPO抑價的行為是否能夠使其市場份額恢復(fù),從而恢復(fù)其受損聲譽。本文以2005-2015年保薦人及其保薦上市的IPO企業(yè)為研究樣本,通過對比IPO抑價程度檢驗受到證監(jiān)會信用監(jiān)管處罰的保薦人在聲譽恢復(fù)中做出的努力,發(fā)現(xiàn)受到證監(jiān)會信用監(jiān)管處罰的保薦人在IPO定價上更為謹(jǐn)慎,IPO抑價程度更低;本文進(jìn)一步檢驗了受到證監(jiān)會信用監(jiān)管處罰的保薦人為修復(fù)受損聲譽做出努力的動力機制,發(fā)現(xiàn)相比于未受到證監(jiān)會保薦信用監(jiān)管處罰的保薦人,受到證監(jiān)會保薦信用監(jiān)管處罰的保薦人在之后年份市場份額會顯著下降,但在做出恢復(fù)聲譽的努力后,市場份額有所回升,尤其是對于規(guī)模較大的保薦人其努力成效更為明顯。本文的研究發(fā)現(xiàn)對于完善保薦人信用監(jiān)管制度,發(fā)揮聲譽機制規(guī)范保薦人行為,提高資本市場資源配置效率及金融市場健康穩(wěn)定運行具有一定的借鑒意義。
[Abstract]:The implementation of the sponsor system is a major change in the IPO system (Chen Donghua, 2009). The sponsor's behavior related to IPO companies, investors and other stakeholders, even in relation to the financial market's long-term stable development, can be said to have a key role of "domino". However, since ten years of the implementation of the sponsor system, in a spill in the language of Bel, and also occurred in reality can be heard without end. "Everbright Securities storm", "Edmond branch of financial fraud scandal frequently sponsors events such as exposure, will also sponsor system to sponsor" fraud conspiracy "in the teeth of the storm," not only recommended protection the label will also be the focus of public attention back to examine the reputation of underwriters and the Securities Regulatory Commission punishment efficiency effect (Zhang Tiesheng, 2016). The Commission sponsor credit supervision punishment The constraint mechanism, how to run the underwriter reputation mechanism, and how to bring the impact to the economic behavior of sponsors? The idea of this paper is: firstly, explore the impact of the Commission's regulatory penalties on the sponsor sponsor credit market share. By the Commission sponsor credit supervision punishment after years of market share compared to sponsor to by the Commission sponsor creditsupervision punishment sponsor market share will decline significantly. On the basis of investigation by the Commission sponsor credit supervision punishment after year to sponsor sponsor business efforts, found that compared to the sponsor credit supervision has not been punished by the sponsor, the sponsor sponsor creditsupervision punishment IPO underpricing significantly reduced. Finally, investigation by the Commission Credit Regulatory penalties sponsor cautious practice, reduce the underpricing of IPO behavior is not able to The market share of recovery, so as to restore its reputation. The 2005-2015 year sponsor and sponsor IPO enterprises listed as the research sample, by comparing the IPO underpricing Inspection Commission credit supervision punishment by sponsors in reputation restoration efforts, found by the Commission Credit Regulatory penalties sponsor in IPO pricing more cautious, IPO underpricing is lower; the further inspection by the Commission regulation of credit punishment mechanism to make the sponsor for the repair of damaged reputation, not by the Commission found that compared to the sponsor credit supervision punishment by the Commission sponsor, sponsor creditsupervision penalty sponsor will significantly decrease the market share in the year after. But in making efforts to restore his reputation after the market rebounded, especially for larger sponsors of their efforts more clearly The findings of this research. To improve the sponsor credit supervision system, develop the reputation mechanism to regulate the behavior of the sponsor, has a certain significance to improve the efficiency of capital market allocation of resources and financial market healthy and stable operation.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：安徽工業(yè)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F832.51

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