發(fā)布時間：2018-03-02 03:19

  本文關(guān)鍵詞： 混合主體多樣性 混合主體深入性 高管激勵 公司價值 調(diào)節(jié)作用　出處：《云南財經(jīng)大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：2013年黨的十八屆三中全會通過了《中共中央關(guān)于全面深化改革若干重大問題的決定》,該文件的發(fā)布將混合所有制經(jīng)濟的發(fā)展規(guī)劃提到“以公有制為主體、多種所有制經(jīng)濟共同發(fā)展”這一中國基本經(jīng)濟制度的重要實現(xiàn)形式的高度。中國企業(yè)改革進程的逐漸推進,使混合所有制已經(jīng)在中國達到了良好的發(fā)展態(tài)勢。截至2014年底,混合所有企業(yè)從2000年的7.21萬戶增至17.14萬戶�；旌纤兄聘母锏纳罨M一步引起公司內(nèi)部結(jié)構(gòu)的調(diào)整,高管激勵機制及激勵效率也會隨之發(fā)生相應(yīng)的變化,在混合所有制的影響下,即不同主體之間的混合方式以及不同的融合深入程度下,高管激勵對公司價值的影響存在差異。本文旨在研究混合所有制改革對高管激勵與公司價值之間關(guān)系的影響,選取2006-2014年期間實際控制人為國有的A股上市公司為樣本,構(gòu)建模型并回歸,得出以下四個結(jié)論:第一,混合主體多樣性在高管激勵與公司價值之間發(fā)揮正向的調(diào)節(jié)作用,即,混合主體越多樣,高管薪酬和高管持股越能有效促進公司價值的提升;第二,混合主體深入性在高管激勵與公司價值之間所發(fā)揮的調(diào)節(jié)作用呈現(xiàn)倒“U”型,即,混合主體融合的深入程度并不是越深越好,而是在一定范圍內(nèi),混合主體深入性發(fā)揮正向的調(diào)節(jié)作用,超過一定范圍后,混合主體深入性將發(fā)揮負向的調(diào)節(jié)作用,并且混合主體深入性在高管薪酬與公司價值之間發(fā)揮調(diào)節(jié)作用的最優(yōu)區(qū)間是15%-40%,在高管持股與公司價值之間發(fā)揮調(diào)節(jié)作用的最優(yōu)區(qū)間是25%-60%;第三,國有持股比例越高的公司實行混合所有制改革,混合主體多樣性在高管激勵與公司價值之間發(fā)揮的調(diào)節(jié)作用越大。綜合以上分析,提出相關(guān)的政策建議如下:一是在混改進程中應(yīng)該引入多樣化的混合主體;二是掌握好混合主體融合的深入程度,合理配置非國有混合主體的資本比例;三是繼續(xù)全面加強混合所有制的改革力度;四是降低政府對混合所有制企業(yè)的干預(yù)程度;五是選擇與自身混合特點相契合的激勵方式。
[Abstract]:In 2013, the third Plenary session of the 18 CPC Central Committee adopted the "decision of the CPC Central Committee on comprehensively deepening several important issues of Reform." the release of the document referred to the development plan of the mixed ownership economy as "public ownership as the main body." The common development of multi-ownership economy "is the height of the important realization form of China's basic economic system. With the gradual advancement of the process of enterprise reform in China, mixed ownership has reached a good development trend in China." as of end of 2014, The number of mixed enterprises increased from 72,100 households to 171,400 households in 2000. The deepening of the reform of mixed ownership will further adjust the internal structure of the company, and the incentive mechanism and efficiency of executives will change accordingly. Under the influence of mixed ownership, that is, the way of mixing between different subjects and the different degree of integration, The purpose of this paper is to study the influence of mixed ownership reform on the relationship between executive incentive and corporate value. The following four conclusions are drawn: first, the diversity of mixed agents plays a positive role in regulating the relationship between executive incentives and corporate value, that is, the more diverse the mixed agents, the more diverse they are. The more effective the executive compensation and stock ownership can promote the promotion of corporate value; second, the depth of the mixed subject plays a regulatory role between executive incentive and corporate value, that is, The deeper degree of fusion is not the deeper the better, but in a certain range, the depth of the mixed subject plays a positive regulatory role, beyond a certain range, the depth of the mixed subject will play a negative regulatory role. And the optimal range between executive compensation and company value is 15-40, and the optimal interval between executive stock holding and company value is 25-60th; third, The higher the proportion of state-owned stock is, the more mixed ownership reform is implemented, and the more the diversity of mixed agents plays an important role in regulating the relationship between executive incentive and corporate value. The relevant policy suggestions are as follows: first, the introduction of diversified mixed agents in the process of mixing and reform, second, the better understanding of the depth of integration of mixed agents, and the rational allocation of capital ratio of non-state-owned mixed agents; Third, we should continue to strengthen the reform of mixed ownership in an all-round way; fourth, reduce the degree of government intervention in mixed ownership enterprises; fifthly, choose the incentive mode that is compatible with its own mixed characteristics.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：云南財經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F275;F832.51

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