本文選題：環(huán)境規(guī)制　切入點(diǎn)：地方政府競(jìng)爭　出處：《中國礦業(yè)大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：在全球經(jīng)濟(jì)體密切聯(lián)系、區(qū)域經(jīng)濟(jì)一體化發(fā)展不斷加快的宏觀大背景下,外商直接投資對(duì)我國的經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展產(chǎn)生著深遠(yuǎn)的影響,成為我國經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展的重要推動(dòng)力。近年來在科學(xué)發(fā)展觀的指導(dǎo)下,我國政府更加注重經(jīng)濟(jì)與環(huán)境協(xié)調(diào)發(fā)展,強(qiáng)調(diào)生態(tài)環(huán)境保護(hù)在社會(huì)經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展中的重要地位,環(huán)境保護(hù)政策逐年嚴(yán)格化。然而嚴(yán)格的環(huán)境規(guī)制政策會(huì)增加企業(yè)的生產(chǎn)經(jīng)營成本,在很大程度上影響著外資企業(yè)的區(qū)位選擇。在中國財(cái)政分權(quán)與政治集權(quán)的制度框架下,以經(jīng)濟(jì)增長為核心的政績考核機(jī)制促使地方政府間展開了激烈的引資競(jìng)爭,其中,通過競(jìng)相降低環(huán)境標(biāo)準(zhǔn)以吸引外商資本流入是典型的手段之一。地方政府間環(huán)境規(guī)制惡性競(jìng)爭的行為非常不利于我國生態(tài)文明建設(shè)和可持續(xù)經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展。針對(duì)上述情況,本文首先闡述了環(huán)境規(guī)制對(duì)FDI區(qū)位選擇的作用機(jī)制;然后分別運(yùn)用博弈論和社會(huì)網(wǎng)絡(luò)分析法從理論和實(shí)證兩方面分析了地方政府間環(huán)境規(guī)制競(jìng)爭機(jī)理;最后在以上理論框架的基礎(chǔ)上,選用2000-2014年省際面板數(shù)據(jù)實(shí)證研究我國地方政府環(huán)境規(guī)制競(jìng)爭對(duì)外商直接投資區(qū)位選擇的影響。研究結(jié)果顯示:(1)放松環(huán)境規(guī)制能夠顯著增加一個(gè)地區(qū)FDI的流入,各地方政府出于轄區(qū)利益最大化的目標(biāo),有動(dòng)機(jī)降低環(huán)境規(guī)制水平以吸引FDI流入;(2)地方政府之間的環(huán)境政策博弈的確存在著“逐底競(jìng)爭”的特征,環(huán)境規(guī)制成為地方政府間爭奪經(jīng)濟(jì)增長的博弈工具;(3)外商直接投資具有地區(qū)集聚效應(yīng),外商直接投資企業(yè)傾向于選擇基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施和工業(yè)配套程度較好、外資企業(yè)集中的地區(qū)。然而,當(dāng)一個(gè)區(qū)域內(nèi)經(jīng)濟(jì)資源稀缺或有限時(shí),地區(qū)間便會(huì)展開爭奪FDI的競(jìng)爭。在以上實(shí)證研究結(jié)論的基礎(chǔ)上,本文結(jié)合中國的國情提出了相應(yīng)的對(duì)策建議,以期優(yōu)化我國外商投資結(jié)構(gòu),匡正我國地方政府間的競(jìng)爭行為,建立區(qū)域合作發(fā)展、互利共贏的機(jī)制,實(shí)現(xiàn)我國國民經(jīng)濟(jì)持續(xù)健康穩(wěn)定發(fā)展。
[Abstract]:Under the background of the close relationship between the global economy and the accelerating development of regional economic integration, foreign direct investment (FDI) has a profound impact on the economic development of our country. In recent years, under the guidance of the scientific concept of development, our government has paid more attention to the coordinated development of economy and environment, and emphasized the important position of ecological environment protection in the social and economic development. The environmental protection policy becomes more and more strict year by year. However, strict environmental regulation policy will increase the cost of production and operation of enterprises, and to a great extent affect the location choice of foreign-funded enterprises. Under the framework of fiscal decentralization and political centralization in China, The performance assessment mechanism, which takes economic growth as the core, has prompted fierce competition among local governments to attract investment, among which, It is one of the typical means to attract foreign capital inflow by competing to lower environmental standards. The vicious competition behavior of environmental regulation among local governments is very harmful to the construction of ecological civilization and sustainable economic development in China. This paper first expounds the mechanism of environmental regulation on FDI location choice, and then analyzes the mechanism of environmental regulation competition between local governments from two aspects of theory and demonstration, using game theory and social network analysis method, respectively. Finally, on the basis of the above theoretical framework, Using the provincial panel data from 2000 to 2014 to study the impact of local government environmental regulation competition on FDI location selection, the results show that the relaxation of environmental regulation can significantly increase the inflow of FDI in a region. In order to maximize the interests of local governments, local governments are motivated to reduce the level of environmental regulation in order to attract FDI into the local government.) the "bottom-by-bottom competition" does exist in the environmental policy game among local governments. Environmental regulation has become a game tool for local governments to compete for economic growth. Foreign direct investment (FDI) has the effect of regional agglomeration. Foreign direct investment enterprises tend to choose infrastructure and industry supporting degree better. However, when the economic resources in a region are scarce or limited, there will be competition between regions for FDI. According to the situation of China, this paper puts forward the corresponding countermeasures and suggestions in order to optimize the structure of foreign investment in China, correct the competitive behavior among local governments in China, and establish a mechanism of regional cooperation and development, mutual benefit and win-win. To achieve sustained, healthy and stable development of our national economy.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：中國礦業(yè)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：D630;F832.6

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